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The Bloody Sunday Tribunal of Inquiry - A Report by Professor Dermot Walsh for the Bloody Sunday Trust {part 2}


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Text: Prof. Dermot Walsh ... Page Compiled: Fionnuala McKenna
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Truth


Importance of Truth
The search for the truth lies at the very heart of the inquisitorial approach. Accordingly, the primary task of the Widgery Tribunal of Inquiry was to investigate and make a determination on what actually happened at the time and place in question. It was no part of the Tribunal's role to make a determination in favour of one side or the other. Its function was to gather the evidence relevant to what happened on that day and to use it to make a determination of the truth. The vital objective of satisfying the public that the full facts of what happened on Bloody Sunday had been established rested on the shoulders of the Tribunal. Only after the full facts had been established would it be possible to identify what needed to be done to restore public confidence in the Army and the State.


Conflict of Evidence
One of the most striking features about the Tribunal proceedings was the extent of the conflict between the evidence of Army witnesses on the one side and that of civilians and journalists on the other. Broadly speaking it would be fair to say that the evidence of the civilians and journalists was to the effect that the Army had opened fire on unarmed civilians in circumstances where the lives of soldiers were not seriously threatened. The evidence from Army sources was largely to the effect that a legitimate and necessary decision was taken to effect an arrest operation against rioters, and that individual soldiers opened fire only where they had identified a gunman or bomber who was threatening their lives or the lives of their comrades. Of course, this conflict was evident in the immediate aftermath of the shootings and it was a significant factor in prompting the decision to set up the Tribunal of Inquiry. The fundamental task of the Tribunal was to determine objectively and authoritatively where the truth lay among these conflicting versions.


Looking at only Part of the Picture
There are two prominent and related features of the Tribunal's Report which suggest that the Tribunal did not ascertain fully what happened with respect to the events within its terms of reference. First, the Report does not offer an analysis of each of the shots fired by each of the soldiers. Second it approached its findings from the perspective that the single most important issue which it had to determine was who fired first. Each of these points will be considered in turn. A third and separate point concerns the fact that the Tribunal actually refused to consider a substantial body of witness statements that had been gathered by a body sympathetic to the interests of the deceased and injured. This will be considered below immediately after the first two points.


An Analysis of Each Shot
The Tribunal Report does not offer an analysis of the circumstances in which each shot was fired by each soldier. In so far as the firing by each soldier was analysed at all in the Report, it was done indirectly pursuant to an examination of the issue of who fired first and the circumstances in which each of the deceased were shot dead. This was supplemented by a superficial and generalised discussion of whether the soldiers were justified in firing. The result was a finding that: "..in the majority of cases the soldier gave an explanation which, if true, justified his action" and that "..in general the accounts given by the soldiers of the circumstances in which they fired and the reasons why they did so were, in my opinion, truthful." The Report does not support these findings with an analysis of the evidence which it accepted and rejected in each individual case. Nor does it even clearly identify and substantiate the minority of cases in which it felt that the soldiers were not justified in shooting or those cases in which it felt the soldiers were not telling the truth. It does say that the shots which killed the four men in Glenfada/Abbey Park were fired without justification. However, it makes no attempt to place these in a different category from any of the shots that were fired by the soldiers in the Park. Since no less than 42% of the 108 shots fired by the Army were fired in that Park, the Tribunal's finding that the majority of the firing by the soldiers was justified has a very hollow ring about it. Indeed, it can even be said that it is downright misleading.

Not only is this whole approach likely to convey an incomplete and possibly an inaccurate picture about the full circumstances in which the deceased were shot, but it fails to deliver a full account of the events which led to the deaths that afternoon. With the exception of John Johnson and Damien Donaghy it does not even provide an account of the circumstances in which each of the wounded came to be shot. Similarly it fails to address those instances in which shots were fired which cannot be attributed to any of the known deaths. Indeed, it is doubtful that the analysis of the circumstances in which each of the victims were shot dead conveys much useful information about the conduct of the soldiers in firing.

The forensic evidence with respect to the 13 deaths was such that it was possible to match up an individual soldier with a specific fatal shooting in only two instances. For each of the remainder the Tribunal attempted to identify the soldier or soldiers responsible by considering: the evidence of each soldier about his location(s) and the circumstances in which he fired each shot, civilian and material evidence about where and how each victim was shot dead and medical evidence about the wounds suffered by each such victim. In a few cases the Tribunal felt that it could identify the soldier responsible with a degree of confidence. For the rest, however, it could do no more than identify several soldiers, any one or more of whom could have been responsible.

In order to identify the soldier(s) responsible in each individual case, the Tribunal began by using the medical evidence to chart the likely line of fire of the fatal bullet(s). It then examined the soldiers' evidence concerning the time and location of the instances in which they fired bullets and their description of their target(s). By matching up the medical evidence and the actual description of the victim with the soldiers' accounts, the Tribunal sought to identify the soldier(s) who was most likely to have fired the fatal shot(s) in each case. In each case the Tribunal scanned the evidence of the soldier(s) concerned for his account of firing the shot(s) that is most likely to have killed the victim. Incredibly, the Tribunal Report makes no attempt to examine each shot in the context of all the shots fired by the soldier concerned. Equally, it makes no attempt to examine the fatal shootings in the context of the woundings.

As a result of this peculiar approach, the Report puts more focus on the movements of the victims immediately prior to their deaths than on the conduct of the soldiers in firing that afternoon. It fails to offer a complete picture of the circumstances in which each soldier fired each shot. This is particularly disappointing because the Tribunal actually received a very large body of evidence covering the circumstances in which each shot was fired. This evidence included oral evidence given during the Tribunal sessions, statement evidence given to the Treasury Solicitors and statements from the soldiers to the Military Police. Significantly, many of the soldiers who gave evidence about firing at, and hitting, targets described those targets in terms that could not be matched with any of the known dead and injured. This, of course, seriously undermines the value of the Tribunal's approach in focusing on which soldier killed which victim. At the very least, it could be expected that the Tribunal would use the evidence available to it to present an analysis of the circumstances in which each soldier fired and the Tribunal's findings with respect to the same. Such analysis and findings are central to the whole object in appointing the Tribunal. The public concern which led to the appointment of the Tribunal was evoked by the widespread feeling that soldiers may have fired without justification at unarmed civilians, killing and wounding 26. This concern could not be assuaged by a Report which deliberately omits to address each instance in which each soldier fired, and which fails to make reasoned findings as best it can on whether each soldier was justified in his actions. Generalisations are simply not good enough, especially when they are not based on a full and transparent analysis of the evidence.

Interestingly, two early drafts of sections of the Report drawn up by the Secretary to the Tribunal (see later) did attempt to address all the shots fired by each soldier in turn. These sections are missing from the published version. It follows, therefore, that the Tribunal was at least aware of the importance of considering the overall conduct of each soldier who fired shots, including the circumstances in which he came to fire each shot. At some point, however, a deliberate decision was taken to omit that vital aspect from the Report. It is not immediately apparent why the Tribunal would have wanted to omit this material. The drafts drawn up by the Secretary were actually quite sparse and did little more than offer a potted version of the explanations given by the soldiers concerned.


The "most important single issue"
The second related point which suggests that the Tribunal's Report may not offer a complete picture of the events which led to the deaths that afternoon concerns the question of "who fired first?" In its report the Tribunal describes this question as "probably the most important single issue" which the Inquiry has to determine. The Tribunal did not actually explain why it considered this to be the single most important issue. However, it clearly implied that it was vital in apportioning responsibility for the deaths and injuries suffered that day.

Undoubtedly, the question of who fired first is relevant to an objective and complete determination of the events that led to the deaths that afternoon. Moreover, if all the shots fired that afternoon were fired in the context of a pitched battle between the Army and a unit of the IRA then it may well have been the single most important issue. However, there is no suggestion that all the shots were fired in these circumstances. The reality is that at least 21 soldiers fired at least 108 shots in the ten minute period at different locations that afternoon. According to the soldiers' versions they fired at 40 identified targets. The mere fact (which is disputed) that the first shots were fired at the Army does not offer a general justification for the shots fired by each soldier over the next ten minutes. Certainly, the legality of each soldier's actions would have to be established individually on the basis of what each saw and believed when he opened fire The key task for the Tribunal, therefore, was to determine whether each individual soldier was justified in firing each individual shot. Instead of discharging this critical task the Tribunal contented itself with general findings about the soldiers' actions which were heavily coloured by its perception of what was the single most important issue which the Inquiry had to determine.


The Missing Statements
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association collected over 700 statements from witnesses in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday. These were delivered to the Treasury Solicitor's Office in London on 3 March 1972, although they were not referred to Lord Widgery until 9 March 1972. Commenting on these statements in a memorandum (dated 10.3.72) the Secretary to the Tribunal said:

"It is likely however that had these statements been received at an earlier stage the Treasury Solicitor would have thought it worthwhile to take statements with a view to the writers giving evidence "
According to the same memorandum it seems that Lord Widgery was not prepared to call any of the witnesses to make formal statements. He considered that the statements were submitted at a late stage in order to cause him maximum embarrassment. Lord Widgery did, however, read fifteen statements which counsel for the Tribunal thought worthwhile to draw to his attention. Nevertheless, he refused to call these witnesses to make statements on the ground that they could not "bring any new element to the proceedings of the Tribunal." Counsel for the Tribunal subsequently advised Lord Widgery that he would like to see four of these statements given in evidence bearing on the deaths of three of the deceased. He advised that at least two of these statements were likely to be more reliable than evidence already presented to the Tribunal on these matters by another witness (Miss Richmond). The memorandum records, incredibly, that the Lord Chief Justice still refused to budge. The Secretary proceeded to advise Lord Widgery:
"It is important that the LCJ's report should not include references to the deaths of these four (sic) men which could be criticised as contradicted by evidence which was available to the Tribunal but not considered by it. If the Chief refers for example to Miss Richmond's evidence he will need also to refer to having seen statements which present another possibly more reliable account of the same events ."
Interestingly, in the Report itself, Lord Widgery did refer to the evidence of Miss Richmond and did refer to the statement of another person which he preferred, namely Sean McDermott.[15] Since Mr McDermott was not called as a witness during the proceedings, it would seem reasonable to conclude that his was one of the statements that counsel for the Tribunal wished to have called. In any event it is apparent that Lord Widgery preferred the statement of a witness who was never called to appear at the Tribunal over a witness who was both examined and cross-examined during the Tribunal's proceedings.

The Secretary also claimed in the memorandum that he advised Lord Widgery on the desirability of taking evidence from at least a few of these potential witnesses in order to avoid subsequent heavy criticism. He further described how Lord Widgery intended to deal with the issue in his Report as follows:

"He was quite prepared to say in the report that the Tribunal had taken note of all the statements, on the basis that they had all been inspected by Counsel for the Tribunal or by Treasury Solicitor's officers. Indeed, in the last resort he was prepared to read them all himself, though Mr Stocker assured him that this was not necessary."
Interestingly, the Report states:
"The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association collected a large number of statements from people in Londonderry said to be willing to give evidence. These statements reached me at an advanced stage in the Inquiry. In so far as they contained new material I have made use of them."[16]
In the light of the Secretary's Memorandum and the Tribunal Report itself, however, it would appear that Lord Widgery only made use of one statement, namely that from Sean McDermott. Moreover, there must be a strong suspicion that this was done to satisfy the Secretary's misgivings about referring to the evidence of Miss Richmond without disclosing that the Tribunal had seen statements that presented a different and probably more reliable account of the incident in question.

