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PRESS INFORMATION

from KEVIN McNAMARA MP

EMBARGO: 12.00 noon, Wednesday, 21 September 1988

TOWARDS A UNITED IRELAND - LABOUR'S PLAN FOR PEACE

In a major document released today, the Labour Party's Front Bench Spokespersons spelt out their strategy for the implementation of the Party's policy of Irish unification with consent.

Rejecting violence in Northern Ireland from whatever quarter, they wrote:

'The starting point for Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland and its ultimate objective is the search for enduring peace. From this the Party's commitment to a united Ireland follows. We recognise that the National Question, and hence the Border, is central to the "Troubles" and that only the resolution of that question can bring peace.'

Speaking at a press conference in the House of Commons to launch the document, Kevin McNamara MP, Principal Labour Spokesperson on Northern Ireland, said:

'The paramilitaries must not be allowed to set the agenda. Labour has always sought to take the initiative in finding ways to move forward - we were the only British political party to give evidence to the New Ireland Forum, and out of that came the Anglo-Irish Agreement. We hope that this document will prove a similar spur to progress.'

In the document Kevin McNamara MP, Jim Marshall MP and Marjorie Mowlam MP detailed a dual strategy for achieving a united Ireland with consent, involving the reform of Northern Ireland on the one hand, and harmonisation with the Republic on the other. They went on to highlight the significance of the Single European Act for such a programme, particularly in relation to economic harmonisation, regional development and the development of a common social policy.

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Labour Leader Neil Kinnock MP, in an introduction to the document, strongly endorsed the strategy:

'Too many people look at Northern Ireland and turn away saying that the problems are intractable. That is the politics of despair.

'Others say that Britain should wash its hands of Northern Ireland. That is the politics of Pontius Pilate.

'We are prepared ... to continue with all efforts to end violence, poverty and division and in their document my Front Bench colleagues spell out the democratic socialist programme for achieving these objectives in the island of Ireland.

'Theirs is a most compelling argument for mobilising reason to ensure that violence will not prevail'.

For further information or comment contact:

Kevin McNamara MP on (0482) 448170 or (01) 219 3422/6477/5194

Marjorie Mowlam MP on (0642) 490404 or (01) 219 5066/6094

NOTE TO EDITORS

The document will be launched at a PRESS CONFERENCE in the JUBILEE ROOM,
HOUSE of COMMONS at 11.30 am on WEDNESDAY, 21 SEPTEMBER 1988

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This document is issued by the Labour Party's Front Bench Northern Ireland team in the House of Commons, Kevin McNamara MP, Marjorie Mowlam MP and Michael O'Donnell MP, and outlines the strategy for implementation of Party policy in Northern Ireland.

(1)

INTRODUCTION BY THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE NEIL KINNOCK MP
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

There is no "right" time for a political party to address the problem
in North

TOWARDS A UNITED IRELAND

Reform and Harmonisation: A Dual Strategy for Irish Unification¹

The continuing violence and violence has led even the most earnest
seeker of solutions. But, since it is obvious that a tragedy ignored
is a tragedy increased, the political and economic security of Northern
Ireland demand continual and active attention and they emphasize the
need to address the situation by tackling the root causes rather than
the symptoms.

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There must be a broader, more comprehensive and consistent approach.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement is of course a positive step in the
direction but, as we have always argued, it is not sufficient by
itself.

Labour's strategy requires action on two complementary fronts: the
political, economic and social institutions of Northern Ireland must

¹ This document is issued by the Labour Party's Front Bench Northern
Ireland team in the House of Commons, ~~Kevin McNamara MP, Jim~~
~~Marshall MP and Marjorie Mowlam MP~~, and outlines the Front Bench
strategy for implementation of Party policy on Northern Ireland.

(1)

INTRODUCTION BY THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE NEIL KINNOCK MP
LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

There is no "right" time for a political party to address the problem in Northern Ireland.

The continuing violence and bloodshed can deter even the most earnest seeker of solutions. But, since it is obvious that a tragedy ignored is a tragedy increased, the conflict and economic security of Northern Ireland demand continual and active attention and they emphasise the need to address the situation by tackling the root causes rather than the symptoms.

In this document my colleagues in the Northern Ireland Front Bench team present a carefully thought out and coherent strategy to implement our policy of unity by consent.

Crises have to be managed but policies that consist only of crisis management are no answer.

Force has to be used to counter and address violence but policies that rely only on that will not, of themselves, secure resilient peace.

There must be a broader, more comprehensive and consistent approach. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is of course a positive step in that direction but, as we have always argued, it is not sufficient by itself.

Labour's strategy requires action on two complimentary fronts: the political, economic and social institutions of Northern Ireland must be reformed. Failure to do so in the past has exacerbated conflict.

At the same time, harmonisation of policies in Northern Ireland and the Republic is essential. The conflict cannot be ended simply through changes in internal arrangements in Northern Ireland. There must be an all-Ireland dimension.

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(11)

This paper spells out a practical basis for harmonisation which will both extend the rights and improve the conditions of people in both traditions in Northern Ireland and, at the same time, help progress towards gaining a united Ireland by consent. Whilst that consent must by definition be freely given, no group or Party can be allowed to veto advance in that direction for it is the course of peace for the people of Ireland - North and South of the Border.

Too many people look at Northern Ireland and turn away saying that the problems are intractable. That is the politics of despair.

Others say that Britain should wash its hands of Northern Ireland. That is the politics of Pontius Pilate.


Neither attitude can or will serve the interests of the people on either side of the Irish Sea. On the contrary, detachment, whether it was casual or deliberate, would result in intensified strife.

Labour believes that the quest for peace and social justice is a challenge which no democrat can or should avoid.

For us, turning away is not an option.

We are prepared, therefore, to continue with all efforts to end violence, poverty and division and in their document my Front Bench colleagues spell out the democratic socialist programme for achieving these objectives in the island of Ireland.

There is a most compelling argument for mobilising reason to ensure that violence will not prevail.



September 1988

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A: LABOUR'S OVERALL STRATEGY

1. In its policy statement of April 1987, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party re-affirmed the Party's commitment to Irish unification with consent. In doing so it elaborated on and updated the 1981 Conference Statement. The Party has fought two General Elections on manifestos which spell out its commitment to unity with consent. It is an aspiration which is shared by the vast majority of Irish people and which is both a feasible and the proper stance for a democratic socialist party. We are convinced that it could and should only be achieved by consensual, peaceful and democratic means.
2. The Party's commitment to a consensual, democratic and constitutional path to Irish unification sharply distinguishes its strategy from that of Republican paramilitaries and their followers. They seek to force the unification of Ireland through coercion and bloodshed. The Labour Party utterly rejects the use of violence and believes that far from advancing the cause of unification it destroys any prospect of achieving that end. In this the Party is at one with the constitutional Nationalist parties of Ireland, which together enjoy the electoral support of almost 95% of nationalists in the island as a whole. It is not simply because the campaign of violence is abhorrent to the party and in direct conflict with the principles of democratic socialism that we oppose it, fundamental though such considerations are. We are convinced that the paramilitary campaign would lead to yet another partition of Ireland, rather than the ending of partition. At worst it could lead to civil war and sectarian blood-letting on a hitherto unprecedented scale.
3. There are those, both within and outside the Labour Party, who reject the politics of violence practised by the paramilitaries whilst advocating an immediate, or at least precipitate, British withdrawal from Northern Ireland (or, in its most moderate formulation, withdrawal within a specific period, usually the

