



An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

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SUMMARY NOTE

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Overview of the Security Situation in Northern Ireland

FACTS

- The RUC has an establishment strength of 8,250 and 2,750 in full-time reserve.
- The present strength of the British Army in Northern Ireland is 10,900.
- The strength of the UDR (Nov. 1985) is 6,440 (2,689 full-time and 3,751 part-time).
- Since 1 January there have been 16 reported attacks on RUC/UDR barracks (5 in January, 1 in March, 4 in May, 2 in June and 4 in August).
- Since 1 January, 21 members of the security forces have been killed (10 RUC; 7 UDR; 4 British Army).
- Responsibility for all of the above killings has been claimed by the Provisional IRA. Responsibility for one of the attacks on RUC/UDR barracks has been claimed by the INLA. The remainder of the attacks has been claimed by the Provisional IRA.
- Since January 1986 there have been 10 sectarian murders in Belfast, eight of them carried out by Loyalist paramilitaries. Seven of the victims have been Catholics.
- Since January there have been 56 violent incidents in border areas which can be attributed to IRA activities. These have caused 25 deaths broken down as follows: 5 UDR, 10 RUC, 4 Army and 6 civilian. In addition, one member of the IRA has died and another has been injured in an SAS ambush.

Security Situation in Northern Ireland

1. With the close of the marching season, the main focus of the security situation in Northern Ireland is now on the IRA and its threat on the lives of those working for the security forces. The WLA has begun to attract attention, after a period of inactivity, with the bombing on 28 August of a number of targets in Belfast, Newry, Downpatrick, Derry and Antrim. The activities of loyalist paramilitaries have been largely sectarian: there has been one recent sectarian killing in Belfast and there have been threats against catholic workers in a number of firms.
2. In a statement on 5 August 1986, the PIRA extended its list of targets among civilians supplying or working for the security forces in the North. Since then the PIRA has killed one further contractor, Mervyn Bell (a Protestant), in Derry.

There was widespread condemnation of the PIRA move in both communities and it has heightened fears and uncertainty throughout the North.

There are rumours of tensions within the PIRA/SF camp about the advisability of the move, given its unpopularity within the nationalist community generally.

So far in 1986, the PIRA has killed three civilian contractors, who were working for or supplying the security forces.

3. There have been ten sectarian killings in Northern Ireland in 1986. Eight of them were by loyalist paramilitaries and two protestants who died were regarded by the police as also victims of sectarian attacks. After three killings by the UFF in the space of one week in July, over 5 weeks elapsed before the next and most recent killing, that of Paddy McAllister in West Belfast on 26 August.

In recent pronouncements in "An Phoblacht" and elsewhere, the PIRA/SF have been claiming that the loyalist sectarian killings this year were, in the words of Gerry Adams, a "predictable consequence and a tragic result of the Hillsborough Agreement".

Cross-Border Security Cooperation

1. The programme of work intended to enhance cross-border security cooperation as envisaged in Article 9(a) of the Agreement got under way when the Commissioner and the Chief constable met in Dublin on 15 February 1986. At that meeting there was agreement on the broad approach to be adopted and on the areas that would be examined in the development of the programme.
2. Subsequently it was decided (on the suggestion of the Irish side) to set up a small steering group (now referred to as the quadripartite group) comprising the chief officers of both police forces, the NIO, Department of Justice and Secretariat to oversee in a general way the development of the work programme and to act as a channel through which reports on the programme of work would be submitted to the Conference.
3. The first meeting of the quadripartite group was held in Stormont on 25 February 1986. At that meeting the two chief officers agreed to set up working groups of senior police officers to tackle the work programme under the general headings set out in Article 9(a). Assistant Commissioner Fanning and Assistant Chief Constable Forbes would examine matters relating to intelligence (threat assessment, liaison structures, exchange of information) and Deputy Commissioner McMahon and his opposite numbers (Wallace, Mellors, Whiteside - as appropriate) would report on operational matters (including resources, technical cooperation and training of personnel). This group would also examine relevant legislation and legal procedures affecting security cooperation.