This cavalier attitude to a very substantial body of evidence critical of the Army reflects poorly on the manner in which the Tribunal approached and discharged its task. A Tribunal appointed under the 1921 Act is expected to adopt a positive and inquisitive attitude to digging out the truth. Effectively dumping a whole body of relevant evidence that had been painstakingly put together hardly fulfils that expectation. The excuse of the lateness of the hour in which the statements were produced is weak. They were produced just ten days after the first day of the Tribunal proceedings. If the work of the Tribunal was considerably advanced by this stage, that is more a reflection of the inappropriate haste at which it was conducting its business. In any event, a Tribunal appointed under the 1921 Act should not refuse to hear relevant evidence simply because it was submitted late in the proceedings. Even if it is accepted that the Tribunal counsel and Treasury Solicitors adequately vetted the material, the fact remains that they considered some of the statements highly pertinent in the light of other evidence that had been received by the Tribunal. The failure to have all of these particular statements considered publicly by the Tribunal cannot be excused because the Tribunal chairman considered them in private and concluded that they added nothing new. If they contradicted evidence already given in public, they should at least have been scrutinised in public.

Inevitably the Tribunal's refusal to call any of these witnesses must fuel the suspicion that it was looking at only part of the picture. The part presumed missing was associated with the deceased and injured. This, in turn, is likely to raise suspicions of bias (see later). If the Tribunal Secretary's memorandum is accurate on this point, then it must also be said that these suspicions will be fanned even further by the very clumsy and misleading attempt by the Tribunal to conceal the fact that it did not make any substantial use of the statements.


Reliance on Army Evidence
The conflict between the testimony of Army witnesses on the one hand and that of civilians and journalists on the other was a recurrent theme throughout the inquiry. The resolution of this conflict lay at the very heart of the inquiry. The Tribunal Report, however, discloses that this conflict was not resolved categorically one way or the other. Indeed, nowhere does the Report confidently identify any witness or group of witnesses as offering false testimony. The closest that it came in this regard was when it implied that the evidence of one or two soldiers might not have been wholly truthful. Occasionally it also expressed a preference for the evidence of one witness over that of another. Almost invariably, however, it accepted that witnesses were doing their best to be truthful.

Given the fact that the Tribunal was not able to conclude that the evidence given against the Army had been discredited, it is astounding that the Report discloses a finding against the Army on only one occasion, namely the deaths in Glenfada/Abbey Park. On every other issue, even where independent evidence was seriously damaging to the Army case, the Tribunal came out in favour of the Army explanation. The contents of the order to commence the arrest operation is a case in point. The allegation against the Army on this point was that only C Company was ordered to go in and conduct a limited arrest operation on foot around the junction of William Street and Little James Street. In the event, Support Company also entered in vehicles penetrating right down Rossville Street and into Glenfada/Abbey Park and Rossville Flats. In oral evidence the senior Army officers concerned denied that there had been any breach of orders, despite the fact that the Brigade Log clearly recorded that only one sub-unit, namely C Company, was ordered to go in, and that it was specifically directed "not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street". Moreover, the evidence of Superintendent Lagan supported the allegation that Support Company had acted in breach of orders. The Tribunal, however, resolved this very important conflict by accepting the sworn evidence of the Army witnesses. It dealt with the awkward Brigade Log record by concluding that the Log keeper had made a mistake in making the relevant entry. The fact that the Brigade Order also specifically stated that any arrest operation was to be conducted on foot in the William Street/Little James Street area was quietly ignored.

This exceptionally sympathetic hearing for Army testimony is carried through to the determination of the circumstances in which the first shots were fired in Rossville Flats and to the conduct of the soldiers generally in firing lead bullets. The Tribunal Report describes the issue of who fired first in the courtyard of Rossville Flats as "probably the most important single issue" which the Inquiry has to determine.[17] It follows that the manner in which the conflicting evidence on this issue was resolved was of the utmost importance in the context of the Report as a whole. The Tribunal's conclusions in favour of the Army version are reported as follows

"I am entirely satisfied that the first firing in the courtyard was directed at the soldiers. Such a conclusion is not reached by counting heads or by selecting one particular witness as truthful in preference to another. It is a conclusion gradually built up over many days of listening to evidence and watching the demeanour of witnesses under cross-examination. It does not mean that witnesses who spoke in the opposite sense were not doing their best to be truthful. On the contrary I was much impressed by the care with which many of them, particularly the newspaper reporters, television men and photographers, gave evidence. Notwithstanding the opinion of Sergeant O I do not think that the initial firing from the Flats was particularly heavy and much of it may have been ill-directed fire from pistols and like weapons. The soldiers' response was immediate and members of the crowd running away in fear at the soldiers' presence understandably might fail to appreciate that the initial bursts had come from the direction of the Flats. The photographs already referred to in paragraph 7 confirm that the soldiers' initial action was to make arrests and there was no reason why they should have suddenly desisted and begun to shoot unless they had come under fire themselves. If the soldiers are wrong they were parties in a lying conspiracy which must have come to light in the rigorous cross-examination to which they were subject."[18]
This quotation is particularly significant in that it identifies all the factors which enabled the Tribunal to be "entirely satisfied" that the Army did not fire first. Clearly, the key factor is the Tribunal's complete acceptance of the soldiers' version of events. This acceptance, however, is based only partly on the soldiers' performance in the witness box. Disturbingly, the Tribunal also finds support for its conclusion in the notion that the soldiers would not have ceased the arrest operation and opened fire if they had not been shot at first. Reliance on this notion is disturbing because it is the very allegation which the Tribunal is supposed to be examining. Instead of examining it objectively in the light of all the evidence, the Tribunal actually treats it as confirmation of its finding that the Army did not open fire without proper justification.

In a similar vein is the fact that the Tribunal finds support in the notion that if the soldiers' evidence is not truthful they were engaged in a lying conspiracy which would have come to light under cross-examination. The Tribunal might just as easily have concluded that if the civilian witnesses and journalists were not telling the truth then they were engaged in a lying conspiracy which would have been exposed under cross-examination. The naivety of the Tribunal in this matter is exposed, of course, by events since Bloody Sunday which strongly suggest that cross-examination is not always an effective tool to expose witnesses being less than truthful in combination in the witness box. It is also worth mentioning at this point that, as will be seen later, virtually all of the soldiers concerned had made statements shortly after the shootings which did not accord in many material respects with the evidence that they gave to the Tribunal. Had these earlier statements been available to counsel for the deceased then it is reasonable to assume that their cross-examination would have been much more damaging. The earlier statements were known to counsel for the Tribunal, but inexplicably they were not used to conduct a damaging cross-examination of the soldiers. In these circumstances it was, to say the least, disingenuous of the Tribunal to consider the soldiers' performance under cross-examination as corroborative of the truth of their evidence.

In the light of the large body of civilian and independent evidence in conflict with the Army version, one might have expected the Tribunal to express at least some doubts or uncertainty about who fired first. Once again, however, the awkward evidence which contradicts the Army version is explained away as being mistaken. It is difficult to accept, however, that so many civilians and independent journalists could all have reached the same mistaken conclusion about the same incident based on their own independent powers of observation. To remain "entirely satisfied" about the Army version in the face of such a large body of evidence to the contrary from independent persons who were "doing their best to be truthful" discloses an exceptional degree of confidence in the honesty and reliability of the Army witnesses.

The extent to which the Tribunal places its confidence in the Army version is evident again later in the Report. When discussing generally whether the soldiers were justified in firing that afternoon the Report states:

"Those accustomed to listening to witnesses could not fail to be impressed by the demeanour of the soldiers of 1 Para. They gave their evidence with confidence and without hesitation or prevarication and withstood a rigorous cross-examination without contradicting themselves or each other. With one or two exceptions I accept that they were telling the truth as they remembered it."[19]
The Tribunal went on to conclude that "in general the accounts given by the soldiers of the circumstances in which they fired and the reasons why they did so were ... truthful." Significantly, in considering this issue, the Tribunal did not examine on a case by case basis the circumstances in which each soldier fired each shot. Nor did it even bother to refer to the evidence of civilians and independent witnesses. Once again, the concealment of the discrepancies between the accounts given by the soldiers in their earlier statements and the accounts they gave in evidence is pertinent. However, before coming to the nature and extent of these discrepancies, it is worth noting several aspects of the soldiers' evidence presented to the Tribunal which, in themselves, raise serious doubts over the credibility of that evidence.

The most obvious problem is the fact that in most cases there are no dead and wounded to correlate with the accounts given by the soldiers to the Tribunal. That in itself raises a huge doubt over the reliability of their evidence. This doubt is accentuated by the fact that there is virtually a complete lack of physical, photographic and video evidence to support the soldiers claims that the persons they shot were in possession of guns and bombs and their accounts of the nature and level of hostile shooting and bombing. It is also worth noting that there is no evidence of any civilian or military casualties from sources other than the Army. Indeed, the evidence of the soldiers regularly depicted an unreal picture of civilians engaging in suicidal behaviour by picking up guns and bombs dropped by the gummen and bombers on being shot. Given the overwhelming risk to life inherent in such actions, the Army accounts must be treated with the greatest scepticism.

Given these aspects of the soldiers' evidence it is difficult to understand Lord Widgery's reliance on it throughout his Report, particularly in the face of credible and reliable evidence to the contrary from independent witnesses. When the conflict between the soldiers' original statements and the evidence they offered to the Tribunal is thrown into the equation, Lord Widgery's confidence becomes simply untenable.


Soldiers' Statements
It is to be expected that the Tribunal of Inquiry will accept and act upon Army testimony where it is satisfied that that testimony is credible and reliable. By the same token, however, it is to be expected that the Tribunal will equally accept and act upon civilian testimony which is found to be credible and reliable. Where evidence from these respective sources conflict, despite appearing to be both credible and reliable, it is to be expected that the Tribunal will look to independent sources of evidence as a guide towards establishing the facts. A distinct weakness of the Widgery Tribunal's approach, however, is its tendency to cling stubbornly to Army testimony even where there is credible and reliable evidence to the contrary. Where this conflicting evidence is supported from independent sources, the Army version is still preferred. On occasions, particularly awkward evidence is explained away by hypothetical possibilities. It now seems that the Tribunal persisted with this exceptional reliance on Army testimony despite the fact that there were many significant conflicts between the accounts offered by the soldiers concerned in their statements on the night of 30/31 January and the evidence that those soldiers offered at the Tribunal hearings.

In the Summer of 1996 the embargo on a range of documents associated with the Widgery Tribunal of Inquiry was lifted (see earlier). This resulted in many of the statements made by soldiers to the Military Police on the night of 30/31 January 1972 becoming available for public inspection. In all there are 41 such statements. All of the soldiers who opened fire in Derry on the afternoon of 1972 made a statement to the Military Police that night. These statements are among those available for public inspection. In the course of the few days immediately after 30 January some of these soldiers made statements supplementary to their original statements. Of the 41 statements available for public inspection 13 are supplementaries (two from one soldier). Statements were also taken by the Treasury Solicitors from all soldiers who were subsequently called to give evidence to the Tribunal. Most of these were taken in early March. It is also apparent that many other soldiers and police personnel involved in the events of 30 January 1972 made statements to the Military Police on 30/31 January 1972. These, however, are not among those released by the Public Records Office. There must be a suspicion, therefore, that the documents were removed by the Home Office before the decision on public access was taken.

The partial release of these statements produced an additional and significant source of publicly available material on the circumstances surrounding the firing of each bullet on the afternoon of 30 January. With respect to each shooting incident, the actual evidence given to the Tribunal has now been supplemented by at least two statements from each of the soldiers who fired the shots; one made to the Military Police on the night of 30/31 January (plus supplementaries) and the other made to the Treasury Solicitors in early March for the purposes of the Tribunal proceedings. Significantly, counsel for the relatives did not have access to these statements. Now, however it is possible to compare the evidence given to the Tribunal by each soldier concerned with the statement made by that soldier on the night of 30/31 January 1972. If this comparison reveals serious and relevant discrepancies between the two, the trust that the Tribunal placed in the Army testimony will be very severely challenged. Given the extent to which the Inquiry's findings are dependant on the reliability and veracity of the soldiers' testimony, the unavoidable conclusion will be that the Inquiry's findings are fatally flawed.