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lifetime of a Labour government). This is not Labour Party policy, and nor should it be, for there would be no guarantee that the outcome would be a united Ireland. Instead it would commit a Labour government to end British involvement irrespective of the likely consequences at the time. In addition, it would violate the principle of consent and be in conflict with the Party's commitment to peaceful progress towards unification. Whilst the logic and thrust of Labour's policy involves a British withdrawal, preceded by a progressive process of disengagement, this would be an integral part of the progress towards unification. Since it would be impossible to predetermine a timetable for the latter, it would be folly to impose one on the former. Whilst unification must involve withdrawal, precipitate withdrawal might preclude unification. Such abdication of responsibility is not a policy, it is the politics of indifference or despair, and ignores the wishes of the Irish Government and political parties. We are not in the business of imposing solutions on the Irish Government or people.

4. Republican paramilitaries have no monopoly on violence and murder and the Labour Party is equally determined that Loyalist campaigns of violence will not prevent political progress in Northern Ireland. Just as the activities of Republican paramilitaries set back the possibility of the unity to which they claim to aspire, so Loyalist violence defeats its own ends. The campaign of violence against the Anglo-Irish Agreement, for instance, served simply to strengthen the resolve of the British Government and to demonstrate that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was prepared to resist campaigns of violence from whatever quarter. The Labour Party will not be deflected from its commitment to unity with consent, by threats of violence and attempts at intimidation by Loyalist paramilitaries, or other extremist minority groups. While consent must, by definition, be freely given, no group or party will be allowed to exercise a veto on policies designed to win consent for unification.

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5. We see as part of the role of the Front Bench the continuous review and clarification of our strategy for the implementation of policy in the light of changing circumstances. In particular, we have been aware of the need for re-assessment following the changed political climate after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Party has fully endorsed and continues vigorously to support the Hillsborough Accord, because it is compatible with our long-term aspirations and our chosen means for realising them. In this context we have given a particular welcome to Article 1(c) of the Agreement, the declaration by the two Governments that

'if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish'.

We regard Article 1(c) as an endorsement by the two Governments of the Labour Party's policy of unification with consent. We continue to have fundamental differences with the present British Government, however, over the implementation of Article 1(c). We do not believe that it is responsible or adequate to await passively the dawning of consent, as the Government does. The Labour Party, by contrast, is committed to working actively to build that consent.

6. Our major criticisms of the workings of the Hillsborough Accord flow from this difference. When it was signed, the Accord provided for a review of the operation of the Inter-Governmental Conference after three years. Any objective review would demonstrate the relative failure of the Conference to deal effectively with issues other than security. The Conference has become primarily a forum for crisis management, reacting to an agenda set by outside events and groups, rather than a structure through which the two Governments pursue a coherent programme of reform as provided for in the Agreement. The Conference has

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failed to implement those Articles in the Agreement which promised the radical reform of Northern Ireland, and has neglected to give any serious consideration to the steps necessary to integrate the institutions, laws or policies of the two parts of Ireland. Where significant initiatives outside the security field have been taken, they have derived almost exclusively from the Irish Government and have been blocked, on almost every occasion, by the British Government. The Labour Party's support for the Agreement was based in large part on the commitments it included on reform and harmonisation. It is the Party's view that such steps are preconditions for the constitutional unification of the island.

7. Areas specifically mentioned in the Agreement, and in which there has been little or no progress, include measures to foster cultural heritage, the ending of economic and social discrimination, a Bill of Rights, measures to make the security forces more acceptable to Nationalists, action to increase the proportion of people from the Nationalist population in the RUC, mixed or three-judge courts, economic and social development in the most severely depressed areas, and the promotion of confidence in the administration of justice. In addition, the Agreement committed the two Governments to cross-border co-operation on economic, social and cultural matters, and the harmonisation of parts of the criminal law, all areas in which there has been a demonstrable lack of progress.
8. In this document we will elaborate a dual strategy involving the reform of Northern Ireland and harmonisation with the Republic. The two parts, whilst separate in principle, are strongly connected in practice. Our strategy will form the basis of Labour Party action in Government, and is central to our arguments in Opposition. It is a path which we commend to all political parties in Britain and Ireland as the most viable strategy for political change and reform.

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9. The first part of the strategy involves a programme for reforming Northern Ireland's institutions and policy-making procedures to eradicate the material and political bases and causes of sectarianism. This programme is vital both for its own sake and as a means to our other end, the unification of Ireland by consent. In government, a democratic socialist party, whether seeking unification or not, would be duty-bound to end injustices which exist in both the public and private sectors in Northern Ireland.

10. Successive British governments have

- * failed to redress many of the legitimate grievances of those of the minority tradition;
- * presided over a system for the administration of justice which has embarrassed Britain in the eyes of the world and seen the Government dragged repeatedly through the European Court of Human Rights; and
- * failed to steer Northern Ireland's people towards a just and democratic accommodation of their differences.

Such defects in British policy-making and practice, in evidence since the beginning of direct rule in 1972, let alone the disastrous mistakes of earlier history, demand remedy and reform. Some argue that Northern Ireland is unreformable. Our view is that since a concerted, systematic and sustained programme of reform has never been tried, they cannot know. Rather than abdicating responsibility to the paramilitaries, as such counsel would require, we are determined that such a reform programme should be introduced with determination and commitment. Whilst we argue that Northern Ireland could never be economically or politically viable on its own and that both logic and history dictate union with the south of the island, we also argue that without political, legal, social and economic reform union would itself be unattainable.

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11. Such reform as has been attempted has usually been timid, ad hoc, piecemeal and poorly co-ordinated. Security policy-making, for instance, has often conflicted with policies designed to improve community relations. Legislation and practice designed to end religious discrimination and inequalities has often been ineffective or ineffectual, raising doubts at home and abroad about the commitment of British Governments to remedying the problems of the Province. Labour is determined to demonstrate the political will, to mobilize the administrative resources and to institute the programme of action outlined below, to achieve the substantial reform of Northern Ireland.

12. This programme of reform will be a priority for an incoming Labour government because it is intrinsically desirable and because it is a necessary pre-condition for unification by consent. Such unification requires:
- * the erosion of historically and culturally entrenched communal antagonisms to enable a united Ireland to function harmoniously;
 - * the establishment of institutions of State, law and justice which command widespread support and legitimacy;
 - * the successful experience of mutual political co-operation and coalition between the different traditions and their political representatives within Northern Ireland; and
 - * the ending of social and economic inequalities which have contributed to instability.

The unification of Ireland by consent, it follows, presupposes the reform of Northern Ireland.

13. Changes limited exclusively to the North, however, will still preclude unification. A process of harmonisation of institutions, policies and practices, North and South, is another pre-requisite of unification. This will require the active co-operation of the Irish Government and the people of the Republic.

