



# An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

<b>Reference Code:</b>	2017/4/150
<b>Creation Dates:</b>	July 1987
<b>Extent and medium:</b>	18 pages
<b>Creator(s):</b>	Department of Foreign Affairs
<b>Accession Conditions:</b>	Open
<b>Copyright:</b>	National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives.

## THE POLITICAL SITUATION

### (i) A Return to Politics

The return to Westminster by Unionist MP's, and the publication of an abridged version of the Joint OUP/DUP Task Force Report, mark a change in Unionist tactics in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. There is a clear recognition now that the Anti-Agreement protest campaign ("Ulster Says No" etc.) has failed and has caused the Unionists to lose friends and influence at Westminster. "Protest is no substitute for politics", according to the Task Force Report. This was the clear message to the Unionist leadership from the General election and from the soundings made by the authors (Peter Robinson, Harold McCusker and Frank Millar) of the Task Force Report. There is now a clear desire among ordinary Unionists to re-open dialogue with the British Government.

Unionists got themselves off the "hook" of their demand for suspension of the Anglo-Irish Agreement by distinguishing between "talks" and "negotiations". The next step is what the Unionist Leaders, Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley, referred to, yesterday, as "probing talks". These are not negotiations (and therefore do not "require" the suspension of the work of the Anglo-Irish Agreement or the Secretariat) but talks to see if the British Government is prepared to enter into negotiations to seek an alternative to, and a replacement of, the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The demand for the suspension of the working of the Agreement and the Secretariat remain in so far as "negotiations" are concerned.

A statement by the Unionist Leaders (Molyneaux and Paisley) on 8 July seemed to indicate that the Unionist representatives at the "probing talks" would be the members of the Task Force - (Peter Robinson, Harold

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

McCusker and Frank Millar). This may be deduced from the Unionist Leaders' statement that "the Task Force is to remain in being to help us as we have these probing talks". Other statements by the OUP Leader, Mr. Molyneaux, and by the DUP's Sammy Wilson, seem to indicate that such talks as take place will be with British/NIO officials rather than with Ministers at this stage.

(ii) The Task Force Report

The Report has been seen as the beginning of a new departure in Unionist thinking. While there is a case for this view, there is cause for caution as well. The Report reflects the thinking of a younger generation of Unionists and the Leaders of the OUP and DUP approached it very cautiously. Though published on 2 July, Messrs Molyneaux and Paisley waited until 8 July to comment on it. Even then they stopped short of endorsing the Report. Their only commitments were to "probing talks" and to keeping the Task Force in existence to assist with such talks. The Task Force Report is still, therefore, in the nature of an internal document. The Unionist Leaders' attitude to it is one of keeping their distance and their options open. Their view of the specific recommendations in the Report was that they would consider the matter carefully in the context of the developing situation. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Task Force Report will lead to anything concrete before the Autumn.

(iii) Nationalists Concerns

The SDLP Leader, Mr. Hume, has taken the attitude that he wasn't going to comment on the Task Force Report, given that the Unionist Leadership had not endorsed it and that it was, therefore, an "internal" document. He is likely to maintain this position for the foreseeable

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

future, given that the Unionist Leaders have not fully endorsed the Task Force Report nor shown any inclination to implement its recommendation at this stage. At the same time, the SDLP leader welcomed the report in so far as it indicated the beginning of an "internal debate" in Unionism.

In general, however much we would like to see the Task Force as a positive document (and there are many positive elements in it), there are suggestions and recommendations in it which would pose problems for nationalists (North and South) at the stage of serious negotiations, if such a stage is reached. In addition, the SDLP remains somewhat suspicious of Unionist motives in relation to "talks" and to the Task Force Report. The SDLP is concerned that Unionists are endeavouring to appear flexible to British public opinion and to portray the SDLP as the stumbling block to progress. In that sense, our reaction to the Task Force Report, in conversation with the Secretary of State, should tend towards the cautions. We should probably confine ourselves to welcoming it as an indication of willingness to engage in dialogue, but add, if a discussion on the matter arises, that there are aspects which would be difficult for nationalists to accept if they are proposed at the negotiating stage (e.g. the proposition that the Irish Government would no longer act as custodian of nationalist interests and the proposal that a devolved administration should have control of security).