Unfortunately for the Tribunal and for those who have placed their trust in the reliability of its findings an analysis of most of the soldiers' statements reveals very serious discrepancies between the accounts they gave to the Military Police and the accounts they gave to the Tribunal. Each soldier's account is considered in turn; a feature which is noticeably missing from the Tribunal's Report.


Soldiers A and B
Soldiers A and B were the first soldiers to open fire on alleged targets. They were stationed in a building on the corner of William Street and waste ground, A in an upper room and B in the ground floor. Both claimed in evidence that they saw two smoking objects flying past the building in which they were stationed and then heard two explosions which they presumed to be nail bombs. Both claimed that they identified a nail bomber. Both fired independently at this target, with A firing two shots and B firing three (while wearing his gas mask). B claimed that his target was always in his sights and that there was about eight people immediately behind the target. A, on the other hand, claimed that the target was darting in and out from the corner of a building at a different spot from that identified by B. Moreover, A did not see any other persons in the immediate vicinity. Despite these differences in their evidence to the Tribunal, both claimed to have shot and hit the same target, namely Damien Donaghy. Neither admitted to having shot John Johnson although it is clear that he was shot in the same incident. Significantly, A claims to have received orders to shoot from his platoon commander. B, on the other hand, shot without communicating with his commander even though he was in the same room. Another significant feature is that there is no record of this shooting in the Brigade Log. It follows that, contrary to established practice, it was not reported immediately after the event.

The Tribunal accepted that both Donaghy and Johnson were not throwing nail bombs and were innocent of any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it also accepted that both soldiers A and B honestly believed that they were firing at a man about to throw a nail bomb at them. In reaching this conclusion it also accepted that they believed that they had seen and heard nail bombs thrown in their vicinity, despite the fact that all non-soldier evidence was to the effect that there were no nail bombs thrown in the vicinity. The Tribunal made no attempt to determine how a second innocent man came to be shot when both soldiers apparently fired at and hit the same innocent target. Nor did it seriously address itself to the discrepancies between the soldiers' accounts of the firing, nor the admitted failure (in the case of soldier B) to report the presence of the nail bomber to his commander before firing or to report the firing immediately to base.

The statements made by A and B on the night of the firing differ from each other on some critical points, and A's statement differs in some vital respects from the account which he gave to the Tribunal. A's original account placed his target at a different spot from that in B's account. Also, A's original account described his target holding the alleged nail bomb in his right hand and striking it against the wall at which point it ignited. B's original account, by contrast, describes the target holding the bomb in his right hand and striking a fuse match against the wall with his left hand. Interestingly, in A's later statement to the Treasury Solicitors, he made two critical corrections to his original statement. The first changed the location of his target to bring it more into line with that of B's target. The second revised his description of the actions of the target in lighting the alleged nail bomb to make it identical to B's account. This correction was critical not just in order to make A's statement consistent with B's, but also because it was highly improbable as it stood. Nail bombs are not ignited by striking them against the wall. If all that A had seen was a man striking an object against the wall, he would hardly have been justified in shooting to kill that man.

The vital question, of course, is why A changed his account in these critical respects. Was it the result of mature reflection, or was it the result of advice that his account as it stood might not afford sufficient justification for his action given that two persons had been wounded and both were objectively innocent of any wrongdoing? An additional or alternative possibility might be a desire to avoid the difficulties that would arise from substantive differences between the accounts of A and B. Soldier A explained the correction of the bomber's location on the basis that the map he was using when he made his original statement was not sufficiently detailed for him to pinpoint the position of the bomber exactly. He also claimed that his original hand-written statement had stated that the bomber had struck a fuse match against the wall with his left hand and brought it towards a round object (which he presumed to be a nail bomb) in his right hand. He suggested that a mistake must have been made in typing up his original hand-written version. It is not possible, of course, to reach any definitive conclusions on these issues. Given the manner in which the corrections were made, however, there is at least the appearance that soldier A was advised about the discrepancies between his statement and that of B either at or immediately before making his statement to the Treasury Solicitors. It is also worth emphasising that the critical differences between the original statements of A and B and those between A's original account and the evidence he gave to the Tribunal were not revealed during examination in chief nor probed during cross-examination. Counsel for the deceased would not have been aware of the contents of the statements made by the soldiers.


Soldier N
Soldier N was the commander of mortar platoon. His platoon was the first to debus in Rossville Street. Significantly he heard no shots at all until he fired himself. He claimed in evidence to the Tribunal that he fired three shots over the head of a crowd that was advancing threateningly towards him from an alleyway leading from Chamberlain Street. He described firing the first two of these shots into the wall of 13 Chamberlain Street at about two feet above head height, and the third into the East wall of 14 Chamberlain Street at head height. All three shots are significant for at least two reasons. First, there is a very strong case for believing that they are the first shots fired on Rossville Street. It is difficult to see how soldiers in any of the other vehicles would have had time to debus and commence making arrests before these shots were fired. If shots had been fired at the vehicles before the soldiers in any of the other vehicles had time to debus it is difficult to see how they would not have been seen or heard by soldier N. However, it is quite feasible that the three shots fired by Soldier N were heard by other soldiers who would not have immediately presumed that they came from an army source. Whatever, the correct explanation the Tribunal ignored the strong possibility that these shots were the first shots fired on Rossville Street when making its determination on who fired first.

The second significant feature about these shots was the fact that they were fired contrary to the terms of the "Yellow Card". The Tribunal did not attach much importance to the strict terms of the yellow card per se. It was more concerned to consider whether the soldiers had engaged collectively in undisciplined or unjustified shooting. In its brief consideration of the instances when warning shots were fired over the heads of a crowd it did not conclude that there were grounds for admonishing the soldiers concerned.[20] This position is particularly startling in N's case as he actually admitted in evidence to the Tribunal that one of the shots were fired at head height. Moreover, the evidence of a journalist who would have been in the immediate vicinity of the warning shots fired by N was to the effect that a bullet hit the wall just about 5 - 10 inches above his head. The timing and location of this incident suggests very strongly that this was one of the bullets fired by N. Incredibly, the Tribunal does not consider this aspect of N's warning shots at all. This omission is particularly significant not just because it suggests a reluctance to address seriously evidence of unacceptable conduct by individual soldiers, but also because shortly after firing these warning shots N claimed to have fired at and hit an alleged nail bomber.

N claimed that he spotted a person about to throw a smoking object which he took to be a nail bomb. He fired one shot at this person, hitting him in the leg. The victim staggered out of sight behind a wall. N did not see nor hear the alleged nail bomb explode. Since the Tribunal did not examine all the wounding cases (with the exceptions of Donaghy and Johnson) the propriety of N's actions in this matter was not considered.

There are some material discrepancies in the account given by N in his original statement and that offered to the Tribunal. In his original statement he claimed that he fired one shot high into the East wall of 14 Chamberlain Street and two high into the North Wall of 13 Chamberlain Street. This is the reverse order to that given in evidence to the Tribunal. The version given to the Tribunal appeared for the first time in the statement made to the Treasury Solicitors. The discrepancy was neither explained nor disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Strangely, he made an additional statement the next day in which he said that after firing the first shot he thought that his rifle had not recocked whereupon he ejected a live bullet before firing again. This meant that he used one more bullet than he had accounted for in his original statement. While this addendum does not disclose any impropriety when considered in isolation, it does nevertheless contribute to a general trend of soldiers making subsequent additions to their statements in order to make them more consistent with the facts and/or consistent with each other. Although soldier N did mention the ejection of the live bullet in evidence to the Tribunal, it was not disclosed that it was not contained in his original statement.


Rossville Flats Courtyard
The general thrust of the soldiers evidence relevant to their firing in and around the courtyard of Rossville Flats is to the effect that they came under sustained gunfire from several gunmen, nail-bombing from several nail bombers, acid bombs from the flats, at least one petrol bomb and other missiles. They claimed to have identified no less than six and possibly seven gunmen. Three soldiers fired at five and possibly six of these gunmen in all and claimed three and possibly four strikes. Two soldiers also claimed to have shot at two nail bombers and one petrol bomber, while one soldier claimed to have shot at one acid bomber.

It must be said at the outset immediately that the soldiers evidence on these matters lacks credibility. For a start, there was only one known casualty and his description and location of his shooting did not match any of the accounts given by the soldiers. Furthermore, there is no doubt that there was a large number of civilians running through the courtyard during these events. It is unlikely to say the least that gunmen and bombers could go into action with the ferocity alleged without inflicting a substantial number of casualties and without the civilians and journalists concerned being aware of it. In fact there was only one casualty and he was shot by the soldiers in circumstances where there was ample reliable civilian witnesses.

The evidence of the civilians and journalists was virtually unanimous in claiming that the soldiers chased the crowd into the courtyard of the flats and opened fire without any obvious or serious provocation. No-one (apart from the soldiers) saw anyone fire shots or throw nail, acid or petrol bombs. The veracity of the soldiers' allegations is seriously undermined by the fact that they are not supported by the independent sources of evidence. It is further undermined by the fact that it does not fit easily with the known facts. For example, no bodies or wounded were found at the spots where the soldiers claimed to have hit gunmen and bombers. None of the dead or wounded (wherever they were found) could be matched with the descriptions of the alleged gunmen and bombers that the soldiers claimed to have shot. The only person to have been shot dead in the courtyard was John Duddy. Neither the place at which he was shot nor his description match any of the victims the soldiers claim to have shot in the courtyard. Moreover, there is ample reliable evidence to establish that Duddy was shot dead while running away, along with many others, from the advancing soldiers. The forensic evidence establishes that there is no suspicion that he might have fired a gun or thrown a nail bomb. This is confirmed by all the witnesses to his shooting.

In the light of this evidence to the Inquiry one might have expected the Tribunal to conclude, at the very least, that no serious credibility could be attached to the Army evidence relevant to their firing in the courtyard. Incredibly, however, the Tribunal did not even examine the circumstances in which each individual soldier opened fire. Instead it attempted to determine who fired first and who shot John Duddy. Bizarrely, the Tribunal concluded that Duddy probably ran into the line of fire directed at a gunman or bomber. No attempt was made to determine where this gunman or bomber might have been, or exactly what evidence there was for his existence. Instead the Tribunal contented itself with a dubious finding that the Army were fired on first in the vicinity of the courtyard and that they returned aimed shots at identifiable targets (i.e. gunmen or bombers). The Tribunal did not examine on a case by case basis the evidence of each soldier who fired shots in the courtyard. It simply reached the general conclusion that the evidence of the soldiers as a whole was honest and reliable, and that they genuinely believed that they fired at legitimate targets in each instance. This was despite the fact that the Tribunal itself expressed doubts about soldier O's evidence on the severity of the hostile fire directed at the soldiers.

The failure of the Tribunal to examine the evidence of each of the soldiers on a case by base basis is a serious weakness in its procedure and raises substantial grounds for doubt over the credibility of its findings. These doubts are considerably enhanced by the discrepancies between the accounts given by the soldiers concerned in the their original statements and the evidence they offered to the Tribunal.

Soldier Q
Soldier Q was in Soldier N's platoon. In evidence he claimed to have heard shots about one minute after debussing, but he did not know where they came from or at whom they were fired. If these were not shots fired by the Army then his evidence on this point does not accord with N's. He claimed that he saw a person throwing what appeared to be nail bombs at soldiers. He thought they were nail bombs from their shape. He claimed further that one of them exploded and he shot the bomber as he was about to throw another. This other bomb rolled away without exploding. However, the Tribunal was not able to identify a victim that accords with Q's account. Moreover, none of the civilian witnesses or journalists saw a nail bomb explode in the courtyard.

In his original statement Q claimed that the person whom he shot was throwing nail bombs at soldiers taking cover at a military vehicle about 50 yards from the corner of Block 1. In evidence, however, he said that the person was throwing the bombs at soldiers at the entrance to Chamberlain Street. The version given in evidence first appeared in the statement given to the Treasury solicitors. No explanation was offered for the discrepancy, nor was it revealed during the Tribunal proceedings. One possible explanation for the change is that the soldiers sheltering behind the military vehicle would have been beyond the range of a bomber located at the position where Q claimed that the bomber was located. Accordingly, some alteration would have been necessary in order to protect Q's original account from being discredited under cross-examination.

