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Secure Fax

15 November 1995

SECURE-FX TRANSMISSION 002:004 11 mars must to had EMBASSY OF IRELAND 2234 MAS E.N.W. 20008 PSS MD MURPAY TEAHON MR. S. DONLON ADAMS MEETING WITH KENNEDY AND

Dear Secretary

- 1. The meeting between Adams and Senators Kennedy and Dodd lasted 11/4 hours. According to Senator Kennedy's Office, the Sinn Féin President "looked whipped and beaten" and painted a very bleak picture of the state of the peace process. In this overall regard, the two Senators came away with the view that Adams had come to Washington (a) to convey a clear warning in private, both to them and to the White House, that the process was falling apart and that he could not "hold out much longer", and (b) to get Washington to up the pressure on the British.
- 2. In his briefing. Adams placed absolute emphasis on the need for a date for all-party talks to be agreed at the earliest possible moment. This, he added, might not be a date that either he or John Hume would like, but it would move the process forward and give him "breathing space". It would also facilitate him in being flexible in all other areas.
- 3. On the other hand, if a date was not delivered. Adams' message was that he was at the end of the road and that the IRA would go back to their campaign. Asked how much time he thought he had, Adams said he did not "want to talk about time-lines" but that he wanted the Senators to understand that "I really can't hold out much longer". (One person present at the meeting even felt that Adams was hinting there

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might not be a further warning). He emphasised that he had held the ring for fifteen months, adding that the situation in the North was in sad contrast to that of Bosnia where, despite the scale of killings there, talks got under way a few weeks after a ceasefire had been put in place. Senator Kennedy made this latter point to the press subsequently.

- 4. The Adams briefing had a very worrying impact on Kennedy and Dodd, in particular as this was the first time that Adams has spoken of the IRA being close to going back to violence. (Dodd, as a result, also had some initial concern about the President going on a visit to Ireland if there was a danger of the process coming apart shortly afterwards).
- 5. The Morrison/O'Dowd idea of a US Envoy, to try and facilitate parties getting around the table, did not come up in discussion. Adams told me subsequently that he has no position on the proposal - his priority, as is clear from the above, is to maximise the pressure on John Major to move. Kennedy, asked by journalists for his views on the issue, kept his options open - if only to put pressure on the British - but, in reality, he has given no thought to it.
- 6. I have briefed the White House and Senator Kennedy's Office on the latest developments, and will be meeting Senator Dodd tomorrow. I have in particular again emphasised that everything is being done by the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste to move matters forward over the coming days. The White House is fully conscious of this; Lake also has been urging the British, in telephone calls this week, to show maximum flexibility. His firm view is that the British are committed to trying to get agreement on the twin-track approach as quickly as possible.

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- 7. It is likely that Dodd and Kennedy will now seek to brief the President directly on the above; given that the President is "consumed" with the budget crisis at present, this is unlikely to take place before next week.
- 8. Adams is meeting Lake and Soderberg this evening, and we will make contact with both sides afterwards.

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Yours sincerely

Dermot Gallagher Ambassador

Seán Ó hUiginn Uas Secretary Anglo-Irish Division Department of Foreign Affairs