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14. Consent for unification by non-Nationalists would have to grow out of the recognition of the undoubted common interests of people in the North and South, and as a result of allaying Unionist fears for their culture and history. They would need to be convinced that the Protestant tradition would survive in a united Ireland without either feeling under personal threat or feeling that their tradition as a whole was under seige. This would demand flexible and innovative constitutional approaches by the governments of Britain and Ireland, and the people of the South as well as the North.
15. The starting point for Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland, and its ultimate objective, is the search for enduring peace. From this the Party's commitment to a united Ireland follows. We recognise that the National Question, and hence the Border, is central to the 'Troubles' and that only the resolution of that question can bring peace. We recognise that, historically, economically and politically, the people of both parts of Ireland were and are bound together and that despite their differences they have more in common with each other than with any other communities. It is out of a recognition by Irish people of both traditions of their common history and common interests that consent for a united Ireland must grow.
16. What, then, is the meaning of consent as it is used in Party policy? No democratic sovereign government would yield to a minority of its citizens a veto over its relations with other sovereign states, or over the negotiation of co-operative agreements with, or the signing of international accords with such states. No government would allow vociferous minorities to veto policies which it believed to be in the general interest and which were compatible with the rule of law and the civil rights of its citizens. But any democratic government should accept that where a change in sovereignty was in prospect which

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would affect directly the interests and citizenship of a part of its population, those thus affected should have a determining say in the question.

17. These are the tenets central to the concept of consent. Its application turns on the distinction between the exceptional circumstances of a prospective constitutional change involving a transfer of sovereignty, when it will apply, and the normal operation of the process of government, when it will not. It will not, for instance, be applicable to the day-to-day work of government, or to regular relations between London and Dublin. It will not be a factor where steps are being taken simply to harmonise policies and practices North and South of the border. No Labour administration will allow its commitment to consent to be transformed into a veto on political progress towards unification. But consent will be required before any change is made in the sovereign status of Northern Ireland. The constitutional step of unification will be taken only with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. Some critics of the Labour Party's policy have argued, often mischievously, that there is a contradiction between the commitment to consent and the objective of unification. That is not the case. The Party's policy is unequivocal in relation to the need for consent before changes in sovereignty. But it also makes quite clear that its dual strategy, reform of Northern Ireland and harmonisation of North and South will proceed even in the face of possible sustained opposition from some section of the community. Those who argue that the consent requirement should be abandoned conveniently ignore the problems an Irish government would have in implementing unification in the absence of consent.
18. There are many different ways in which consent could be measured and some might be more appropriate than others in different circumstances. One approach might be more acceptable in the

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context of devolved government, for instance, whilst another might be better suited if Direct Rule still existed. It will be up to the government of the day to determine what means are most appropriate in the light of circumstances then prevailing. But however consent is measured, no Labour government will proceed with a change in sovereignty unless it has ascertained that it will be doing so with the broad support of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland.

19. The two parts of the Party's strategy are mutually reinforcing. Promoting reform within Northern Ireland is essential to create the mutual goodwill and co-operation necessary to make any future united Ireland a stable and effectively functioning democracy. Harmonising the institutions and policies of the two parts of Ireland promotes reform and facilitates the material, political and cultural conditions essential for successful unification.
20. Forced unification of the two parts of Ireland would defeat the primary objective of the Party's policy, the achievement of peace. Hence our commitment to consent. The steps to which the Party is committed in its programme to achieve consent, however, as well as contributing to this process, are desirable in their own right. Just as a reformed Northern Ireland is desirable for its own sake, so the harmonisation of the economic, legal, political and cultural affairs, policies and rights of two neighbouring regions of the European Community is a desirable objective in its own right. The promotion of economic investment, mutually beneficial co-operation in service provision, the strengthening of individual rights, the amelioration of conditions which feed paramilitary violence and the reduction of the abuse of frontiers for fiscal and legal evasion or avoidance are all policies which would benefit the vast majority of individuals, North and South. Such policies,

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are, in fact, simply common sense in the context of the European Community's commitment to harmonise the market and many laws and policies by 1992.

21. The Labour Party does not seek to achieve unification by stealth. Its objective is spelt out for all to see. In this respect it differs from the present British Government which negotiated and agreed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Whilst supporting the Agreement, Labour Party spokespersons have criticised the Government for its failure to consult, as have representatives of the Unionist parties. Similarly, Labour and Unionist spokespersons have accused the British Government of a covert policy of economic disengagement from Northern Ireland, exemplified by its commitment to privatise the three major employers, Short Brothers, Harland and Wolf and Northern Ireland Electricity, apparently without regard for the impact of privatisation on employment levels, or for the long-term viability of the concerns under private ownership. We declare openly to all the people of Northern Ireland that we seek to persuade them of the merits of Irish unity and to win their consent for it. Since it will, in the end, be the Northern Irish people who make the choice, we cannot fairly be accused of deception or coercion. As a democratic socialist party we subscribe to the politics of democracy and open government. We are convinced that our strategy will lead to the creation of a peaceful, stable, prosperous and united Ireland. We are convinced that consent for unification will flow from the growth of mutual tolerance and understanding and the recognition of common interest which our policies are designed to foster.

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B: REFORMING NORTHERN IRELAND

22. Successive British governments have failed to reform adequately the political, economic and social institutions which have exacerbated conflict in Northern Ireland. The key elements of a strategy for reform are elaborated below in three parts: social and economic policies; legal reforms and changes in the administration of justice; and political restructuring and reform.

Social and Economic Policies

23. The reform of Northern Ireland requires policies specifically designed to combat sectarianism, but it also necessitates policies aimed at the amelioration of social and economic injustices. Whilst some of Labour's policies in this area address specifically the problems unique to Northern Ireland, in others the principles are no different from the Party's proposals for dealing with similar problems in Britain.
24. In general, a Labour government will introduce measures designed to begin to reverse the extreme inequalities which have resulted from the market based policies of the Conservative Government. As in Britain, measures will be introduced to end the penalisation of the poor and of working people generally, to restore the rights of trade unions and trade unionists and to apply to Northern Ireland the principles of the Party's progressive programme of reform designed to reverse the slide into poverty of those who have borne the brunt of the Tory assault. Steps will be taken to restore health and safety regulations and legislation, to reverse the pressure for privatisation of ancillary services in the health and education fields, and to protect those in the non-public sector industries where the Party's proposals for social ownership will not apply.