In his original statement Q also said that the bomber had thrown only one nail bomb before he shot him, while in evidence he said that he had thrown several.

Soldier S
Soldier S was in N's vehicle. He claimed in evidence that they came under fire immediately they debussed. This plainly contradicts N's evidence. He took shelter at the back of the houses on Chamberlain Street. He spotted a gunman firing from between Blocks 1 and 2. He returned fire on four separate occasions, firing three shots on each occasion. He believed he struck his target twice, although it might not have been the same gunman on both occasions as he kept moving in and out of S's vision. The Tribunal was unable to identify any person who was killed or injured in circumstances which would have accorded with S's account.

There are several material discrepancies between S's original statement and the evidence he gave to the Tribunal. First, there is no mention of coming under fire immediately after debussing. Given N's evidence to the Tribunal this omission is particularly significant. It raises a serious issue over the credibility of S's evidence on this point to the Tribunal. His claim that they came under fire is first mentioned in S's statement to the Treasury Solicitors, but no explanation is offered as to why it was first disclosed at that point. Its absence from the original statement was not disclosed during the Tribunal's proceedings. It is worth recalling in this context that S's evidence was specifically cited (and presumably relied upon) during the Tribunal's consideration of the "vital issue" of who fired first.

Interestingly, S claimed in his original statement that he first cocked his weapon when he took up position at the back of Chamberlain Street. This would suggest that he did not come under fire immediately upon debussing. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor (and in evidence to the Tribunal), however, the original version changed to the effect that he cocked his weapon as soon as he came under fire, which in the context of this statement (and evidence) meant immediately after he debussed and before he took up position at the back of Chamberlain Street. It is difficult not to conclude that at some point after making his original statement a deliberate decision was taken to change the original version of events to include a false assertion that he came under fire immediately after debussing. The discrepancy about when he cocked his weapon was not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Second, he said in his original statement that a section of the crowd opened up to reveal the gunman and closed again immediately after S returned fire. S claimed that this pattern repeated itself on each of the four occasions on which he fired at the gunman's position. This account was not repeated in evidence. It is almost inconceivable that unarmed civilians would repeatedly put themselves in the line of fire between a soldier and a gunman, particularly in these circumstances where it was generally agreed that the crowd was trying to escape through the alleyways between the flats. No explanation was offered for why S's evidence on this point should have changed from his original statement. One obvious possibility is that he was advised that it was barely credible as it stood and that it would probably come under attack for that reason at the Tribunal. The discrepancy between S's original statement and his evidence on this point was not disclosed during the Tribunal's proceedings.

Third, in his original statement he claimed that nail bombs and acid bombs were raining down from the flats, while in evidence to the Tribunal he only mentioned the acid bombs. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors he claimed he admitted that his earlier claim about nail bombs raining down from the flats was not correct. He explained the discrepancy rather weakly by saying that he heard distant bangs and assumed that they were nail bombs. Neither the alteration nor the explanation was disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

It is also worth mentioning in this context that after making his original statement on 30/31 January, S made a further statement on 4 February. It is not entirely clear why he made this additional statement because it relates not to any action he took himself, but to the actions of soldier O. In it he claimed that he saw a gunman open fire from a ground floor window in the flats and he saw O engage this gunman. Oddly, O's version of this incident differs in some material respects. S also claimed in the additional statement that he saw nail bombs and acid bombs being dropped from the flats. In fact he specifically mentioned seeing five nail bombs. This claim is made a full four days after his original statement. Given that S subsequently admitted to the Treasury Solicitors that he did not see any nail bombs, a serious doubt is obviously raised over the truthfulness of his evidence generally. Nevertheless, these facts concerning the nail bombs were never disclosed to counsel for the relatives, nor were they adverted to during the Tribunal proceedings.

Fourth, in his original statement S claimed that the shots fired at him by the gunman between Blocks 1 and 2 passed about 5 - 10 metres from him and struck the wall about 50 metres behind him. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors his version altered to the effect that the shots hit the wall about 5 - 10 metres behind him. Once again, this discrepancy was not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier V
Soldier V was in N's vehicle. In his evidence to the Tribunal he claimed that he heard two explosions before debussing with S. He heard and saw rifle fire landing near them just after debussing. His evidence on both these points is obviously not supported by N's and it does not accord fully with S's. V fired one shot at a person who was about to throw a petrol bomb with a lit fuse. He hit his target and spotted the fuse burning some distance away. He assumed that the person concerned had thrown the bomb and that the fuse had become detached. The circumstances of the shooting and the description of the victim as given by V could not be matched up with any of the casualties.

V claimed that after shooting the bomber he took up position behind S at the back of Chamberlain Street. This is strange because in evidence S said that a gunman fired shots at him which struck the wall behind him. V did not report seeing or hearing these shots. Moreover, S did not report seeing V firing at the alleged petrol bomber. The evidence of S and V also conflicts on the issue of the numbers and movement of people in the immediate vicinity. Further, more serious problems with V's evidence are exposed when it is compared with his original statement to the Military Police.

In his original statement V said that he saw a person throw a bottle with a fuse attached to it. He saw the bottle hit the ground, but it did not explode. V then fired one shot at him. On the basis of this statement there are grounds for charging V with murder or attempted murder depending on whether his target was killed or not. It is highly significant, therefore, that the version given in evidence had changed substantially. In evidence he claimed to have fired as the bomber was about to throw. This difference would make a charge of murder or attempted murder much more difficult to sustain. The difference first appeared in V's statement to the Treasury Solicitors, but no explanation was offered apart from his assertion that the version he gave to the Treasury Solicitors was correct. Once again the change was not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings. It is difficult to believe that such a critical change was merely the product of V recalling the sequence of events more accurately at a later date. There must at least be a suspicion that he was advised to revise his original version in order to protect himself against the threat of criminal proceedings.

There are other discrepancies between V's original statement and the account he offered in evidence. In the former he claimed that he heard two explosions as he debussed. In evidence he said that he heard these before he debussed. In his statement he said that the rioters threw petrol bombs and acid bombs. In evidence he mentioned only one petrol bomb and made no mention of acid bombs being thrown. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors he admitted that he had not seen any petrol bombs thrown. However, he did not offer any explanation for his earlier statement to the contrary. Furthermore, in his original statement V said that firing was directed at them from several different directions. He did not make this claim in evidence.

Taking all these discrepancies into account, including the disparities between his evidence and that of others such as S and N, it would be difficult to place much trust in V's evidence.

Soldier O
Soldier O was in the second vehicle of N's platoon. In his evidence he said that he did not hear any shots on debussing. However, after he began to make arrests he claimed that they came under fire from four or five different positions in the flats. He claimed that about 80 - 100 shots were fired at them in a very short space of time. It was the most intense he had ever experienced over a few minutes. O claimed that he fired three shots at a man firing a pistol from behind a car parked in the forecourt of the flats. He claimed that he missed with his first shot and struck with the other two. The gunman was carried away by three or four men and a Knight of Malta. O then saw a gunman on the lower catwalk between Blocks 2 and 3. He fired three shots at him. The first one missed and he hit the target with the next two. The gunman was dragged away by people on the balcony. A few minutes later he fired two shots at a gunman between Blocks 2 and 3, but he does not know if he scored a hit.

The reliability of O's evidence is suspect in at least two important respects without ever having to compare it with his original statement. First, his account of the intensity of the hostile firing in the forecourt was so far-fetched that the Tribunal itself felt the need expressly to discount it.[21] Second, his account of the circumstances in which he shot his victims did not accord with the circumstances in which any of the dead or wounded were hit. The significance of these points is enhanced by the many discrepancies between the account given in his original statement and that given in evidence.

In his original statement he made no claim that the hostile firing was the most intense that he had ever experienced. He also said that he was at the rear of the Miliary Vehicle when the firing started, while in evidence he said that he was returning to it. In the original statement he said he fired two shots at the gunman on the catwalk, while in evidence he said it was three. He corrected his original statement on this point the next day by making an additional statement. However, he did not explain why he did not mention firing the three shots in his original statement. In his original statement he said that he did not see the gunman on the catwalk after he had shot him, but he saw people moving along the catwalk dragging something before they disappeared and reappeared shortly afterwards at ground level. In evidence, however, he said that he saw people drag the body of the gunman into the cover of an archway and made no mention of them reappearing at ground level. In his original statement he claimed that they came under attack from several acid bombs and petrol bombs. In evidence, however, he said that he saw only one acid bomb and did not mention seeing any petrol bombs. In his original statement he made no mention of giving a order to shoot anyone who threw acid bombs from the flats. In evidence he claimed that he did give this order.

None of these discrepancies were disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

It is also worth noting that O's weapon was cocked from the time they left Little James Street. He claimed that N gave them permission to cock their weapons at this point. This suggests that the soldiers were expecting to engage gunmen even before they moved through the barriers.

Soldier R
Soldier R was in the second vehicle of N's platoon. He debussed in the company of soldiers O and T. He claimed in evidence to have heard one or two explosions shortly after debussing. As they moved into the forecourt of Rossville Flats he claimed that they came under intense firing from around the Flats. He claimed that he spotted a man about to throw a lighted nail bomb. He shot the man and the bomb dropped to his feet but did not explode. Then he was splashed by one of two acid bombs thrown from the Flats, but he did not seek immediate medical attention. He saw O fire at a man at a car in the carpark. Then he saw a man between Blocks 2 and 3 fire a pistol. He returned three shots but did not know if he hit the target.

There are problems with R's evidence as given to the Tribunal. His claim about coming under intense fire as they advanced into the forecourt raises the question of why the soldiers should have continued to advance in such circumstances. It also suffers from the weakness common to other such evidence, namely that no civilian or military casualties resulted from the allegedly intense firing despite the fact that it supposedly occurred in a confined space where there were crowds of people milling around. His shooting of the alleged nail bomber provides yet another example of a lighted nail bomb failing to explode. Also, none of the victims match the circumstances in which R claims to have shot the nail bomber. Further weaknesses are exposed by a comparison of his original statement with his evidence to the Tribunal.

In his original statement he said that acid bombs were thrown at them, one of which "splattered" across his legs. In an additional statement made on 4 February this had changed to two bombs which actually "struck" him on the legs staining his denims. He also claimed in this statement that another soldier threw water over his legs to prevent him from being burned. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors he corrected this to the effect that the water was not thrown on him until later. In his original statement there was no mention of O firing at the gunman at the car. He did not mention this incident until the additional statement. It is also significant that in his statement to the Treasury Solicitors he corrected his position as described in his original statement in order to bring it into line with the positions of O and T. However, at no point in any of his statements did he mention T firing, or being ordered to fire, at the alleged acid bomber. He did however, make these assertions in his evidence. No explanation was offered for any of the discrepancies between R's statements and evidence or for any of the additions. Their existence was not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

It is also worth noting that in his evidence to the Tribunal, R claimed that he was always entitled to shoot when confronted by a gunman or bomber, even if there were innocent people in the background.

Soldier T
Soldier T was in the second vehicle in N's platoon. He debussed in the company of O and R. Unlike R, he did not hear or see any explosions or nail bombs on debussing. He claimed in evidence, however, that he was splashed by acid bombs thrown from the Flats. On orders from O he fired two shots at a person he claimed was about to throw an acid bomb, but did not claim a hit. His identification of the bomber was based on the fact that he had already seen him throw what he took to be an acid bomb on account of its colour. He fired at him when he saw him with another bottle in his hand. Even if T's account is true, it means that he fired in circumstances where the threat to life was highly speculative. There is also a significant difference in the account that he gave of this incident in his original statement.