4. As matters developed, 4 working parties were established - one under Fanning and Forbes dealing with intelligence matters and three under McMahon and Wallace/Mellors dealing with operational planning, legislation, legal procedure and related matters and computerisation.
5. The Fanning/Forbes report on intelligence matters was completed in early May 1986. This was followed by a bilateral meeting between the two chief officers at which the report was agreed in principle. A quadripartite meeting was held on 4 June 1986 at which the report was discussed in detail. At that meeting, the Commissioner outlined his approach to implementing the report and it was agreed that the officers responsible for the report would oversee its implementation.
6. The report was discussed at the meeting of the Conference on 17 June 1986. During the discussion, the British side stressed the importance they attached to having an agreed programme (including a timetable) for implementing the recommendations. The Conference agreed that implementation would be monitored and that the Conference itself should be kept informed of progress.
7. The present position in relation to the other areas of work is that three reports have now been completed by the working parties. The first of these deals with operational planning (including structures and resources); the second contains a review of legislation, primarily in the area of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction (including matters such as police powers of arrest and detention, questioning of suspects etc.) and the third deals with computerisation. These reports have been submitted to the two chief officers. The most important of these reports is that prepared on operational planning etc., and the report, as it emerged from the working group, showed areas


of disagreement between the RUC and the Gardai. Following a meeting between the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner on Monday, 18 August, the areas of disagreement have been narrowed considerably.

8. A meeting of the Quadripartite Steering Group will take place on 10 September to prepare the matter for discussion at the next meeting of the Conference. It is not clear yet whether the Steering Group will be in a position to discuss all three remaining reports or whether it will be confined to the report on operational planning etc., which has been dealt with by the two police chiefs so far.

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Construction of New Observation Posts in South Armagh

We have been advised by Garda and Army that the British Army are in the course of constructing up to 20 new permanent observation posts in the South Armagh area. These are concrete structures which are manned both day and night. The locations chosen indicates that it is the intention to dominate any high ground in the South Armagh area and they should enable the British to effectively monitor any movements in the area. In the case of one of these posts 'Drumackavall' it is situated very close to the border and has been the subject of an IRA attack. (We had anticipated this possibility and had advised the British of the likelihood of such attacks). It would appear from the present pattern of construction that the British intend to circle the Crossmaglen area with these posts. The Army have advised that from a military view-point the new posts are a sensible measure to try to effectively control a very difficult terrain; the alternative is to saturate patrol the area which would require a great deal more manpower. It is equally clear that those posts in sight of the border are likely to be a provocation to the IRA and as such, may be a source of conflict. We have also had indications that people living in the locality of these posts are 'uneasy' about their presence and fear being caught in crossfire. The Special Meeting of the Conference on 29 July briefly discussed these observation posts and we outlined the negative public relations aspects of the oppressive military presence which these posts represented and the associated security risks of such installations along the border. The British side responded by saying that we would see the justification for these posts when the scheme was completed.



David Barry,
Anglo-Irish Section,
1 September, 1986.



Group of farmers and other local people from the Armagh/Louth border area protesting at the destruction of trees and hedges by the British army. Right: The British observation post at Drumuckavall.—(Photographs: Tom Conachy)

British army fells trees

ANGRY residents, including about 30 farmers whose lands extend on both sides of the Louth/Armagh border, staged a protest yesterday near a British Army hilltop observation post against the latest action by soldiers in removing trees and hedges from surrounding farms in the wake of the recent takeover of 300 acres for the erection of look-out posts.

The demonstration, along the Dundalk to Crossmaglen road, followed a public meeting at which an action committee was formed to highlight the protest by the residents over what the group's chairman, Mr John Leneghan, described as "the ruination of farms and the rape of the landscape."

Mr Joe Griffin, a member of the SDLP Newry and Mourne district executive, who was among the protesters, said Mr Seamus Mallon, MP, had already made a protest to the GOC of the British Army at Lisburn, Co Antrim.

"There are ongoing protests since these lands were taken over and the situation has now been seriously aggravated by the removal of trees and hedges, thus creating serious problems for the owners of the property."

Mr Michael McKeown, a farmer, said he lost eight acres of his 33-acre holding as a result of the army's action.

Geographical Pattern of Fatal Casualties 1980 - 1986

	Category 1 Belfast Area	Category 2 Rural Non Border	Category 3 Border Area	Total
1980	40 (56.3%)	6 (8.5%)	25 (35.2%)	71
1981	56 (52.8%)	12 (11.3%)	38 (35.9%)	106
1982	39 (41%)	17 (18%)	39 (41%)	95
1983 ¹	23 (33.8%)	11 (16.2%)	34 (50%)	68
1984 ²	20 (35%)	10 (17.5%)	27 (47.5%)	57
1985 ³	8 (15.7%)	7 (13.7%)	36 (70.6%)	51
1986 (Jan-July)	11 (27%)	7 (17%)	23 (56%)	41
TOTAL	197 (40.3%)	70 (14.3%)	222 (45.4%)	489

Category 1 : Belfast Area includes Belfast, Lurgan, Lisburn, Portadown, Hollywood, Carrickfergus and Craigavon, and the area bounded by a continuous line drawn through these towns.