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25. A new Labour government will accord the highest priority to measures designed to provide for equality of opportunity in employment, to end discrimination and remedy under-representation of groups which have been at an historical disadvantage. As part of its equality of opportunity programme, it will review the effectiveness and operation of relevant legislation and institutions with a view to introducing any changes necessary.
26. One of the significant limitations in the present Government's approach to date is the absence of a clear statement as to the target for the rapid reduction of the substantial inequalities between Catholics and Protestants, particularly in employment. In government, Labour will establish goals which it will seek to achieve in its first five years of office. In particular, it will aim to bring about a substantial reduction in the differential rate of unemployment between Catholics and Protestants without increasing the already unacceptably high unemployment rate generally. We recognise that it is easier to promote equality of opportunity in employment where there is economic growth. Nevertheless, even in the absence of growth, there is scope to bring about significant change. If existing policies and the new policies which we discuss in paragraph 27 below do not achieve significant progress towards this goal, a Labour government will re-assess them, and in the light of experience will devise and implement alternative strategies designed to achieve such progress.
27. To be effective, equality of opportunity provisions should include a wide-ranging affirmative action programme, regular monitoring to measure progress, the setting of goals and timetables, the existence of effective sanctions and remedies where discrimination is demonstrated, an adequately resourced and empowered enforcement agency and the use of the economic power of the State, through grant and contract compliance. We

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spelt this out in great detail in our response to the Government's White Paper on Fair Employment published in June 1988 and the approach of a future Labour government would be based on the position laid out in that response.¹ A Labour administration will extend its application to include areas other than religion. Existing legislation in the areas of sex and disability will be reviewed and strengthened.

28. Labour will ensure that social and economic policies in Northern Ireland are better integrated and co-ordinated through the allocation of a specific responsibility for this to a unit or similar agency within the Northern Ireland Office and responsible to the Secretary of State. Its brief will include:
- * the overseeing and co-ordination of State investment and economic assistance in Northern Ireland and its direction as far as possible to areas of high unemployment and deprivation;
 - * the co-ordination of European and external investment and assistance with a view to its equitable and effective application; and
 - * co-operation and co-ordination with agencies in the Irish Republic to promote cross-border co-operation and joint initiatives as envisaged in the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
29. Labour, in government, will seek to provide for all children the opportunity of schooling in a public education system which is both comprehensive and integrated. Additional funding will be provided for the establishment of integrated schools (new or through amalgamation) in neighbourhoods where parents demonstrate their preference for such schools and it is clear that they would draw significant numbers of children from each tradition.

¹ Copies of the Labour Party's response are available, on request, from Kevin McNamara MP.

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30. We recognised that under-resourcing of maintained schools has contributed to the relative disadvantage of people in the Nationalist tradition in Northern Ireland. Labour will, therefore, commit itself to work towards equality of funding for voluntary and maintained sector schools to eradicate that source of disadvantage. We will, however, expect reciprocal co-operation from centrally funded schools, whether in the maintained or the voluntary sector, with our promotion of comprehensive education in Northern Ireland. A Labour administration will seek to promote exchanges and contacts between children in schools in the voluntary and maintained sectors and to enhance mutual understanding and cross-cultural exchange. The aim will be to end disadvantage, build confidence in the justice of social policy and promote the emergence of a genuinely open political culture in Northern Ireland.
31. Similarly, where significant need and preference is demonstrated, funding will be provided for Irish language schools and for other institutions, events or activities designed to promote the Irish language.
32. The principle of equality of funding will apply in the field of culture. Labour recognises the importance of culture in maintaining the cohesion of communities, in promoting mutual understanding and in building knowledge of, and pride in history and tradition. Labour will, therefore, publicly support the arts and the cultural expressions of the different traditions in Northern Ireland.
33. The Party's economic strategy was outlined in the NEC statement of April 1987. In that document the NEC noted that unemployment had doubled to 20 per cent since 1979, that manufacturing employment had dropped by a third, that poverty had increased, that a quarter of the population in Northern Ireland was forced to claim means-tested benefits and that over ten per cent of

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housing was unfit for human habitation. The document noted that such conditions bred frustration, alienation, despair and violence. Despite some recent marginal reductions in unemployment, the threat of withdrawal of state support for major industries, the savage cuts in social services and the continuing lack of economic justice mean that the position is little changed.

34. Labour's economic and industrial policies are designed to remedy this situation. Job creation will be given the highest priority with the focus on areas of greatest unemployment. As part of its programme to give people back their jobs and their dignity, Labour will increase public spending on housing and infrastructure. Industrial policy will include a specific focus on the manufacturing sector and, in co-operation with the trade union movement, the government will seek to promote further investment in industries which have already proven their viability and new investment in areas particularly suited to natural and human potential available in Northern Ireland.
35. Much of Labour's longer-term economic strategy will be based on the strengthening of economic ties with the Republic and on developing cross-border initiatives of benefit to both parts of the island. In addition, whilst attempting to maximise European Community (EC) investment in Northern Ireland, Labour will seek to agree with the Republic a basis for joint approaches to the EC for special assistance linked to a programme of economic harmonisation and joint development programmes. This is dealt with in greater detail under section C on harmonisation, below.
36. Overall, a Labour administration will work closely with the organisations and representatives of working people, and in particular the trade unions, to formulate specific policies, ~~implement a democratic socialist programme and rebuild the~~ economy. The Party's current thinking in this area is spelt out

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in the documents which are emerging from the Policy Review and in the decisions taken by Party Conference on the specific policies which the Party will follow. The principles underlying these will apply to Northern Ireland as well as to Britain, except where special circumstances dictate otherwise.

Legal Reforms and Changes in the Administration of Justice

37. The Labour Party is strongly committed to the restoration and extension of civil liberties in Northern Ireland and will undertake changes necessary for the re-building of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Party's commitments in these areas were spelt out in detail in the NEG's policy statement of April 1987.²
38. These steps and other reforms in this area will be a crucial part of a Labour administration's efforts to reduce bitterness and the sense of injustice which continues to exist, among Nationalists in particular, and to create a new climate of hope and optimism. The creation of a sense of a return to normality and the repeal of measures widely regarded and experienced as repressive, will contribute greatly to a renewal of optimism and the feeling that a unique opportunity exists to move on from the divisions and problems of the past to a more positive future. The atmosphere of reconciliation will improve the chances of constructive co-operation between the representatives of the two traditions.

Political Restructuring and Reform

39. A Labour administration will promote the negotiation of an agreed system of devolved government including a power-sharing executive as envisaged in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The exact

² The text of the statement is appended to this document.

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basis of such a system of devolution will be for decision by the Northern Ireland political parties involved, in conjunction with the Labour government. No system which fails to provide for effective participation by representatives of both traditions and to enjoy broad support in Northern Ireland will be accepted. The establishment of such a devolved administration will take place, in the first instance at least, without prejudice to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, except in so far as the Agreement itself provides for the transfer of responsibilities from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to such an administration. Since the signing of the Agreement, Labour spokespersons have made it clear that while the Party remains totally committed to it, its provisions should not be regarded as if they were carved in stone. A Labour government would be willing to enter into talks with the executive of such a devolved administration (once it had shown its ability to command majority support in Northern Ireland, and had demonstrated significant support among members of both traditions) on the possible revision of parts of the Agreement. If representations were made for changes which did not conflict with the policies of the Labour administration, and it seemed to the government that they would promote reconciliation and strengthen the devolved administration, consideration would be given to initiating the necessary changes.