In T's original statement he said that he took aim as the alleged bomber was bringing his arm back to throw the second bottle, and he fired just as the target let go. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitors this had changed to firing after the second bottle had been thrown and before it hit the ground. The second version allows T to claim that he had an opportunity (which was not present in the first version) to see the colour of the contents of the second bottle. No explanation was given for this change, nor was its existence disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Another significant feature about T's original statement was the fact that he did not mention any shots being fired after debussing. This, of course, conflicts with the accounts given by O and R. It is interesting, therefore, that by the time T came to make his statement to the Treasury Solicitors it included a claim that he heard a burst of gunfire after debussing. Once again, T's evidence about hearing the burst of gunfire was specifically cited (and presumably relied upon) during the Tribunal's consideration of the "vital issue" of who fired first. The Tribunal, however, clearly did not take into account that this vitally significant piece of evidence was not contained in T's original statement.


The Barricade Shootings
Eight of the deceased were shot at or around the barricade in Rossville Street. On the basis of the soldiers' evidence any of at least ten soldiers could have been responsible for one or more of these deaths. Only in the case of Michael Kelly was it established with certainty that soldier F fired the fatal shot.

In its assessment of the shootings at or around the barricade the Tribunal rejected the allegation that the soldiers had fired indiscriminately into the backs of a large crowd as it tried to scramble to safety across the barricade.[22] On the basis of eye-witness and forensic evidence there were grounds upon which the Tribunal could reasonably have come to this conclusion. However, that does not answer the question whether the soldiers were justified in firing at targets at or around the barricade and, in particular, at the victims who were shot dead. There is a very serious conflict in the evidence about the circumstances in which each of the victims were shot at the barricade. Each of the soldiers claimed that all their shots were aimed at persons who were firing guns or nail bombs or who were in possession of guns or nail bombs. All of the civilian and journalist witnesses claimed that they did not see anyone at the barricades with either guns or nail bombs. Those who actually saw individuals being shot denied that they were armed. There was no photographic evidence of anyone at the barricades possessing guns or nail bombs and no guns or nail bombs were recovered. With respect to some of the victims the forensic evidence held out the possibility that they might have either fired a gun or been in the immediate vicinity of the firing of a gun. However, the Tribunal accepted it was not strong enough to warrant a finding that any particular individual had fired a gun. There was no forensic evidence to suggest that any of the victims may have thrown a nail bomb.

In the light of this evidence presented to the Tribunal, it would have been very difficult for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the soldiers had fired with justification. Indeed, it is significant that at no point did the Tribunal make a specific finding about the propriety of the actions of the soldiers who were responsible for the deaths at or around the barricade. It contented itself with a finding that the soldiers had not fired into the backs of a fleeing crowd. When considering the circumstances in which each of the deceased had been shot, the Tribunal totally avoided making a finding on the propriety of the soldiers' action (with the possible exception of an expression of confidence in soldier K's evidence - on which see later). The Tribunal's failure to make any clear findings on this issue must be seen in the light of the fact that in some important respects the evidence of some soldiers did not always match with the evidence of other soldiers, and on some occasions did not match with the actual facts. This conflict and mismatch of evidence is disturbing given that the primary reason offered by the Tribunal generally for relying on the soldiers' evidence was the extent to which they impressed in the witness box by sticking to their version of events without contradicting themselves or each other while under cross examination. What is even more disturbing is the fact that the evidence of each of the soldiers who gave evidence about firing in the general direction of the barricade differed in some very material respects from the statements they gave to the Military Police on the night of 30/31 January. Not only were these serious discrepancies not disclosed to counsel for the deceased, but they were not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings. Had they been disclosed the cross examination of these soldiers might have taken a very different course, with all the implications that that would have for the Tribunal's declared confidence in the evidence of the soldiers concerned.

Soldier P
Soldier P was in the second vehicle of N's platoon. He debussed with a partner at the North end of Block 1 before the vehicle proceeded into the carpark at Rossville Flats. In evidence he claimed that they came under fire from the barricade on Rossville Street. He claimed that he saw a man at the barricade lighting a nail bomb in his left hand with a match in his right. He was unable to explain how the man actually lit the match. He fired two shots a him, missing with the first and hitting the target with the second. The bomb fell still fizzing at his feet but did not explode. The fact that the bomb did not explode (thereby providing objective evidence of P's account) is, of course, suspect. Further suspicion is raised by the fact that neither P nor his partner made any attempt at taking cover, despite the fact that they had supposedly come under fire. It is also significant that the partner was closer to the alleged bomber than P but did not take any evasive action.

Shortly after this P claimed that he fired four shots at a man behind the barricade who had a pistol. The first shot hit the barricade and the other three hit the target. If P's evidence is accurate, then the victim could be any one of those found dead at the barricade itself, with the exception of Michael Kelly. It is worth noting, however, that none of the victims behind the barricade suffered three bullet wounds.

Shortly after this, he claimed that he felt threatened by a crowd advancing towards him and he fired three shots over their heads. Such shots are, of course, not covered by the "Yellow Card". In any event, his account of this incident is highly improbable due to the fact that there were armed soldiers between him and the advancing crowd. Not only does this cast doubt on his claim to have felt threatened, but it is barely conceivable that an unarmed crowd would have advanced on a soldier who had just demonstrated his preparedness to shoot to kill and while there were other armed soldiers between the crowd and their object. It is also significant that no other soldier makes any reference to such an incident, or indeed to the existence of a crowd behaving in this fashion. The veracity of P's evidence is further called into question by the major discrepancies between it and the contents of his statement to the Military Police.

In his original statement P claimed that he had cocked his rifle before they actually went through the army barricade to conduct the arrest operation. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he corrected this to the moment of debussing on Rossville Street. He also said that all the soldiers had debussed from the vehicle at the same time, while in evidence he admitted that only some did. In his original statement he said that he operated with two partners, while in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he corrected this to one. In his original statement he placed the alleged nail bomber on the Army side of the Rossville Barricade while in evidence he said that he was on the opposite side. He also said that he fired while lying on the ground while in the statement to the Treasury Solicitor he changed this to kneeling. In the original statement he said that he saw the first shot hit the ground at the feet of the nail bomber, while in evidence he accepted that it could have gone on to Free Derry Corner. In his original statement he said that a crowd moved up and removed the body of the nail bomber, while in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he said that he did not actually see this happen.

Perhaps the most significant discrepancy arises from the fact that in his original statement he claims that he fired five shots over the heads of the crowd for the purpose of dispersing them. He changed the five to three in an additional statement made the next day. It was not until he made his statement to the Treasury Solicitor, however, that he changed his version to firing over their heads because he felt threatened by them. While this corrected version does not accord readily with the facts as described above, it serves to protect P against the allegation that his actions were reckless and undisciplined. There must be more than a suspicion that the change was made deliberately for this purpose. No explanation is given for this or any of the other changes from the version presented in P's original statement to the evidence he actually presented to the Tribunal. Nor were the discrepancies disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier U
Soldier U was in the second vehicle of N's platoon. It is very difficult to know what to make of his evidence as the accounts given in his original statement, his statement to the Treasury Solicitor and his evidence to the Tribunal all differ from each other in several material respects. In the light of this it is difficult to see how any serious credibility can be attached to his evidence.

In evidence he claimed that he heard a long burst of gunfire as his vehicle moved along Rossville Street. None of the other soldiers in the vehicle reported this. Moreover, it was not mentioned in his original statement. He said in evidence that he cocked his weapon after having delivered an arrested person to the arresting point. By contrast he claimed in his original statement that he cocked his weapon immediately on debussing. He said in evidence that he was fired at while bringing the arrested person in, while there is nothing about this in his original statement. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he claimed that he heard four or five shots as he went to arrest the rioter. There is nothing about this either in his original statement or in his evidence to the Tribunal. In his original statement he claimed that he came under fire while at the North end of Block 1 of Rossville Flats. This is not mentioned in his statement to the Treasury Solicitor nor in evidence to the Tribunal. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he said that he saw a soldier at the entrance to Rossville Flats firing at a gunman. This is not mentioned in his original statement nor in evidence to the Tribunal.

In evidence to the Tribunal U claimed that he saw a group of people on the other side of the barricade on Rossville Street. One of them had a pistol. U fired one shot at him and hit the target. This account was fairly consistent in all three stories.

Perhaps the most bizarre aspect of U's evidence concerned his claim of what happened to William Nash and Alexander Nash. In evidence he said that he saw both of them at the barricade. The former had a stomach wound and the latter was attending to him. As he watched he saw an arm holding a pistol emerge from a door in the Flats. Two shots were fired from this pistol. The first struck the ground in front of the barricade and ricocheted into Alexander Nash, wounding him in the shoulder. The second struck William Nash in the head. All of this is highly suspect. According to U none of the other soldiers in the vicinity of Kells Walk fired around this time. This, of course, creates a difficulty about how William Nash came to be wounded in the stomach in the first place. Much more problematic, however, is the fact that William Nash did not receive a bullet wound to the head at all. He was killed by a shot to the stomach.

The Tribunal nevertheless effectively accepted U's account by finding that Alexander Nash must have been shot by an unknown gunman behind the door in the Flats.[23] It supported this conclusion by medical evidence that suggested that the bullet which wounded Nash may have been a low velocity shot, such as that which would have been fired by a pistol. The bullet, of course, was not recovered and the medical evidence was based only the notion that an army bullet could normally be expected to cause more damage than was caused in fact to Nash's arm. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal ignored the fact that U's account was patently wrong as far as William Nash was concerned. The credibility of the Tribunal's conclusion is also seriously weakened by the other inconsistencies in U's accounts generally. In this respect it is worth noting that U did not even mention the incident in question in his original statement.

No explanation was ever given for the discrepancies in U's statements and evidence, nor was their existence disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier C
Soldier C was in the composite force (drawn from different platoons). At one point he took up position on a ramp leading up to the first balcony of Flats overlooking the barricade on Rossville Street. In evidence he claimed that he saw a man fire a shot from a doorway in Rossville Flats. The gunman reappeared and fired two more shots from an automatic weapon. C returned fire and hit his target. The weapon fell to the ground. Then he noticed a man firing shots from a pistol at an open window on the third floor of Rossville Flats. C returned one shot which missed. He was joined at that point by soldier D. The gunman reappeared and fired twice. C fired two shots at him and D fired one. The gunman was hit.

There were some minor discrepancies between this evidence and C's original statement. In the latter, for example, he claimed that he thought he hit the first gunman with his second shot. Also in his original statement he said that he saw a flash of light at the window where the second gunman was located. In the statement to the Treasury Solicitor he said that this was the flash of the window being opened, while in evidence he said that it was the flash of a weapon being fired. This has some significance in that there is compelling evidence that a reporter taking photographs from one of the windows was fired on.

The credibility of C's evidence was very severely undermined in cross examination. He had claimed in evidence that he had been lying down when he spotted and fired at the two gunmen. Counsel for the deceased produced compelling evidence to the effect that there was a three foot wall around the ramp where C was lying. The effect of this wall relative to where C was lying would have rendered it impossible for him to have seen the gunmen. Significantly, the model which the soldier had been looking at and the photographs which he had tendered in evidence did not reveal this wall. This raised the strong possibility that C was not where he claimed to be in evidence when he fired these shots. However, he persisted in his claim that he could see the gunmen over the wall and, bizarrely, the Tribunal seemed to accept his claim. Incredibly, the Tribunal did not commission an engineer's report of this wall and the effect it would have had on C's capacity to see the alleged gunmen from his lying down position. It was quite happy to accept C's word on the matter despite the fact that the compelling evidence to the contrary could easily have been checked.

D's evidence on the shooting at the second gunman conflicts in certain respects with C's evidence.

Soldier D
Soldier D was a member of the composite force. D's evidence was to the effect that he heard pistol fire and C returning fire. When he joined C at this point C told him that there was a gunman on the third floor of Rossville Flats. D fired on two occasions at this gunman and claimed that C fired only on the second occasion. This is a clear contradiction of C's account.