In relation to "talks", the SDLP take the position that they welcome dialogue. Mr. Hume has indicated that he will attend talks between the Party Leaders in late August being convened at the initiative of Archbishop Eames.

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

In the more immediate political context, the SDLP is likely to be concerned about

- (i) The British attitude to implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement now that the Unionists have indicated willingness to talk and
- (ii) About any proposals the British Government may have for devolution.

In relation to implementation of the Agreement, there is a danger that the British will be so sensitive to Unionist concerns, that they will "stall" on implementation of matters of interest to nationalists. It may be necessary, therefore, to remind Secretary of State King that while we understand the need for some sensitivity, at this stage, it is important that there should be no indication or implication that the British Government is retreating from its commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

In relation to devolution, this is not an issue which arises immediately. Nevertheless, the Irish Government has a right to put forward its views on the modalities of achieving devolution in so far as the interests of the minority Community are concerned. It would be useful to make the point, in a general way, that, in relation to devolution, our position is that any system of devolved Government in Northern Ireland would have to include Constitutional nationalists as full participants in a decision-making process.

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

## Report of the Unionist Task Force

The Political Context

An Assessment

-----

### Introduction

The Joint Official Unionist/Democratic Unionist Task Force was established by the respective party leaders, Mr. Molyneaux and Dr. Paisley, on 23 February 1987. Its remit was to consult the Unionist Community to secure support for the campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement and to ascertain what consensus existed about alternatives to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The members of the Task Force were Harold McCusker, M.P. (OUP Deputy Leader) Peter Robinson, M.P. (DUP Deputy leader) and Frank Millar (General Secretary of the OUP). Their report was submitted to the Unionist leaders on 16 June.

The report published on 2 July 1987, it should be noted, is an abridged version of the main report. It is entitled "An End to Drift".

The two party leaders, Messrs. Paisley and Molyneaux, waited some time before commenting on the Report. They made a long but cautious statement on 8 July. The net effect of the statement was to indicate Unionist agreement to "probing talks" (or "talks about talks", as distinct from negotiations). While some commentators (including the DUP's Sammy Wilson) interpreted the Paisley/Molyneaux statement as an "endorsement" of the Task Force Report, this remains far from certain. The statement still maintains a certain "distancing" by Paisley and Molyneaux from the Task Force Report. The Task Force Report is, accordingly, a document of uncertain status and should still be seen, in some sense, as an "internal" document, given that the Unionist leadership has not adopted it formally.

B  
C  
D  
E

11

12

13

The Political Context

There is a case, despite the ambiguous status of the document and despite some worrying points from the Nationalist perspective, for seeing the Task Force report as an attempt by Unionists to come to terms with political realities. The document is geared to establishing a tenable interpretation of the change in the Unionist approach to the Anglo-Irish Agreement from outright opposition to the need to initiate talks at some level.

The title of the document itself - "An End to Drift" - is, clearly, an indictment of the anti-Agreement campaign. The introduction to the document states that "a major finding" of the report was that "protest can be no substitute for politics". The introduction also noted that, while the Task Force was to report on two matters, namely, securing support for the anti-Agreement campaign and an alternative to the Agreement, "the burden of our discussions focussed on the search for an alternative to the Agreement". The Task Force, obviously, considered the revamping of the anti-Agreement campaign to be a secondary matter. The Conclusions Section of the Report, while noting that there is no lessening in support for the anti-Agreement campaign, states that at the same time "our investigations have unearthed deep disquiet about the current protest campaign and a simple disbelief that on its own it can or will persuade Mrs. Thatcher to change course". There was a need, the Report said, to arrest "a widely perceived drift in our affairs". It is clear, therefore, that the message from the Unionist community is that the anti-Agreement campaign has failed and that, henceforth, the priority is the need to re-engage in dialogue.

Information obtained from contacts, subsequent to the publication of the Report, indicate that the section of the Report not made public was highly critical of the anti-Agreement campaign and, by implication, of Paisley's and Molyneaux's leadership of the campaign.