40. In the event of a failure by political parties in Northern Ireland to agree a basis for internal devolution, a Labour government will reserve the right to review means for strengthening the institutional and representative provisions of the Agreement with a view to providing for alternative structures of government. Whilst the Labour Party continues to believe that a devolved administration would be preferable to the present system of Direct Rule, a future Labour government would not hesitate to use the ~~institutions and powers of Direct Rule~~ to act in areas which might otherwise be the province of such a devolved administration. Under such circumstances, no

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vetoed on policies would be tolerated. In the absence of agreement on a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland, political representatives there will regrettably continue to have no direct role in executive decision-making at any but the most local level.

41. The new Labour administration will institute an immediate review of existing arrangements to assess what changes are necessary for effective implementation of its policies. Where indicated by the review, existing institutions and procedures will be restructured or changed and new institutions created.
42. Among the questions such a review would consider would be whether there was a need to strengthen the Northern Ireland Office, widen its areas of direct responsibility and increase its co-ordinating and directive role in relation to the Northern Ireland departments.
43. The authority of the Secretary of State and Northern Ireland Ministers, and their control of decision-making, will be enhanced. They will work in close co-operation with each other to determine priorities and promote the agreed strategy.
44. The present sexual and religious imbalances at the highest levels of the Northern Ireland Civil Service will be remedied at the earliest opportunity. Changes will not be made at the expense of existing civil servants, but will be achieved through a process of expansion, internal advancement and new recruitment. Following a review of the situation at the start of the Labour government's term of office, goals and timetables will be established for the remedying of imbalances.
45. Within the Northern Ireland Office and each Northern Ireland department, ~~equality of opportunity units will be charged with~~ the following tasks:

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- * the monitoring of staff compositions, recruitment, appointment and promotion to ensure fair representation; and
- * the scrutinising of all practices, policy recommendations, decisions and legislation relevant to their departments to ensure equality of opportunity for all.

The units will have the power to recommend changes in practices, policy or legislation to ensure equality of opportunity. Their principal officers will have direct access to the relevant Ministers and, if necessary, to the Secretary of State. The units will be part of the overall equality of opportunity programme which was described in more detail above.

46. As appointments to public boards and quasi-governmental agencies come up for renewal, their memberships will be reviewed and appointments made to increase their representativeness and to promote the democratic process. In particular, consideration will be given to the appointment of locally elected representatives to such posts and to providing for effective representation of minority and under-represented groups.

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C: HARMONISATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND NORTHERN IRELAND

47. It has become widely accepted in recent years that the conflict within Northern Ireland cannot be resolved simply through changes in its internal arrangements. There is a growing acceptance of the need for an 'Irish dimension'. The strategy outlined below is designed to highlight the advantages of progress towards a united Ireland, without involving any violation of the principle of consent. It is designed to cover every significant policy area and to extend rather than limit the rights of the communities in Northern Ireland.
48. Co-operation with the Republic will be multi-dimensional, covering all the major institutional, economic, cultural, legal and security questions. In contrast to the policies of previous governments, which tended to focus on security and to be one-dimensional, it will be important to maintain a balanced approach with comprehensive and inter-linked packages of measures being adopted. Any movement towards the establishment of a united Ireland should be founded on the need to increase freedom and prosperity. Of the many difficulties in the path of progress towards a united Ireland, fear of economic deprivation and loss of civil liberties are important barriers in both parts of Ireland. It will, therefore, be important to ensure that changes do not affect adversely the existing rights or living standards of individuals in either part of the island.
49. The proposals put forward below are presented under six headings. First, we describe the institutional framework which will be employed. Secondly, we indicate the ways in which the economy of Northern Ireland will have to be reconstructed, together with proposals for the harmonisation of the economies of the North and South. Thirdly, we deal with the related issue of the equalisation of social security provision. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections cover co-operation in education,

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harmonisation of the legal systems and security respectively. In the last section we make the point that it would be naive to expect that measures taken to remove the causes of violence would suddenly bring violence itself to a halt. An effective security policy, which should not be confused with a military solution, would remain a necessity for some time to come.

The Institutional Framework

50. Since November 1985, the politics of Northern Ireland have been dominated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Institutional questions have been restricted to consideration of the Agreement-inspired bodies, the Inter-Governmental Conference and the Secretariat. We do not regard the Agreement as an end in itself and a future Labour government will build on the existing institutional framework. We will continue to encourage the formation of a Parliamentary tier.
51. The institutions established by the Agreement, the Inter-Governmental Conference and the Secretariat which services it, have been used, so far, primarily for discussing security and related issues. For a Labour government to be able to pursue its harmonisation strategy it will be necessary to expand the scope and resources of these institutions, something that will not involve any conflict with the Agreement as it exists at present. We envisage the expansion of the Secretariat to provide for sections with specific expertise and remits related to each of the major Northern Ireland departments and to their counterparts in the Republic, while retaining a central section to provide overall co-ordination between the governments. In addition we will encourage direct bilateral discussions between Northern Ireland departments and their equivalents in Dublin. Each specialist section of the Secretariat will be charged with

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developing proposals for harmonisation in its area, doing so in consultation with the relevant departments in Belfast and Dublin.

52. Instead of being devoted primarily to crisis management, as at present, the Inter-Governmental Conference meetings will be devoted to discussions of specific proposals for harmonisation in each departmental area and will involve participation by Ministers with responsibility for those departments in the North and the Republic. Input of ideas and proposals from the North or the South will be possible at both the Secretariat level and the meetings of the Inter-Governmental Conference. Such an arrangement will obviously have to be agreed with the Irish Government, but subject to such agreement will provide a powerful and practical method of pursuing Labour's harmonisation programme.
53. The European Community (EC) will play an important role in encouraging harmonisation in at least three respects. First, the onset of the Single Market has the potential for drawing both parts of Ireland more closely together economically. Secondly, regional aid can be better utilised to assist economic development. Thirdly, the social policy of the EC provides an important foundation on which to build a harmonised social policy for Ireland, North and South. The development of a coherent and progressive EC Social Policy to accompany the progress of the Single Market should thus be supported for the positive effect it will have on Irish unity, as well as because of the more human face it gives to the Community.

Economic Harmonisation

54. ~~Although it would be unrealistic to assume that economic recovery would act as an instant panacea, it is certain that any hope of political stability would depend on a successful~~

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resolution of the acute economic problems. Furthermore, the Republic's own economic difficulties could constitute a hindrance both to the development of the northern economy and to the prospects of political progress. We share, therefore, the views of the Irish trade unions North and South of the Border that what is needed is an all-Ireland recovery programme.

55. Both economies have much in common, suffering severely from the post-1974 world recessions exacerbated by the mistakes of past governments. Both have above average unemployment, relatively low incomes and relatively high costs of living, costs which have been accentuated by the distortions resulting from the presence of the Border. Both suffer from the economic effects of violence, directly in security costs and, indirectly, through lack of inward investment and the restricted development of tourism.
56. It would be tempting for a new Labour government to take unilateral action to attempt to remedy the problems of the Northern Irish economy, but this would be to ignore several important issues. First, Northern Ireland's acute economic difficulties is endemic and not merely a reflection of Tory government policy since 1979. Secondly, over-stimulation is likely simply to lead to an even greater deficit in the Province's trade with Britain. Indeed excessive dependence on the mainland economy has been a longstanding problem for Northern Ireland. Thirdly, a cost-effective policy can only be conducted on an all-Ireland basis. Fourthly, among the great barriers facing both economies are the distortions created by the existence of the border itself, so economic regeneration would be more likely to succeed if these distortions were addressed directly. Finally, the increasing constraints placed on unilateral government action by both states' membership of the EC, particularly with the advent of the Single European Market, would create further difficulties.