Soldier K
Soldier K was in the composite force. In evidence he claimed that he saw two men behind the barricade crawling in the direction of Rossville Flats. The one at the rear appeared to have something under his body which looked like a rifle. K fired one shot at him, as did soldiers L and M beside K. He was not sure if he hit his target. The man kept crawling until he reached the door of the Flats at which point he was dragged inside by others, as was the second man. In his original statement K said that he thought he may have hit the target although he did not observe a strike.

The Tribunal specifically praised the credibility and reliability of K's evidence.[24] Surprisingly, the Tribunal made no mention of the propriety of K firing at someone who only may have been carrying a rifle and who was not posing an immediate threat to anyone. It does not appear that any warning was shouted before K fired. In these circumstances there are grounds for arguing that the shooting was unjustifiable. At the very least the Tribunal could be expected to have considered further whether a warning should have been given before opening fire. It is worth noting in this context that K said in evidence that he did not hear any explosions at this time.

The full implications of the Tribunal's trust in K's evidence does not become immediately apparent until L and M's evidence is considered. If K's evidence is accepted as accurate then it poses some difficulties for that of L and M, and vice versa.

Soldier L
Soldier L was in the composite force. In his evidence he claimed that he saw two men behind the barricade crawling in the direction of Rossville Flats. The one in front had what appeared to be a rifle below his body (K said it was the one behind). L fired one shot and thought that he hit the target. The front man kept crawling and as the man behind him overtook him the rifle became clearly visible. L fired another shot and reckoned that he hit both men. He did not say anything about others dragging the two men into the Flats. However, he did say that a man came out of the Flats doorway and fired a few shots. Later another soldier warned him about a building at the other end of Kells Walk. He saw a man with a rifle at the building and fired two shots at him but did not think that he hit his target.

The comments made above with respect to K's shooting of the man behind the barricade also applies to L's shooting of both men behind the barricade. The conflict between his account of what happened and that of K's also raises some doubt about the reliability of their accounts. It is also worth noting that the independent and medical evidence suggests that only one man was shot while crawling behind the barricade in the direction of Rossville Flats. L's credibility is further called into question by the material discrepancies between his evidence and the account he gave in his original statement.

In his original statement L claimed that both men behind the barricade had a weapon underneath their bodies. Moreover, he claimed that he was ordered to fire. He also said that the second man reached the doorway and was pulled inside. He said nothing about a man coming out and firing a few shots. Furthermore, he also claimed that as they were withdrawing they were fired on from a side street off Rossville Street and he returned two shots. All of this is really quite different from the account he gave in evidence.

The credibility of L's evidence is even further undermined by the fact that his statement to the Treasury Solicitor differs in some material respects from both his original statement and his evidence. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he claimed that he had already shot the man crawling behind the barricade before he saw the second man crawling. He also said that the second took possession of the rifle left by the first man. Both of them managed to make it to the door but he reckoned that by the time the first man made it there he was dead. There was no mention of a man coming out and firing a few shots. He also said that K went into Glenfada Park. K did not say this in evidence and no-one else said that K went into Glenfada Park.

No explanation was offered for the discrepancies in L's statements, nor were they disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier M
Soldier M was a member of the composite force. In evidence he claimed that he saw two men behind the barricade crawling in the direction of Rossville Flats. Both had what appeared to be a weapon underneath their bodies. He fired one shot at the first man and struck his target. He then fired another shot at the second man and hit the target. He claimed that the first reached the door of the Flats and was dragged inside, while 10 -15 people came out and dragged the second man inside.

The comments made above with respect to K's evidence applies equally to M's. It is also worth noting that M's version differs in some important respects from both K's and L's. It is even more at odds with the independent evidence applicable to these events than is either L's or K's.

Ironically, M's account offered in his original statement does not differ materially from that given in evidence. However, in a bizarre twist he made a further statement on 4 February. This stated that as they moved along Kells walk they came under fire from Rossville Flats. He located the gunman on the top floor balcony of Flat 2. The gunman was engaged by another soldier whom he could not identify. M proceeded to say that he hit two gunmen during the action, but did not clarify whether these were the two he had already described in his original statement. If they were it is not entirely clear why it was necessary for M to make this further statement. To confuse matters further the statement is signed (in print) by soldier K although it purports to be M's statement.

No explanation was offered for these discrepancies, nor were they disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.


Glenfada/Abbey Park Shootings
Of all the shootings those in Glenfada/Abbey Park are probably the most controversial. Four civilians were shot dead and three were wounded. There is a compelling body of evidence to suggest that most, if not all, of those who were shot dead in the Park were unlawfully killed. The case against the army was strengthened considerably by the fact that the six soldiers who gave evidence about events in the Park offered versions which not only conflicted with civilian and independent evidence, but which also conflicted in many important respects with each other. In addition the evidence of at least one soldier (soldier H) was so bizarre that the Tribunal specifically singled it out as being unreliable.[25] It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the Tribunal should proceed to find that the shots which killed the four victims "were fired without justification."[26] However, a distinctly unsatisfactory aspect of this finding is the fact that it was made only on a balance of probability. The nature of the evidence offered was such that any impartial judicial body should have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the soldiers' firing in Glenfada/Abbey Park was unjustifiable. This is confirmed by the contents of the soldiers' original statements. The contents of the soldiers' evidence to the Tribunal coupled with a comparison between it and their original statements demonstrate beyond question that the evidence of the soldiers in question to the Tribunal was inherently unreliable.

Soldier E
Soldier E was in the anti-tank platoon. In evidence he claimed that he heard firing from Rossville Flats after debussing on Rossville Street. He said that he spotted a gunman at the window of one of the Flats and fired one round at him. Later, he saw a crowd move from the barricade into Glenfada Park. On his own initiative he proceeded into the Park (taking about 4 others with him) to arrest them. In the Park one of the crowd threw a petrol bomb. When he went to throw a nail bomb E fired two shots at him. The first one missed and the second hit the target. The nail bomb exploded. Under cross-examination he claimed that a second nail bomb had been thrown and landed shortly in front of him. It also exploded. He saw two other persons fall, but does not know how they were hit. The crowd was still aggressive. He and his colleagues moved forward and arrested about 30 of them.

E's account of what happened in Glenfada Park differs substantially from that of his colleagues (none of whom gave similar versions). Moreover, The platoon commander, Lieutenant 119 claimed, not only to have given the order to go into Glenfada Park, but to have followed his men in. E's account of the nail bombs exploding is not supported by any evidence of injury or damage from the explosions. Further discrepancies are evident from his original statement.

In his original statement he claimed that the crowd in Glenfada bombarded them with petrol bombs and nail bombs. In his evidence he mentioned only one of the former and two of the latter. In the statement he said that he saw the rioter light a nail bomb before throwing it in his direction, while in evidence he said that he did not see him lighting it. Also in his statement he said that he saw the other two rioters fall before he fired, while in evidence he said that they fell after he fired. He did not mention anything about the arrests in his original statement. No explanation is offered for these discrepancies, nor are they disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier F
Soldier F was in the second vehicle of the anti-tank platoon. In evidence he said that he heard shooting from Rossville Flats on debussing. He also saw two explosions about 40 yards in front of the barricade. He saw a person about to throw a nail bomb from the barricade. He fired one shot at the bomber and hit his target. He then saw a man with a rifle go from the barricade with a group of others into Glenfada Park. On the orders of E, both he and G went into Glenfada Park to intercept them. On entering he saw a group of three persons, one of whom was about to throw a nail bomb. He fired two shots at the bomber and hit his target. The bomb fell at the bomber's feet and did not explode. Then he went to the corner of the Park to investigate firing which he heard from the direction of Rossville Flats. He fired two shots at a gunman between the Flats and Joseph Place. He hit his target. He then spotted about 20 people huddled together at the wall. He arrested them and withdrew back to his vehicle on Rossville Street. The radio operator at the vehicle said that he saw a gunman at a window on the second floor of the Rossville Flats. F got out and fired three shots at a movement which he took to be a rifle at the window in question. He moved forward to the front of the vehicle and fired three shots at a gunman with a weapon sticking out of the adjacent window. He then saw a gunman at a window on the top floor and fired two rounds at him.

F's evidence about what happened in Glenfada Park differs substantially from that of his colleagues (none of whom gave similar versions). He also claims that he went in on the orders of E although Lieutenant 119 claims to have given the order. A particular feature of F's evidence is the admission in his evidence to the Tribunal that his original version of events had been quite different in some respects. In particular, he admitted that he forgot to mention having shot dead the alleged gunman between Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. This omission can only be described as bizarre. A further twist is that he originally accounted for the two shots expended on the gunman by adding them to the shots he fired at the alleged gunmen at the windows of Rossville Flats. This, of course, severely undermines the credibility of his evidence about these alleged gunmen. In any event, on the basis of the accounts given by F to the Tribunal it is apparent that there are grounds for concluding that F was not firing at clearly identifiable, legitimate targets. Whatever credibility remained of F's evidence must surely have been extinguished by some further bizarre contradictions between the contents of his original statement and the version he gave in evidence.

In his original statement he claimed that he heard shots from a window in Rossville Flats before going into Glenfada Park. Incredibly, he fired three shots at the window where he estimated that the shots had come. In other words he fired without having a clearly identifiable target. There is no mention at all of this incident in his evidence. One can only assume that it relates to one of the incidents in which he fired at a window after coming out of Glenfada Park. Either way, the admitted circumstances of the firing are a clear and reckless breach of all rules governing the discharge of firearms. Equally strange is the absence of any reference in the original statement to the shooting of the nail bomber at the barricade. Even when he made an additional statement later there was no mention of shooting the nail bomber at the barricade. This did not appear until his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

In his original statement he claimed that 30 to 40 rioters went from the barricade into Glenfada. There is no mention of this in his evidence. He said that he shot the nail bomber in the Park while there was a riot going on. There was no mention of this riot in his additional statement. He also said that after shooting the nail bomber in the Park he advanced towards the rioters and they scattered. There is no mention of this in his evidence. As described above he made no mention in his original statement of shooting the alleged gunman between Rossville Flats and Joseph Place. Even when he made his additional statement there was no mention of this shooting. It did not appear until his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

In his original statement he gave an even more incriminating version of shooting at alleged gunmen at the windows of Rossville Flats. On the first such shooting F claimed that something moved at a window which the radio operator had identified and he fired four shots at it.

Finally it is worth noting that the positions marked on the map showing where F fired from are totally at odds with his evidence. He claimed that he was able to correct these positions with the benefit of aerial photography. It should also be said that F is one of the few soldiers for whom it was necessary to make an almost complete second statement to the Military Police. The credibility of his evidence is not helped much by the fact that even this second statement does not accord with his evidence. His second statement is actually signed (in print) soldier G, but presumably this is a misprint.

Not all of the serious discrepancies in F's statements were disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings. It is worth noting in particular that those which suggest that F fired recklessly and without lawful authority were not disclosed.

Soldier G
Soldier G was a member of the anti-tank platoon and was F's partner. He claimed in evidence that after debussing and taking cover beside a wall at Kells Walk he heard someone shout that there was a gunman down an alley. He looked down the alley and saw a man dodging from side to side and carrying what appeared to be a weapon of some sort. G immediately fired two shots at him but did not hit his target. After going into Glenfada he saw two gunmen at the south west corner. He immediately fired three shots at one of them. Both fell. He assumed that F, who had fired beside him, had shot the second. A crowd ran past and picked up the weapons. After returning to his vehicle on Rossville Street the driver reported shots being fired from a window in Rossville Flats. G saw the window move and shots come from it. He fired back at someone who moved at the window.