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

While the Report moots the possibility of new constitutional arrangements (there is, for example, much talk of negotiated independence) outside the Union, this remains a backdrop to the immediate task of initiating talks on the future of Northern Ireland.

The Report, in several instances, broaches the need to redefine Unionism. While it would be an exaggeration to describe the Task Force Report as the beginning of a Unionist New Ireland Forum, it is evidence of what the SDLP leader called "a wide-ranging debate" within Unionism. The Report accepts, for example, that Unionism has lost what it calls "a series of vital rounds" in the battle to preserve the Union since the 1960s. It notes that the Anglo-Irish Agreement marked, as Mr. Molyneaux put it on 15 November 1985, "the beginning of the end of the Union as we have known it".

There is an implicit, and sometimes explicit, acceptance that the "not an inch" brand of Unionism is outdated. The import of the discussions held by the members of the Task Force is that Unionists would have to "contemplate variations of political structures for Northern Ireland which they, and we, have previously rejected". The Report bemoans the fact that Sunningdale "fell without any understanding or agreement as to what should take its place". The clear implication here is that the kind of "negative" Unionism which brought down Sunningdale was a mistake which Unionists cannot afford to make now.

An important point in the overall political context is that, as the Report recommends, "no matter could or should be precluded from any negotiations". Subsequent media interviews underlined this point. When asked whether power-sharing could be included, Peter Robinson said that "well, if the SDLP bring power-sharing to the table then it is included in any discussion". He added that the outcome of negotiations was a matter of "barter". The report itself stated that "barter" and "compromise" were part of the process, but had to be matched by the other side. It is

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13



also noteworthy that the Task Force members interviewed by the media, especially Peter Robinson, made strenuous efforts to avoid putting themselves on further "hooks".

While its significance should not be overstated, it is worth noting that the Report states that "Unionists would be foolhardy to reveal their hand ahead of negotiation". This might suggest that some of the more hardline positions adopted in the Report (e.g. negotiated independence), are starting positions. Such tough positions can also be viewed as a means of establishing the necessary political credentials to speak on behalf of the Unionist community and to bring along the hardliners.

There is a case, therefore, for viewing the Report of the Task Force in the overall political context, as stated at the outset, as indicative of the beginning of a new departure in Unionist thinking. That being said, a note of caution needs to be sounded. The Report clearly represents the thinking of a new generation of Unionists and it remains to be seen if they can deliver on their "new departure". In that context, it may not be without significance that the respective party leaders, Mr. Molyneaux (a committed integrationist) and Dr Paisley (who had ruled out power-sharing in the past few weeks) were absent for the publication on the Report. They allowed their deputies to make the running on the Report and were clearly preserving their "distance" pending the reaction of the Unionist grass-roots. Their reaction came in a statement on 8 July when it was clear that the Report had gained some measure of acceptance amongst the Unionist community at large. The statement, nonetheless, maintained a certain distance between the Unionist leadership and the Report.

#### The Proposals

The Conclusions Section of the Report contain the Task Force's specific and procedural proposals and what might be termed the conceptual framework for these proposals. These are analysed in the paragraphs under.

B  
C  
D  
E

11

12

13

The Conceptual Framework

The Report states that the objective is devolution. It concedes that while there is support among Unionists for integration, "devolution is the more attainable objective" and then states "devolved government therefore is our objective". The Report insists that such a devolved government would have to have control over "internal security matters".

A willingness to consider power-sharing is evident in several places in the Report. The Report notes that the UDA document, "Common Sense" (published in February 1987), which advocated a form of power-sharing, had attracted "considerable interest and some support". It goes on to say that "many in addition to the UDA would clearly be prepared to contemplate SDLP participation in the Government of Northern Ireland. The Report attaches an important proviso, however. It states that such SDLP participation could be envisaged "provided the SDLP agree to forfeit the role of the Government of the Irish Republic as custodians of the Nationalist interest" (the word "provided" was in bold type).