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57. As far as economic policy is concerned, the increasing Europeanisation of policy-making is likely to have implications for the North, for the Republic and for Anglo-Irish relations in general. In order to secure for both parts of Ireland the most advantageous position in the single market and from the implementation of the Single European Act (SEA), a high degree of co-operation between the British and Irish Governments will be necessary.
58. Both Irish economies could face serious disruption as a result of the SEA. The proposed abolition of all barriers to trade could provoke significant economic difficulties, and alter the patterns of trade, particularly in the border areas. The dangers the single market would present to the weaker peripheral economies of the EC is well-recognised. The SEA itself assumes a large expansion of the Social and Regional Funds. However, if sufficient resources to minimise damage as a result of the creation of the single market are to be provided, the authorities governing the peripheral regions (Objective One areas) will have to co-operate closely. Furthermore, if both parts of Ireland are to receive an adequate share of such support, it will be necessary to present joint British-Irish schemes to the EC, particularly in the form of an integrated development programme for the border regions. Given the EC framework, both political and economic considerations dictate increasing integration of the Northern and Southern economies.
59. There is a further incentive to adopt such a strategy. The economic costs of violence, in terms of damage inflicted on material and human productive capacity and with respect to lost inward investment, are substantial. By remedying some of the political and economic grievances at the root of the violence, economic co-operation between the two governments will contribute to an amelioration of the security situation.

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60. Given these factors, it will be natural for the Inter-Governmental Conference and the Secretariat to devote much of their effort to agreeing a basis for bi-lateral co-operation in the day-to-day running of the two economies. The issues which will merit particular attention will be monetary reform, industrial strategy, agriculture, energy, transport and tourism.
61. An essential element in the process of economic co-operation will be movement towards a common currency. Labour will take steps to re-establish a stable relationship between the currencies in the two parts of Ireland.
62. The existence of the Border has distorted inward investment, and the two major development agencies - the Industrial Development Agency (IDA) in the Republic and the Industrial Development Board (IDB) in Northern Ireland - have been forced into a situation of competition with each other. Given the global perspectives of investors, these agencies are also competing directly with others in Scotland, Wales and the North of England, not to mention Spain, Portugal and elsewhere in the EC. Such competition is unnecessarily wasteful and undermines the negotiating position of both agencies. Early efforts will be made to resolve this through the creation of an all-Ireland agency with agreed criteria for the encouragement of inward investment. The same argument applies to the existence of separate tourist organisations. In addition, a common approach will be sought on regional development, with the submission of joint schemes to the EC Regional and Social Funds, in order to maximise European backing for a large-scale programme of job creation.
63. Since agriculture is a major contributor to production and employment in both parts of Ireland, any move towards economic harmonisation will have, of necessity, to deal with the problems of agriculture. In no other area is there such an explicit

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degree of common interest between North and South. Harmonisation of agricultural policy, and joint action by Dublin and London, will provide benefits, particularly to the farmers of Northern Ireland. Within the framework of the EC, Northern farmers have long regarded themselves as receiving less favourable treatment than their Southern counterparts. Given the far less salient nature of agriculture in Britain compared to the Republic, the interests of Northern Ireland farmers have almost inevitably been neglected compared to those in the South. As part of an all-Ireland bloc within the EC, the influence of Northern Ireland farmers in the formulation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will be significantly strengthened. They will be in a much better position to secure the levels of protection and support which farmers in other peripheral regions have been able to obtain. A Labour government will seek to build such a co-operative approach with Dublin as soon as possible.

64. Even more substantial rationalisation could be achieved in the sphere of energy policy. The British Government's commitment to privatisation of Northern Ireland Electricity is hardly likely to be conducive to the reduction of the already exorbitant energy costs in Northern Ireland. The establishment of an all-Ireland energy authority would result in large savings for both economies, as such an organisation could adopt more rational schemes for the use of energy resources in and around both parts of Ireland, as well as exploiting greater economies of scale. The re-establishment of the electricity inter-connector will be placed on the agenda of such an authority, together with responsibility for the possible development of all indigenous fuels on the island of Ireland.
65. High transport costs are yet another unnecessary burden on the two economies. ~~Some extra costs are inevitable given the peripheral location of the island in Europe, but this makes more~~

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urgent the elimination of unnecessary inefficiencies. In terms of public transport, there is little to justify the existence of two railway companies with such limited mileage. As for road transport, there is a clear need for a common planning body, and for an all-Ireland network designed to improve infrastructural links north to south and east to west. A scheduled Belfast-Dublin air service to complement the myriad of services between Britain and different parts of Ireland, is long overdue.

Social Security Provision

66. Concerns that those on social security in Northern Ireland would be worse off in a united Ireland have often been cited as an obstacle to winning consent for unification, even among people from a Nationalist background. Harmonisation will not be simply a question of adjusting levels of benefits, but will involve changes to the type and basis of provision. Recent changes in both dispensations, however, have reduced differences in the form and level of benefit provision. The resources of an expanded Secretariat, and meetings of the Inter-Governmental Conference, will be used to negotiate with the Irish Government harmonisation on a basis which conforms with the terms spelt out in agreed EC provisions. A Labour government would continue to help finance the system after unification, if necessary, as part of a negotiated financial settlement with the Irish Government. Despite this commitment, we would expect the financial burden to decline as the economic recovery programme began to take effect. Determined efforts will also be made to obtain EC funds for employment creation and vocational training, as outlined above, thereby reducing numbers dependent on social security.

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Educational Co-operation

67. The National Question and the differences in traditions and historical perception are central to the divisions within Northern Ireland and between the North and South of Ireland. It would be nonsense and morally unacceptable to suppress such differences. What is acceptable, however, is to attempt to create more realistic and less antagonistic perceptions of the differences between the two traditions.
68. The Anglo-Irish Agreement has already provided an opportunity for the Irish Government to have some say in education policy and practice in Northern Ireland. Such a development is to be welcomed and should be mutual. It should be extended to ensure that curriculum development in the respective education systems reduces differences of approach and increasingly brings the systems into line on both sides of the Border. The objective should be to achieve a common philosophy of education, as far as possible, and to encourage appropriate schemes to provide pupils with an appreciation of both their own traditions and those of others. In the sphere of higher education, there are obvious advantages to be gained from cross-border co-operation. Efforts will be made to facilitate and encourage students from either jurisdiction to be educated in the other, and to equalise grant provision. Steps will be taken to promote co-operation, much of which already takes place, to develop a unified system of student recruitment and to rationalise undergraduate and postgraduate course provision to optimise subject availability within Ireland.