G's evidence about events in Glenfada Park differs in material respects from the versions given by his colleagues (none of which are similar). He accepted in evidence that there was a difference in his recollection of events in Glenfada Park and that of F. He claimed that he first realised this when they discussed the events afterwards. It was also disclosed during his evidence that he had earlier claimed that the person he had shot was throwing a nail bomb. He claimed in evidence that he did not know how this had come about as he did not remember making that statement. There was also a significant difference in his account of firing at the window in Rossville Flats and F's account of firing at the same window. However, when counsel for the deceased attempted to pursue the difference in cross-examination, Lord Widgery cut it short on the basis that it was not possible to establish that both were talking about the same window, despite the fact that both had clearly described the same window.

It is also worth noting that when G fired at the man down the alleyway his life or safety was not in immediate danger, he had not clearly established that the man was carrying a gun and he did not shout any warning. Similarly, on his own evidence, it appeared that the two alleged gunmen in Glenfada Park were not immediately threatening his life or that of his colleagues. Nevertheless, he fired without shouting a warning. In such circumstances a charge of murder or attempted murder is appropriate.

In his original statement he claimed that he fired at the alleged gunman up the alley in order to give cover to a colleague who was running across open ground. There was no mention of this in evidence and it must be said that it is difficult to see how the alleged gunman could have been posing any threat to his colleague in the immediate circumstances. In his original statement he said that after shooting the alleged gunmen in Glenfada Park he and F gave chase to the others who had picked up the weapons. Then they were recalled. Once they had returned they found that prisoners had been taken. There was no mention of any of this in his evidence. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor G said that he went down the western side of the Park and F went down the eastern side. For the first time he also said that he saw F fire shots at a gunman. Contrary to what he said in his original statement G also said that F arrested about 20 civilians just before he joined him.

Bizarrely, G made an additional statement the next day which totally contradicted his original description of the circumstances in which he shot the gunman in Glenfada Park. In the additional statement he claimed that the target was throwing nail bombs. As explained above G claimed in evidence that he does not remember making this claim.

It also appears that G made a further statement on 14 February. This statement does not appear to have been released for public inspection. In it, however, it appears that G claimed that he actually shot both gunmen and a third man who was throwing nail bombs. In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he confirmed that this statement of the 14th was read over to him before he signed it, however, he does not remember it reading as he is told it now does (i.e. that he shot all three). In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he claimed that he might have shot both gunmen and that F might have shot a third man. All this is totally bizarre and it is impossible to know what to make of it except, of course, that it renders G's evidence totally unreliable. Significantly these extraordinary circumstances were not disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.

Soldier H
Soldier H was a member of the anti-tank platoon. Of all the evidence given to the Tribunal his must rank as the most incredible, partly because it is so unbelievable and partly because his version of events changed so dramatically from his original version.

In his evidence H claimed that as he and his colleagues advanced towards the barricade on Rossville Street he saw two gunman at the barricade. He also saw a youth throw what looked like a nail bomb, but did not see it land nor hear it explode. He and his colleagues (F and G) chased the youths into Glenfada Park. Once they got into the Park he saw one of his colleagues firing. H spotted a youth about to throw an object which looked like a nail bomb even though it was not smoking or fizzing. H fired two shots in quick succession, the first one missing and the second one striking his target. The bomb fell to the ground and did not explode. Another youth ran forward and picked it up to throw it. H fired a shot at him and hit the youth who retreated apparently wounded in the shoulder. H then heard a shot and noticed the muzzle of a rifle sticking out of a frosted window of a flat at the southern end of the Park. He saw a silhouette behind the window. H claimed that he fired a total of 19 shots at this alleged gunman over a period of one and a half minutes, taking time to reload once. Each time he shot, the gunman stepped back out of view, but the muzzle did not move from the window. On the nineteenth shot the gunman fell, taking the muzzle with him. Incredibly, H claimed that the window did not shatter during this barrage so that he did not get a clear picture of the gunman.

H's evidence about what happened in Glenfada Park does not accord with any of the versions of his colleagues, all of which are different in material respects. In H's case, however, the evidence about firing the 19 shots is simply beyond belief. Indeed, the evidence shows that no window in Glenfada Park was hit 19 times. One window in the flat that H claimed to be firing at suffered one strike, and that was a clear glass window. The flat in question belonged to an elderly couple. The Tribunal specifically discounted H's evidence of these shots which meant, of course, that they must have been fired at one or more other targets and in different circumstances. However, the Tribunal did not proceed to make any findings as to what these targets or circumstances might have been.

H's evidence with respect to these 19 shots becomes even more bizarre when it is compared to the version he gave in his original statement. In this statement H described a virtual battle scene as the soldiers moved towards the barricade in Rossville Street. He said that they were continually fired at, stoned, nail-bombed and acid bombed. None of his colleagues described the scene in such dramatic terms and there is no photographic or other independent evidence to support this version. Indeed, he did not repeat it himself in evidence. After chasing the youths into Glenfada Park he saw them hiding behind a car. In evidence it was the soldiers (not the youths) who took up position behind this car. He saw three youths behind a wall. They had nail bombs. He fired at the middle youth while F and G fired at the other two. All three fell. Not only does this conflict with the versions given by F and G , but it also conflicts with the version H gave in evidence. In particular it is worth noting that in his original statement there was no suggestion that the youths were about to throw the nail bombs. Since no warning was shouted at them before they were shot, it would seem that H's original statement gives grounds for a charge of murder or attempted murder as the case may be. He then saw a fourth youth run forward and pick up an object dropped by one of the three youths and run away. F fired one shot at the youth and hit his target. In his evidence this changed to the effect that the youth was about to throw it. The difference is critical because the version given in the original statement affords grounds for a charge of murder or attempted murder as the case may be. It is also worth noting that H made a substantial amendment to his original statement, but repeated in it that the youths were merely carrying the nail bombs (i.e. were not in the act of throwing them) and he still did not mention that he thought the fourth youth was about to throw the bomb. These elements did not appear until he made his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

After shooting the fourth youth H claimed that the platoon commander appeared and examined the bodies and confirmed that they were dead. This does not appear in his evidence even though he persisted with it in his substantial amendment. He then claimed that he and his colleagues continued along Rossville Street (in evidence he said that they were in Glenfada Park) towards the barricade which they broke up. He then returned along Rossville Street in a military vehicle which came under fire from Flats extending east towards Chamberlain Street. He located the position of the gunman in a toilet window (about 1 foot square) and returned 19 shots at him. The bizarre feature about this is that it places H in a military vehicle in Rossville Street when he fired these shots. He changed this in his substantial amendment (and in his evidence) to locate the gunman in a toilet window in a flat on the southern end of Glenfada Park, and there was no mention of being in a military vehicle. In short, he was claiming in his original version that his firing of the 19 shots occurred in a totally different place and in very diferent circumstances from that in his later versions.

In the substantial amendment H placed himself and his colleagues behind the car behind which he had earlier placed the youths. His version of shooting the youths also differed. This time two of the youths had nail bombs. He fired at one of them and hit the target. His colleagues also fired and four youths were shot altogether. He then mentioned shooting the youth who picked up an object from the shot youths. This, of course, would make a fifth victim. He also mentioned that his colleagues were E, F and G. This is the first time that he mentioned E.

H's evidence clearly lacked any credibility and the Tribunal was surely correct to conclude that it could not accept his version of the 19 shots. The much more disturbing feature, however, is the fact that the huge conflicts in H's accounts were neither explained nor disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings. In his case the nature of the conflicts are particularly significant in that they raise the prospects that at least some of these shots may have killed or wounded some of the victims and that this may not even have happened in Glenfada Park at all. This, of course, would have profound implications for the Tribunal's strategy of attempting to match up each of the deceased with the soldiers' accounts of the shots that they fired. If there are at least 19 maverick shots floating about, it is difficult to see how the Tribunal could reach any sure conclusions on the circumstances of a fatal shooting based on a soldier's account unless there is very strong, independent corroborative evidence of that account. Nevertheless, the Tribunal was content simply to ignore H's evidence of the 19 shots and not consider any further its implications for the Army version of events in Glenfada Park and elsewhere.

Soldier J
Soldier J was a member of the anti-tank platoon. In evidence he said that after taking cover on Kells Walk some nail bombs were thrown and he heard one explode. As they moved towards the barricade on Rossville Street he saw a person at the barricade about to throw a fizzing object which he took to be a nail bomb. J fired one shot at him but did not think that he hit the target. The crowd behind the barricade began to split up into the side streets. More nail bombs were thrown. Two of these went off and about two did not. He spotted someone at Rossville Flats who had a fizzing object. J fired one shot at him but did not think he hit the target. Then he heard the platoon commander order them to go into Glenfada Park to make arrests. He heard an explosion as he went in behind F and G. He saw them fire at two persons holding metallic objects which he took to be nail bombs. Other civilians in the Park surrounded the bodies and must have picked up the nail bombs. He made two arrests and withdrew. Back at the vehicle he claimed that one of his colleagues returned fire at a gunman in Rossville Flats.

J's version of events as they approached Rossville is substantially exaggerated compared to that of most of the other soldiers. Moreover, there is no independent evidence to corroborate his allegation about the number of nail bombs which were thrown and exploded. His version of events in Glenfada Park differs in several material respects from those given by his colleagues, all of which actually differ from each other. A comparison of his evidence with the contents of his original statement discloses several serious discrepancies.

In his original statement he did not mention seeing or hearing any nail bombs explode. He also said that they were ordered into Glenfada Park to assist in escort duty for a number of youths who had been arrested. In his evidence this became to make arrests. He said that he did this and then withdrew from the Park. The most striking feature about this is that there is no reference to an explosion nor to F and G firing at two persons with nail bombs. Nor is there any reference to making arrests. Also absent is any reference to fire being returned by one of his colleagues at a gunman in Rossville Flats who had fired at their vehicle after they had returned from the Park. In a very confusing amendment made in February, he said that he saw two persons in possession of nail bombs after taking up position in the Park. These bombs did not go off and F and G fired at the persons holding them. He also mentioned the shooting at their vehicle when they returned from the Park. Once again, none of these bizarre alterations were either explained or disclosed during the Tribunal's proceedings.

Soldier 119
Soldier 119 was the platoon commander of the anti-tank platoon. Since he did not fire any shots it is likely that he did not make a statement on the night of 30/31 January. However, it appears that he did make a statement on 4 February which has not been released for public inspection.

In his evidence 119 said that they came under fire as they moved along Rossville Street. However, he did not report this on his radio and generally the credibility of his evidence on the firing was seriously undermined in cross examination. He claimed that he ordered two men into Glenfada Park to cut off gunmen. Under cross examination he said that he told them to take men with them. He followed them into the Park and admitted seeing E, F and G. Under cross examination he also claimed to have seen J. He saw F fire two shots but could not see the target. He saw three bodies on the ground but did not get a chance to examine them. He claimed that he did not report these three bodies because of communication difficulties on the radio, although he claims that an order to withdraw came across on the radio.

In his statement to the Treasury Solicitor he did not mention seeing G and J in the Park.

119's account of events surrounding the shootings in Glenfada Park conflict with the versions offered by the others involved. Indeed, when all the accounts are read as a whole one gets the distinct impression that 119 was not in control of events in the Park at all. There is a very strong likelihood that E, F, G and H were acting on their own initiative and that 119 was merely attempting to impart some legitimacy to their actions after the event.


Gerald Donaghy
A strange and disturbing sequel to the events in Glenfada/Abbey Park concerned the case of Gerald Donaghy. He was one of the persons shot dead in Glenfada/Abbey Park. He was examined shortly afterwards by Dr Swords who found that he was still alive and recommended that he be taken to hospital immediately. He was driven away in a car which was stopped at an Army checkpoint on Barrack Street at which point the Army took control of the car. Instead of being driven straight to the hospital he was driven to the Army medical post on nearby Craigavon Bridge. While there he was examined twice by an Army medical officer who pronounced him dead. Shortly after this examination and while Donaghy was still lying on the back seat of the car the nail bombs were found. There is a conflict over how they were found and, indeed, where they were found. The version that seems to have become established is that a nail bomb was found in each of the two breast pockets of his jacket and one in each of two front trouser pockets, making a total of four in all.