Peter Robinson, interviewed on Radio Ulster, endeavoured to avoid becoming entangled in what the proviso might mean in relation to negotiations with the SDLP. Asked if the proviso would not make it impossible for the SDLP to negotiate, Robinson stressed that the point represented the "view of the people who met us". Pressed on what would happen if the SDLP insisted on the Irish Government's role, Robinson said it would "make it very difficult to get agreement" in negotiations. Pressed on whether it would make it impossible, Robinson pulled back somewhat and said "you're seeking to take me to the stage of negotiations when we haven't even got into them".

The other major conceptual consideration is "negotiated independence". It is referred to in several sections of the Task Force Report and the media paid some attention to the

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

point. Peter Robinson was asked on Radio Ulster if the real import of the point was that he wanted "your own arrangement with Dublin....., in effect, a new Ireland?" Robinson replied that "we should negotiate with the British Government to have devolved government in Northern Ireland." At this stage, it is not possible to say how serious the talk about independence is. There is, at least, a case for regarding it as "tough talk" and one of the few bargaining points/threats Unionists have available.

The Task Force Report states that, in all discussions about Specific and Procedural Proposals Irish Agreements, the three members made clear their view as follows:

The Task Force Report proposes the establishment of three bodies:

(i) A Unionist Convention. It would be called "to construct and lead a renewed campaign" against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. More significantly, however, the Convention would "be invited to endorse the demand for an alternative to and a replacement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the commencement of "without prejudice" discussions with Her Majesty's Government". Since the Task Force Report has clearly indicated that the protest campaign has failed, the Convention's primary concern would appear to lie with the proposed "discussions". The remit to lead a new campaign is probably not to be taken as meaning that a major new protest campaign would be undertaken, given the emphasis in the Report on politics rather than protest.

(ii) A Panel. The Task Force requested that a panel be appointed to establish "whether a base for formal negotiations exists or can be established". While it is unclear, at present, what authority this panel would have, the Report recommends "that the said panel be appointed only to consult and report".

(iii) A Special Commission. The Task Force Report proposes "the appointment of a Special Commission to consider and advise upon those alternative constitutional models, their implication vis-a-vis future relationships with Britain and the Irish Republic, and the steps by which an alternative constitutional

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

arrangement might be secured and sustained". It is difficult, at this early stage, to assess the significance of this proposed Commission. It could, perhaps, become the forum for a fuller consideration of the nature of Unionism in the 1980s. However, it may just be a necessary proposal given the speculation in the Report about alternative constitutional arrangements.

### The Anglo-Irish Agreement

The Task Force Report stated that, in all discussions about possible alternatives to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the three members made clear their view as follows:

1. The early suggestion by Mrs. Thatcher that the Agreement could be "devolved away" does not accord with the terms of the Agreement itself;
2. The Agreement establishes clear, and in our view unrealistic, limits on the powers which might be devolved;
3. Unionists could not contemplate participation in any form of devolved government whose work and functions would be supervised and overseen by an Anglo-Irish Conference."

The members of the Task Force noted that they "encountered little disagreement in regard to these matters".

The Unionist leaders confirmed this stance on 8 July in their statement on the Task Force Report, namely, that in relation to "negotiations" (as distinct from "talks") the Unionists are insisting on the "suspension of the Agreement and of the Maryfield Secretariat".

### Unionist Reaction

The Unionist leadership waited a week (until 8 July) to respond to the Task Force Report. Indications in the media, and information from contacts in the meantime, gave the impression

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

that the OUP leader, Mr. Molyneaux, was under pressure to make some positive comment on the Report. Dr. Paisley may also have been under such pressure. The joint statement by Molyneaux and Paisley on 8 July was general in tone but agreed to engage in "probing talks", pointing out that such "talks" were not "negotiations". The purpose of the "probing talks" would be to see if the Government is prepared to enter into negotiations to seek an alternative to, and a replacement of, the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

The statement described the Anglo-Irish Agreement as representing a "fundamental and unacceptable change in the Constitutional relationship between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It added "we have no doubt that the Anglo-Irish Agreement is tantamount to joint authority and that its early demise is vital if we are to arrest a quickening process leading to our inevitable absorption in an Irish unitary state". The two leaders then made it clear that they wanted a suspension of the working of the Agreement and of the Secretariat before they would engage in "negotiations".