Legal Harmonisation

69. The Single European Act has major implications for harmonisation in the field of commercial law. Progress towards common provisions, particularly in respect of company law, is likely

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to result from the process of establishing the Single Market. In other fields of law, it is important to identify those areas in which harmonisation is not only desirable but also realistic. Criminal law is one such area, whereas in the case of family law it is likely that the differences of approach in the two jurisdictions will not easily be bridged. With respect to the criminal law, the focus of attempts to increase legal co-operation has so far been dominated by the issue of extradition. Although legislative changes and recent judicial rulings have simplified and facilitated the extradition process, extradition to a judicial system which lacks legitimacy among a large section of the population in Northern Ireland will continue to be an emotive issue and to place strains on Anglo-Irish co-operation. Whilst overall judicial reform will be essential, therefore, confidence in the system of justice could be increased in the short-term by greater use of the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act, permitting trial in one jurisdiction of defendants accused of crimes in the other. This would have the advantage of reducing delays and could be implemented without the need for new legislation. In the longer term, this procedure could also be used to promote the establishment of common standards of court procedure, rules of evidence and sentencing.

70. As far as family law is concerned, there are major differences between the two systems. It would be unrealistic, in the short term, to expect either jurisdiction to change its position on emotive issues such as divorce, contraception or abortion. Given this state of affairs, it will be necessary to guarantee that moves towards a united Ireland will be accompanied by the maintenance of existing rights for the residents of Northern Ireland at least. This could be guaranteed through a Bill of Rights or by an expanded role, with enforcement powers, for an all-Ireland equivalent of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR). As this paragraph demonstrates, a united

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D: FROM REFORM AND HARMONISATION TO UNIFICATION

Ireland will only be feasible to the extent that mechanisms are found to accommodate diversity and protect cherished rights and beliefs.

Security Co-operation

71. No set of policy measures can be expected to end violence immediately. The focus of this document is not on the short term, but we recognise that the high degree of co-operation between the various security agencies will need to continue, and to increase, for the foreseeable future. In order to facilitate such co-operation and to allow for the eventual integration of the different agencies, measures will have to be taken to re-build public confidence in the respective police forces and other security services. To this end, consideration will be given to the creation of an all-Ireland structure which will consider the operations of the RUC and Garda, but without infringing their operational autonomy. Steps will be taken to review the role of the British army in support of the civil power with a view to assessing the efficacy of its operations and their effect on both the immediate security situation and the climate of opinion in Northern Ireland.

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D: FROM REFORM AND HARMONISATION TO UNIFICATION

72. Labour's policy on Northern Ireland starts with the need to end the conflict and bring about peace. Its commitment to work for a united Ireland derives from the belief that that route provides the only real prospect of peace. The consent qualification is included for reasons of principle, and because the Party is convinced that peaceful unification will be impossible except with the consent of those involved.
73. Even given the consent of the people of Northern Ireland, however, unification could occur only with the full co-operation, at every stage, of the Government of the Republic of Ireland. For that reason a newly elected Labour government will enter into immediate talks with Dublin to agree a basis for the process of harmonisation outlined in section C above.
74. The unification of Ireland will not be cost-free for either Dublin or London. In the long-term the revival of the economy in the North, the reduction and eventual cessation of violence, and the removal of unnecessary barriers and constraints will lead to a reduction of costs and to material improvements for everyone, whether in the North and South of Ireland, or in Britain. But in the short term there would be a significant shift of the financial burden from London to Dublin.
75. In recognition of this, once consent to the constitutional step of unification has been demonstrated in Northern Ireland, a Labour government will agree with the Irish Government and any devolved administration in Belfast a basis for continuing financial support, beginning at a level corresponding to the subvention then being provided for Northern Ireland by the British Treasury. Such an agreement will be negotiated on the understanding that support will continue until the benefits of

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unification have resulted in a sufficient strengthening of the exchequer of a united Ireland to allow the full burden to be borne within the island.

76. In addition to the above financial support, a Labour government will make a joint approach with the Irish Government to the European Community with the object of negotiating a package of financial measures specifically designed to provide European support for the process of unification and to offset such extra short and medium term costs as may arise from it. Such a package will be in addition to any European Community support already provided for regional development or other purposes.
77. It is our belief that the vigorous and committed pursuit of the programme outlined above, by a British government determined that its writ will run, will benefit the people of Northern Ireland and, eventually, those of the Republic of Ireland and Britain as well.
78. No British government has yet sought to deal with the conflict in Northern Ireland by addressing its root causes and introducing policies designed to remove them. Labour's policy is a practical, flexible and realistic programme which will have every chance of success. The next Labour government will implement it with vigour and determination.

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APPENDIX

1. Introduction

The Labour Party reaffirms its policy on Northern Ireland as set out in our 1981 Conference Statement, 1982

NEW RIGHTS, NEW PROSPERITY AND NEW HOPE

should be united **FOR NORTHERN IRELAND** the basis of consent and by peaceful, democratic means.

As we have made clear in our previous statements, we respect and support the wishes of people in Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom as long as the majority so choose. We therefore support the commitment

A Policy Statement of the National Executive Committee


of the Labour Party

But, as we have also said, no group or party should or will be allowed to exercise a veto on political development or on policies designed to win consent. Labour's objective is to help unite a divided island so that it can achieve and sustain economic prosperity and lasting peace.

This will not be an easy task. We will have to work hard for such consent in Northern Ireland, because without it Britain could be bequeathing to the people of Ireland a legacy of bitterness, violence and anarchy. We will also have to defeat the scourge of paramilitary violence in the process and so deploy security forces effectively and sensitively.

This requires a two-fold strategy. First, we will seek to establish, together with the Government of the Republic, a major programme to harmonise economic systems throughout Ireland.

April 1987



Secondly, we will seek to ensure that the civil, political and religious rights and personal freedoms of different traditions are guaranteed.

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Second, and at the same time, our policy will promote
eliminating conflict and encouraging
trust. It will be important to secure both
The Labour Party reaffirms its policy on Northern
Ireland as set out in our 1981 Conference Statement, 1982
Programme and 1983 Manifesto. We believe that Ireland
should be united and this should be done on the basis of
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1. Introduction

The Labour Party reaffirms its policy on Northern
Ireland as set out in our 1981 Conference Statement, 1982
Programme and 1983 Manifesto. We believe that Ireland
should be united and this should be done on the basis of
consent and by peaceful, democratic means.

As we have made clear in our previous statements,
we respect and support the wishes of people in Northern
Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom as long as the
majority so choose. We therefore support the commitment
contained in the Anglo-Irish Agreement that "any change in
the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with
the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland".
But, as we have also said, no group or party should or will
be allowed to exercise a veto on political development or
on policies designed to win consent. Labour's objective is
to help unite a divided island so that it can achieve and
sustain economic prosperity and lasting peace.

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process and so deploy security forces effectively and
sensitively.

This requires a two-fold strategy. First, we will
seek to establish, together with the Government of the
Republic, a major programme to harmonise the economic and
welfare systems throughout Ireland. And we will aim to
~~reconcile the respective legal systems to ensure that~~
civil, political and religious rights and personal freedoms
of different traditions are guaranteed.