Counsel for the deceased suggested that these bombs had been planted on Donaghy. Certainly there was very strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that the bombs were not present until just before they were "found" on him. One of the bombs in his jacket was so tightly squeezed into the pocket that it had to be cut out. Moreover, his jeans were tight-fitting with the pockets opening to the front. Any bombs in these pockets would have been clearly visible. Indeed, when the first one was spotted it was actually sticking out of the top of his pocket. Nevertheless, they were not spotted by Dr Swords who examined him shortly after he was shot. It is worth noting here that Dr Swords actually searched his pockets for identification. They were also not spotted by the Army medical officer who examined the body twice, actually opening the front of the trousers in the process. There was also compelling evidence that the position of the body had been moved on the seat after the medical officer's last examination and the time when the bombs were first discovered. Finally, there was ample opportunity for the bombs to have been planted after the body had been examined by the medical officer and before the bombs were found. All in all the case for concluding that the bombs were planted seems more credible than the reverse.

Surprisingly, the Tribunal concluded that the bombs had been in Donaghy's pockets all the time.[27] This, of course, is a clear finding that Donaghy was guilty of a criminal offence. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the Tribunal should not have reached this categorical finding unless it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the bombs had been there all the time. Given the nature of the bombs and the nature of Donaghy's pockets, coupled with the evidence that the two doctors failed to notice the bombs during their three examinations would surely have raised more than a reasonable doubt. The Tribunal supported its positive finding with the argument that the evidence for planting the bombs was mere speculation. That in itself, however, does not mean that the only viable conclusion is that the bombs were there all the time. The onus is not on the defence to prove that they were planted, it is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were there all along.

The Tribunal's conclusions are rendered even more suspect by the fact that much of the Army and police evidence surrounding these bombs does not add up. In evidence, soldier 104 claimed that he saw the car at the Bridge Post with its boot opened and what might have been a policewoman looking into the boot. He looked through the window into the back seat and saw the deceased. He noticed a bulging object in a front pocket with a small bit sticking out at the top. Then he heard someone say that there were three nail bombs in the boot. It seems that he had made two statements about this event, but neither are available for public inspection. Nevertheless, he admitted in evidence that he originally gave a version about the location of the car which was mistaken. It also emerged from his statement to the Treasury Solicitor that in his original statement he said that he first saw the deceased when the car was stopped at the checkpoint on Barrack Street and that he saw the nail bomb sticking out of his pocket then. He corrected this in the statement to the Treasury Solicitor to the effect that he first saw the body at the Bridge checkpoint and that he did not know that the object sticking out of the pocket was a nail bomb until he heard someone else say that nail bombs were found in the boot. He was not able to explain the mistake. The most charitable interpretation that can be placed on all of this is that soldier 104's evidence is neither credible nor reliable.

Soldier 150 drove the car from the checkpoint on Barrack Street to the medical post on Craigavon Bridge. He looked into the back seat and saw the body of the deceased with a gunshot wound to the lower abdomen. Interestingly, the medical officer stated in evidence that he could not find the wound on the body despite examining it twice. Soldier 150 did not notice any nail bombs. He thought that the car was checked by the RUC after he had driven it to the Bridge.

PN7 was a sergeant in the RUC who checked the car at the bridge. He was not actually in charge at the Bridge, but his superior was not there when the car arrived and so PN7 took it upon himself to check for evidence of identity of the deceased. In checking for identification he went first for the trouser pocket and found a nail bomb. He immediately sent for an ATO who found three more nail bombs, one in the other trouser pocket and one in each of two breast pockets of the deceased's jacket.

An inexplicable aspect of PN7's evidence is the fact that he said that he never saw the medical officer who carried out the examination. This is peculiar because the medical officer is supposed to have carried out one examination followed by another after an interval. About five minutes after the examination was carried out the medical officer claimed that he heard someone say that nail bombs had been found on the body. PN7, however said in evidence that he saw the car being driven into the Post and he went out more or less immediately to investigate. It is worth noting that PN7's general duties in the RUC involved working with quarries and explosives, so he would have had access to explosives.

It is evident that there are some serious conflicts between the evidence of these Army and police witnesses. While they are not sufficient in themselves to raise a prima facie case that the bombs were planted, nevertheless they are sufficient to raise a suspicion. When this is combined with the fact that Donaghy's body had already been searched before it was put into the car the Tribunal's conclusion would seem to be unwarranted. At the very least one would have expected an impartial and objective Tribunal of Inquiry to have concluded that there was sufficient doubt about the evidence of the bombs being there all along to support a finding against Donaghy.


Other Shootings
There were a number of other army shootings in the Foyleside that afternoon. However, they did not involve the Parachute Regiment and they did not result in any identifiable victims. Despite the fact that oral and written evidence was submitted to the Tribunal concerning these shootings they do not form part of the Tribunal's Report. This must be considered a serious omission. In all of the instances the soldiers had engaged in hostile fire and in many instances claimed to have hit their targets. Their actions, therefore, were clearly relevant to the events that led to loss of life that afternoon. Moreover, the soldiers' claims to have hit targets coupled with the absence of any identifiable victims of their shootings, strike a clear parallel with a lot of the evidence given by the soldiers whose shootings were examined. The Tribunal's failure to examine these incidents must be interpreted as a clear dereliction of its duty. It was excluding incidents and evidence which were highly relevant to the events which it was established to examine.

Soldier Y
Soldier Y was located at a post in the Brandywell. In evidence he claimed that he came under fire from a gunman in bushes in the direction of Creggan Heights. He returned fire and saw the gunman fall back. There is no other evidence of a gunman having been killed or wounded at that location.

Soldier AA
Soldier AA was on duty at a checkpoint in Barrack Street. In evidence he claimed that he heard a single shot pass their position at 4pm. Some civilians told him about three gunmen behind the walls of Charlotte Place. As he moved along Charlotte Place to investigate, a gunman came round the corner of Columba's Walk and fired at him. He returned one shot from the hip to save his life, but did not strike his target. Then he came under fire from a "gun port" in a bricked up building. He saw the flash of the muzzle and the silhouette of the gunman. One of the shots went into the flakjacket of a soldier behind him. AA fired approximately three shots at the gunman hitting his target. Immediately AA switched fire to another gun port where he heard a Thompson being fired up Long Tower Street. He fired two shots into this gun port and two into another in the same building in which he believed the gunman to be. He thought that he hit his target although he did not actually see his target.

If AA's account is correct there is a serious question mark over the propriety of the last two sets of two shots that he fired. He was simply firing into black holes in which here may or may not have been a gunman. The credibility of his account, however, is undermined by the fact that no identifiable victims were found to match the location of his shootings. There are also some serious discrepancies between the version he gave in his original statement and that given in evidence.

In his original statement he made no mention of the warning from the civilians which was supposed to be the reason why he actually proceeded along Charlotte Place. He did mention it in the statement to the Treasury Solicitor, but placed it before he heard the first shot which he timed at 16.15. Also he said that he cocked his weapon on seeing the first gunman while in evidence he said that he cocked it earlier when he heard the shot going past their position. Most significantly, he made no mention of hearing the Thompson being fired from the other gunport before firing into it. This adds to the suspicion that he had acted recklessly in firing these shots. Even when he came to make an additional statement the next day in which he clarified the gun ports in question he still made no mention of the Thompson. This did not appear until his statement to the Treasury Solicitor.

No explanation was offered for the discrepancies in his statements and evidence, nor was their existence disclosed during the Tribunal proceedings.


Concealing the Weaknesses in the Soldiers' Evidence
It is evident from the foregoing analysis of the soldiers' evidence that for almost each soldier who fired one or more shots there are substantial material discrepancies between the account offered in the statement made on the night of 30/31 January and the version given in evidence to the Tribunal. The nature and extent of these discrepancies are sufficient in themselves to raise a serious doubt about the credibility and reliability of the evidence given by these soldiers. That doubt is only increased by the fact that in many of the cases where the soldiers were supposedly describing the same events their original accounts differed from each other, often fundamentally, in many material respects. No less than 12 soldiers considered it necessary to make additional statements within the next few days. An even more sinister feature is the extent to which the accounts were changed again in the later statements to the Treasury Solicitor. It is hardly a coincidence that in many instances the effect of the change was to convert what had originally amounted to an unlawful or reckless shooting to a more justifiable one. Equally, many of the changes had the effect of reducing some of the conflicts between one soldier's version and another. Even so, the soldiers' evidence actually presented to the Tribunal did not always present an internally coherent picture.

The extent of the internal conflicts in the soldiers' statements and evidence taken together is such that it would not be safe to rely on the Army version in virtually any instance where there is credible and cogent evidence to the contrary. It is truly incredible, therefore, that the Tribunal should have proceeded so consistently to base its conclusions on the Army version in the face of credible and cogent evidence, often from independent and reliable sources, to the contrary. Even so, it is submitted that this is not the most significant factor in discrediting the findings of the Tribunal. That accolade must be reserved for the fact that the Tribunal actively concealed the nature and extent of the unreliability of the soldiers' evidence.

Counsel for the deceased was not provided with copies of the statements made by the soldiers on the night of 30/31 January, nor with copies of any additional or supplementaries made in the succeeding days, nor with the statements made by the soldiers to the Treasury Solicitors. Counsel had to conduct their cross examination of each soldier on the basis of the account that that soldier gave to the Tribunal. There was no advance notice of what that soldier was going to say and in almost every case no notice at all of inconsistencies in earlier versions given by each soldier. Clearly, in such circumstances it would be very difficult for counsel to succeed in discrediting a soldier's evidence in the witness box, particularly when that evidence was based on a statement which had been prepared and written well in advance to accord as far as possible with corresponding versions given by other soldiers. It is worth remembering at this point that one of the reasons given by Lord Widgery for putting so much belief in the soldiers' evidence was the fact that they had stood up so well under a rigorous cross-examination. The reality is that the soldiers were never exposed to the sort of cross examination to which they would have been exposed had the contents of their earlier statements been disclosed to counsel for the deceased. As will become apparent below, Lord Widgery himself must have known this.

The disadvantage suffered by counsel for the deceased was not shared by counsel for the Tribunal. The Tribunal counsel, and Lord Widgery himself, did have copies of the earlier statements made by the soldiers.[28] It follows that they were in a position to know that the versions offered to the Tribunal and, indeed, in the statements to the Treasury Solicitors, were often seriously at odds with the versions contained in the soldiers' original statements. At the very least one would have expected counsel for the Tribunal to have put the material irregularities to the soldiers in cross examination. However, this very rarely happened. In the few cases where it became apparent during the Tribunal proceedings that a soldier had changed some aspect of the account he had given in his original statement, it was because he had mentioned it in his statement to the Treasury Solicitors. For the most part, the many and varied discrepancies outlined in the analysis above never saw the light of day in the Tribunal proceedings and were never communicated to counsel for the deceased. Even when the solicitor for the Army asserted in his closing address that the evidence given by the soldiers to the Tribunal did not differ from their original statements, apart from one admitted instance, counsel for the Tribunal remained silent.

The conduct of the Tribunal in this matter is totally inexcusable. A Tribunal of Inquiry is set up to search out the truth. It cannot confine itself to conclusions based on evidence presented in examination and cross examination of witnesses when other relevant evidence is available. It is its duty to dig out that other evidence and to scrutinise it with a view to ascertaining the whole truth. Given the contents of the Tribunal's Report and, in particular, the findings it makes, there can be little doubt that the Tribunal ignored the damaging evidence of the soldiers' earlier statements when it was assessing the credibility and reliability of evidence given by the soldiers in the witness box. It is this more than any other factor which totally discredits the Tribunal's findings. Not only are they based on unreliable evidence, but the Tribunal, by remaining silent when it was its duty to speak up, has actively concealed the existence of the evidence which renders the basis of its own findings unreliable.

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