The statement also noted that the Unionist leadership would be giving "careful consideration to the order in which the various recommendations of the Task Force Report are implemented in the context of the developing situation". While some commentators (including the DUP's Sammy Wilson) see the statement as an endorsement of the Task Force Report, it can be deduced from the statement that this is not so. The Unionist leaders want to keep the door to dialogue open, but are keeping a certain distance from the Task Force Report. At the very least, they are keeping their options open and putting the implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force Report on the long finger. The only clear cut procedural decision made is to keep the Task Force in existence to assist the leadership with the "probing talks".

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

### Nationalist Reaction

There has been little reaction from the nationalist community. Until now the SDLP leader, Mr. Hume, has taken the line that, since the Task Force Report has not been endorsed by the Unionist leadership, it is an internal document. At the same time, he indicated a cautious welcome for the Report in so far as it represented the beginning of an "internal debate" in Unionism.

The SDLP is known to be concerned that Unionists may be attempting to take the high moral ground and to wrong-foot them (the SDLP). Mr. Hume feels that Unionists are most anxious to appear reasonable and open to dialogue and to portray the SDLP "as recalcitrant and "sitting back" under the protective shade of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Equally, the SDLP, while not willing to go into detail at this stage, would be concerned about various aspects of the Task Force Report, namely:

- The insistence that SDLP participation in a devolved government would be contingent on the Irish Government giving up its role as custodians of the Nationalist interest.
- The insistence on control of internal security. The SDLP is unlikely to be able to accept such a proviso at least in the early days of any agreed power-sharing executive.

The above, however, are matters for the future. In the interim, the SDLP position is one of caution, a wariness about the real intentions of Unionists and a desire to avoid being "wrong-footed".

### Conclusion

The statement by the Unionist leaders indicates that nothing much will happen in relation to the Task Force Report recommendations in the short-term. The "probing talks" will

B  
C  
D  
E

11

12

13

Seven local bands - 10 - s involving four bands and some  
300 marchers took part in the parade. Assembling at

obviously go ahead. It seems (given the decision to keep the Lodge  
Task Force in existence) that the members of the Task Force will  
carry out the "talks" on the Unionist side. Public comments by  
OUP leader Molyneux and by the DUP's Sammy Wilson seem to  
indicate that such talks would be with "officials" in the NIO  
rather than with Ministers.

had urged local nationalists to remain in  
and the affair was over by 8.30 a.m. The  
proceeds proceeded to the main Co. Armagh parade in  
They did not pass through any nationalist areas  
on their return home.

In the run-up to the parade the Secretary of State  
urged (in a letter of 2 June to the Secretary of State)  
that parades should not be held through areas where they  
were not welcome. Though the letter was couched in  
general terms, he had specifically mentioned Portadown.  
The Tanaiste's concerns were also conveyed by the Irish  
side of the Secretariat during several exchanges prior to

July, 1987.

Twelfth and in the wake of the RUC's decision. The  
British response was that the Secretary of State had taken  
serious account of the Tanaiste's recommendations and had  
discussed them with his security advisers. In the end it

was felt that for reasons of public order it would be  
advisable for the Secretary of State to avail of his  
powers to prohibit the parade which he had opposed in  
the letter of 2 June.

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

## The 'marching season'

### (1) The "Twelfth" parades

This year's "Twelfth" parades passed off without any major incidents. While there were scattered disturbances over the preceding weekend and at the parades (which took place this year on Monday, 13 July), there was nothing to compare with the widespread violence which occurred last year. This is widely attributed to a desire on the part of the Orange Order to return to the respectable, law-abiding image which it has traditionally enjoyed.

The only serious security incident was the killing of a 46-year-old Protestant by the Provisional IRA in North Belfast in the early hours of 12 July. Firing across the "peace line" from the Ardoyne side, a Provo gunman struck the victim (Alan McQuiston) at a Loyalist bonfire on a patch of wasteground. A 16-year-old youth was also injured. The incident raised tension in the Loyalist community and was clearly intended to provoke sectarian violence in the run-up to the Twelfth marches.

The two most serious potential flashpoints were the Twelfth marches in (i) Portadown; (ii) Castlewellan.