Category 2 : All rural areas including towns not falling within Category 3. Specifically includes Dungannon, Cookstown, Omagh, Ballymena, Downpatrick, Banbridge, Newcastle, Limavady and Enniskillen.

Category 3 : All areas within 10 miles of the border including towns. Specifically including Kilkeel, Armagh, Strabane, Derry and Newry.

Footnote 1 : Information is only available on location for 68 of 77 deaths in 1983.

Footnote 2 : Information is only available on location for 57 out of 64 deaths in 1984.

Footnote 3 : Information is only available on location for 51 of a total of 54 deaths in 1985.

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Geographical Pattern of Fatal Casualties 1983-1986

IRA KILLINGS BY AREA

	Belfast Area	Rural (Non Border)	Border Areas
1983	11 (24.5%)	7 (15.5%)	27 (60%)
1984	9 (24.3%)	7 (18.9%)	21 (56.8%)
1985	4 (9.5%)	5 (11.9%)	33 (78.6%)
1986-Aug 30	3 (10%)	6 (20%)	21 (70%)
Total (Average)	27 (17.5%)	25 (16.5%)	102 (66%)

KILLINGS BY AREA AND AGENCY

		IRA	Protestant Paramilitaries	Security Forces
Zone 1 Belfast Area	1983	11 (68.8%)	1 (6.2%)	4 (25%)
	1984	9 (50%)	6 (33.3%)	3 (6.7%)
	1985	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	2 (29%)
	1986-Aug 30	2 (18%)	8 (73%)	1 (9%)

		IRA	Protestant Paramilitaries	Security Forces
Zone 2 Rural (non-border)	1983	7 (78%)	0	4 (22%)
	1984	7 (87.5%)	0	1 1(12.5%)
	1985	5 (83.4%)	0	1 (16.6%)
	1986-Aug 30	6 (86%)	0	1 (14%)

		IRA	Protestant Paramilitaries	Security Forces
Zone 3 Border Area	1983	27 (93.2%)	1 (3.4%)	1 (3.4%)
	1984	21 (84%)	0	4 (16%)
	1985	33 (91.7%)	0	3 (8.3%)
	1986-Aug 30	21 (91%)	0	2 (9%)

Note: It has not been possible to identify agency in all cases; thus figures are partial and do not correspond to the overall figures for each year.

Zone 1: Belfast Area: This zone includes Belfast, Lurgan, Lisburn, Portadown, Hollywood, Carrickfergus, and Craigavon and the area bounded by a continuous line drawn through these towns.

Zone 2: Rural (non-border): All rural areas including towns, which do not fall within Zone 3. This specifically includes Dungannon, Cookstown, Omagh, Ballymena, Downpatrick, Banbridge, Newcastle, Limavady and Enniskillen.

Zone 3: All areas within 10 miles of the border, including towns. Specifically includes Kilkeel, Armagh, Strabane, Derry and Newry.

* Casualties in N.I. since the Anglo-Irish
Agreement

<u>November, 1985</u>	Deaths	5;	3 RUC, 1 UDR, 1 civilian
	Injuries	1;	1 RUC
<u>December, 1985</u>	Deaths	2;	2 RUC
<u>January, 1986</u>	Deaths	6;	2 RUC, 1 UDR, 3 civilians
	Injuries	15;	3 UDR, 12 Civilians
<u>February, 1986</u>	Deaths	5	1 UDR, 1 RUC, 3 Civilians
	Injuries	24	1 RUC, 12 UDR, 11 Civilians
<u>March, 1986</u>	Deaths	3;	1 BA, 1 UDR, 1 Civilian
	Injuries	59;	2 BA, 1 RUC, 56 Civilians
<u>April 1986</u>	Deaths	4	1 UDR, 1 RUC, 2 Civilians
	Injuries	28;	12 RUC, 1 BA, 15 Civilians
<u>May, 1986</u>	Deaths	10;	1 BA, 1 UDR, 2 RUC, 6 Civilians
	Injuries	30;	19 RUC, 1 UDR, 2 BA, 8 Civilians
<u>June, 1986</u>	Deaths	1;	1 Civilian
	Injuries	22	11 RUC, 11 Civilians
<u>July, 1986</u>	Deaths	12	1 UDR, 4 RUC, 2 BA, 5 Civilians
	Injuries	107	2 UDR, 69 RUC, 2 BA, 34 Civilians
<u>August, 1986</u>	Deaths	4;	1 UDR 3 Civilians

Total deaths since the Agreement 52

Total injuries since the Agreement 236+

* Statistics based on newspaper reports