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Second, and at the same time, our policy will promote discussions aimed at eliminating conflict and encouraging mutual trust. It will be important to assure both traditions that their respective identities and basic rights will be protected and enhanced. The discussions will take place at two levels: between the governments of Britain and the Republic, and among the various interests in Northern Ireland.

2. The Anglo-Irish Agreement

In Labour's Programme 1982 we said that "anything which helps to promote understanding between the two parts of Ireland is to be welcomed, even if it does not directly lead to actual political unity". It is on these grounds that we have given the Anglo-Irish Agreement our support. We have no illusions that the Agreement alone can transform the political, security, economic or legal situation in Northern Ireland, or Northern Ireland's status. But we believe that the Agreement's provisions are a step in the right direction.

We also said in 1982 that "a future Labour government will, therefore, continue to work with the government of the Republic of Ireland to achieve ways of increasing co-operation and understanding between Britain and Ireland".

It is because the Anglo-Irish Agreement now makes some contribution to the process of inter-governmental discussions that it deserves support. We believe that the two governments should use it to propose and adopt the measures necessary to improve living standards and restore civil liberties.

The Agreement also provides for the two Governments to promote social and economic development. It is to this

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that Labour attaches supreme importance. For the economy of Northern Ireland desperately needs revitalisation after years of Tory Government.

In government, Labour will press on with the discussions. Talks with the government of the Republic and the political parties, both North and South, will be initiated to explore how our aims can best be achieved. We will continue to talk, too, with trade unions and other relevant interests. And we will continue to support all those groups concerned with peace and reconciliation which challenge sectarianism - and which seek to promote the interests of people in both traditions.

3. The Economy

The Labour Party believes that peace and security cannot be achieved if policies are divorced from the conditions in which people live. Successive Conservative governments have decimated the economy and impoverished Northern Ireland's people:

- * unemployment has nearly doubled since 1979 and now stands at over 20 per cent - higher than any region in Britain and second only to Sardinia in the EEC;

- * manufacturing jobs have fallen by 33 per cent since 1978;

- * 32 per cent of households have an income of less than £75 per week;

- * one child in every four is in a claimant family;

- * a quarter of the population claims means-tested benefits;

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- * over 10 per cent of housing in Northern Ireland is unfit for human habitation - a higher proportion than any region in Britain - yet housing construction has fallen by over 40 per cent since 1978.

In such conditions frustration and poverty easily lead to alienation, despair and then to violence.

The practice and principles of Labour's economic and industrial strategy will help to revitalise and rebuild the economy in Northern Ireland. And we will reinforce this strategy with additional measures designed to meet the particular problems of the area.

- * Labour's plan for economic recovery will involve the reflation of the economy to increase demand, output, and employment - with job creation being given the very highest priority.
- * Labour will implement a programme of intensive public investment - in housing and infrastructure - so as to help create more jobs in Northern Ireland.
- * Labour will help to increase investment in manufacturing - by the channelling of funds from financial institutions, by the extension of public enterprise and through our industrial strategy. Our aim will be to revive the manufacturing sector upon which the Northern Ireland economy has traditionally been based.

The Labour Government will also work with the Government of the Republic to strengthen economic links between the north and south of Ireland. Specifically, we will seek to integrate the policies of north and south on investment, economic development, energy, transport and agriculture. And we will work with the Government of the Republic to boost tourism and inward investment in Ireland as a whole.

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Labour will also work closely with the organisations and representatives of working people in Northern Ireland - especially the trade unions - to implement democratic socialist policies, create jobs and build a strong economy in Northern Ireland.

4. Equal Opportunities

We recognise the rights of all people in Northern Ireland to equality of opportunity and decent living standards. In addition, therefore, to the creation of jobs, Labour will repeal the payments for Debt (Emergency Provisions) Act (NI) 1971. This has exacerbated the position of those working people already suffering most from Government policies.

We recognise that existing fair employment and equal opportunities practices can make a contribution. But both direct and indirect discrimination remain major problems. We will take steps to increase the effectiveness of anti-discrimination programmes in Northern Ireland, including the promotion of positive action programmes. We will reform, strengthen and make more active use of the existing instruments and agencies of government to ensure the effective promotion of equality of opportunity. And, through out new contract compliance strategy, contracts and grants awarded by government will include requirements to this end. Our programme will not, of course, entail a quota system or the replacement of one individual by another. The effectiveness of our anti-discrimination programmes will be further enhanced by the boost to the economy provided by Labour's economic strategy.

To give effect to Labour's opposition to discrimination on the grounds of religion, politics, sex or sexual orientation, we will introduce stronger additional measures to end such discrimination in Northern Ireland. The Fair Employment Agency, the Equal Opportunities Commission

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(Northern Ireland), the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Complaints will be retained. If necessary, they will be reformed and given strengthened enforcement powers. Women's rights, including the right to abortion, will be extended as a matter of priority. And we will seek to provide for all children the opportunity of schooling in a public education system that is comprehensive and integrated, rather than confine such a system exclusively to the tertiary sector.

5. Security and Civil Liberties

Civil liberties are vital to democratic socialism and to human happiness and freedom. Their erosion represents the undermining of our way of life, and a victory for those committed to violence. For this reason, and as an essential step in its programme for a political settlement, the Labour Party is committed to the restoration and extension of civil liberty in Northern Ireland. To achieve this, and to increase the level of public confidence in the administration of justice, we will introduce a series of administrative and legislative reforms.

The right to live in peace is also a fundamental human right. This is why the Labour Party welcomes the priority attached to improving the security situation in Northern Ireland in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Labour is fully committed to the fight against all paramilitary violence. But we believe that the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 has proved to be ineffective and unnecessary. Labour will repeal it, in its entirety. We will thereby restore the right to remain silent, remove exclusion from the statute book and end the arbitrary provisions for detention without charge.

The Labour Party is committed to the eventual repeal

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of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 which has earned international and domestic notoriety. As a first step, the Act will be amended to remove its more unnecessary and unacceptable powers.

The "supergrass" trials have been shown to be unfair. They have brought the legal system into disrepute with both traditions. Labour will legislate to end them. The conviction of people in Diplock Courts on the basis of one person's uncorroborated accomplice evidence is unacceptable.

We are opposed to the system of Diplock Courts in which scheduled offences are dealt with by a single judge, sitting without a jury. As a first step we will replace the single judge court by three judges - as we have said in previous statements, and as the Government of the Republic has urged. We will work towards the restoration of jury trial for all offences.

Labour will end the humiliating and degrading regime of strip searching such as that which prevailed at Armagh Prison. The sexual harassment and degradation of prisoners which resulted from this is totally unacceptable to us. While committed to maintaining prison security, we will ensure that this is done by the most modern and acceptable techniques and according to strictly enforced guidelines.

Labour will take a number of measures to increase public confidence in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and to reduce the imbalance in recruitment. We will enhance the independence of the Independent Commission for Police Complaints. We will ensure the publication of an RUC Code of Conduct. We will review present recruiting methods. And we will establish an effective system of compensation for injury - one which recognises the risks run by RUC members and reduces delays in paying compensation.