In Portadown, the RUC decided, for the third time in succession, to keep the parade out of Obins Street (the "Tunnel"), a nationalist stronghold and traditionally part of the parade route. However, for the second year in succession, they routed the parade along Garvaghy Road, another predominantly nationalist area. One slight improvement over last year's decision was an explicit veto on the marchers returning along Garvaghy Road. (For the 'church parade' on Sunday, 5 July, the RUC had ruled out Obins Street but had given the marchers the option of Garvaghy Road - in the event, this option was not taken up)



Seven local Orange lodges involving four bands and some 300 marchers took part in the parade. Assembling at 7.30 a.m. on 13 July, they went from Corcrair Orange Lodge to Obins Street, where they were stopped by a security force barrier. They handed in a letter of protest and continued. They were conducted by a heavy escort of police along Garvaghy Road. They marched through without incident (police had urged local nationalists to remain in their homes) and the affair was over by 8.30 a.m. The marchers proceeded to the main Co. Armagh parade in Lurgan. They did not pass through any nationalist areas on their return home later in the day.

In the run-up to the Twelfth marches, the Tánaiste had urged (in a letter of 3 July to the Secretary of State) that parades should not be routed through areas where they were not welcome. Though the letter was couched in general terms, he had specifically mentioned Portadown. The Tánaiste's concerns were also conveyed by the Irish side of the Secretariat during several exchanges prior to the Twelfth and in the wake of the RUC's decision. The British response was that the Secretary of State had taken serious account of the Tánaiste's recommendations and had discussed them with his security advisers. In the end it was felt that for reasons of public order it would be provocative for the Secretary of State to avail of his power to ban the parade (a power which he is opposed to exercising except on the advice of the Chief Constable).

The second potential flashpoint was Castlewellan, Co. Down (a heavily nationalist village). Here the RUC permitted the Twelfth parade to pass along the main street. The lower half of the village (leading to the main nationalist estates) was blocked off from the marchers and the parade passed off without incident. In advance of this parade, the Irish side of the Secretariat had urged the authorities to consider two alternative routes which would have respected the principle of parades not being routed through areas where they were not welcome.

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

Elsewhere, the Twelfth parades passed off without any major disturbances.

No trouble occurred in Belfast, where the largest parade took place. In Limavady (which the Irish side had also identified as a potential flashpoint), there were some minor skirmishes in the early morning of 13 July but otherwise an increased RUC presence preserved the peace and the anticipated disturbances did not materialise. In Kilkeel (also a potential flashpoint), the Twelfth parade passed off without incident. In Ballynahinch a Loyalist band attempted to march to a small Catholic estate but were prevented by the police from doing so.

(2) New Public Order Legislation

On 1 April, 1987, a new Public Order (NI) Order came into effect. This Order made a number of important changes in the law governing parades and assemblies in Northern Ireland. These changes included:

- (i) extension of the requirement for advance notice of parades from 5 to 7 days (some flexibility will be built into this requirement);
- (ii) a requirement to provide notice in writing and to provide much fuller information covering the likely number of participants and plans for controlling the parade as well as the planned route;
- (iii) an end to the exemption for 'traditional parades';
- (iv) an extension of the Secretary of State's power to ban parades (to include cases where the RUC's power to impose conditions are not considered sufficient to prevent serious damage to property, serious disruption to the life of the community or intimidation);

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13

- (v) a corresponding extension of the powers of the RUC to re-route or impose conditions on parades;
- (vi) the extension of powers to the RUC to impose conditions on open-air public meetings and to the Secretary of State to ban such meetings.

These changes were welcomed by the SDLP and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On 1 December 1986, Seamus Mallon welcomed, in particular, the enhanced powers of the Secretary of State as a 'clear recognition that marches are not just an operational matter for the RUC and there is a need for decision by a different agency to protect the interests of the community in general'.

The new legislation has already made an impact. The RUC's determination to enforce it was made clear during the Easter parades. After the initial Loyalist protest had died down, the Orange Order in particular came to terms with it and now seems ready to comply with its various provisions, notably the requirement for seven days' advance notice (rather than five as in the past).

Anglo-Irish Section,  
July, 1987.

2669M

B  
C  
D  
E

11  
12  
13