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PST; PSS; Messrs. Teahon,
Donlon & Dalton;
Ambassadors London &
Washington; Joint Secretary;
Counsellors A-I

002/004

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EMBASSY OF IRELAND

2234 MASSACHUSETTS AVE., N.W.

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28 May 1997

DISCUSSION WITH JIM STEINBERG

Dear Secretary

1. This is just to confirm the details of my telephone call with Jim Steinberg, the Deputy at the NSC, in The Hague this afternoon.
2. Steinberg was particularly interested in having a sense of the Sinn Féin meeting today with British officials. We discussed this, and then went on to reflect again on tomorrow's meeting between the President and the Prime Minister. Steinberg's view is that, in the absence of any "specifics" from the Sinn Féin meeting, the President should make a fairly general statement tomorrow. This would welcome the steps taken by the Prime Minister to move the peace process forward, express strong support for the efforts of the two Governments, call for the present opportunity to be seized, urge the IRA to restore their ceasefire (an aspect which I strongly endorsed), and look forward to inclusive talks.
3. Pat Hennessy has picked up a similar sense of what the President is likely to say, and this is attached.
4. Steinberg also asked me to take him through the present state of the decommissioning discussions between the British and ourselves and I was happy to do this. We had, I might add, passed on a copy of our paper to the White House earlier in the week.

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
Trimble

5. Steinberg said that the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, had spoken this week with David Trimble. He found the Unionist Leader to be generally non-committal and "holding his fire"; Trimble also made the point that many of the current issues were still very difficult for him. Overall, the White House had a sense of someone who had still to analyse fully the recent election results, and to decide in which direction he intended leading his party in the changed electoral circumstances both in Britain and Northern Ireland.

Mo Mowlam

6. Steinberg also went over a number of aspects of our respective discussions with the Secretary of State in Washington last Friday. He said Mo Mowlam had made the point that, if a ceasefire were declared, it would be possible for the British to take a number of helpful initiatives pretty well immediately. As you know, she had suggested in our discussion that such initiatives would include an early meeting with Sinn Féin at political level.

Yours sincerely



Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

Seán Ó hUiginn Uas
Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

President's Statement in London

We understand from a reliable source that the paragraph on Northern Ireland in the President's opening statement at tomorrow's joint press conference in London, in its current draft, contains the following elements:

- applauds the Prime Minister for adding momentum to the peace process
- the President is convinced that the Prime Minister, working with the Irish Government, is committed to the achievement of inclusive talks
- the President is confident that if Sinn Féin do call a ceasefire they will be included in inclusive talks
- if asked about the setting of a date for entry to talks, the President will reiterate his conviction that in the event of a ceasefire Sinn Féin will gain entry to the talks.

P Hennessy

28 May 1997

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23 May 1997

DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Secretary

1. Mo Mowlam, the Secretary of State, called to the Residence this afternoon. We know each other of old, and had a very relaxed conversation which extended well beyond the half hour originally scheduled. She was accompanied by the British Ambassador, Sir John Kerr, Quentin Thomas, Anthony Cary (British Embassy), and her private secretary, Ken Lindsay. Pat Hennessy was with me.
2. The Secretary of State felt that her visit to Washington had gone well. She had met last evening with Peter King, Richie Neal, and one or two others, with Senators Dodd and Kennedy this morning, and was just coming from lunch with Sandy Berger at the White House. (Pat Hennessy will be reporting on these).
3. She spoke positively of this week's meeting of British Officials with Sinn Féin, and was clearly interested in our sense of the Sinn Féin reaction. This led on to a discussion of the four Sinn Féin requirements for a ceasefire. The Secretary of State thought the timeframe and confidence issues were well on the way to being resolved. However, the date for entry of Sinn Féin into talks was a problem. She and Thomas made it clear that Sinn Féin could not join the talks on the same day as the ceasefire was called. If a way forward was to be found, therefore, there would have to be frank talking at the next meeting between British Officials and the party in order to ascertain what the core Sinn Féin position was. Overall, however, she felt that, with careful choreography, this issue could be resolved.
4. The Secretary of State said she had discussed with the White House what they could do

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to help in the period between a ceasefire and Sinn Féin's entry into talks; she saw the granting of a visa to Gerry Adams as one obvious step. She gave a sense also that the British Government would be prepared to talk at political level with Sinn Féin pretty well immediately a ceasefire was called. She added that a continuation of the present de facto ceasefire would be helpful in enabling London to move matters forward quickly once a new declaration was made (she mentioned that she had said much the same thing publicly in an interview to-day with Jim Dougal).


5. À propos the above, I should mention that I had some slight sense from our visitors that, if Sinn Féin maintained their requirement of same day entry, the British might give consideration to an adjournment of the talks, possibly to September, with bilateral activity substituting in the meantime for roundtable discussions. However, I suspect that until the NIO tease out Sinn Féin intentions further at their next meeting, London's thinking will remain very tentative on this.
6. On decommissioning, the Secretary of State's view was to stick firmly to the Mitchell Principles. She also emphasised the importance of a joint position by the two Governments. Thomas took the opportunity to refer lightly to the fact that we "owed" them a paper in this area, going on to add that there had to be more to decommissioning than a readiness to "consider" it. I thought the Secretary of State deliberately held her own counsel on this latter point!
7. We spent some time discussing David Trimble's role in the process. She felt that she should perhaps have spent more time over the past week taking Unionist leaders, including Trimble, through her various initiatives, and thereby helping to minimize criticism. That said, she thought that Trimble had shown a welcome restraint in recent days, including in his interventions at Westminster this week. She especially welcomed his endorsement of the Blair Belfast speech, and felt he was now moving towards accepting inclusive talks.

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I said I hoped that Trimble would draw the appropriate lessons from the electoral apathy shown this week by many Unionists, and move to fill the need for real leadership which was now felt widely in the Unionist community. (Feeling that perhaps she personally could do with some encouragement, I warmly welcomed her initiatives since taking office, adding that anyone who shows leadership of this degree inevitably incurs criticism in the early stages before the benefits become more widely appreciated)

8. Overall, the commitment and the determination of the Secretary of State to moving the process forward came across clearly to us. At the door, she said privately that "we can do it" (i.e. reach an overall settlement) between now and next May. She added that, with such a historic opportunity, it was ludicrous if we could not find a way forward on the date of entry issue.

Yours sincerely



Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

PS I have reluctantly to add that the Secretary of State did not look terribly well, although allowance must be made for her hectic schedule over the past week.

Seán Ó hUiginn Uas
Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

05/23/97 19:18

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23 May 1997

Dear Seán

As mentioned on the phone, it appears that Phil Lader, a long-time friend of the President, will be the next U.S. Ambassador to London. Both Phil and his wife, Linda, are good personal friends of Maeve and myself.

Lader is aged 51 and a native of South Carolina. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and also studied at Oxford. He worked for a number of years with a U.S. land and resort development company owned by Sir James Goldsmith and, around that time, ran unsuccessfully for Governor of South Carolina. He then moved to Australia where he was briefly President of a private University.


When President Clinton came into office, Lader was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff at the White House. He subsequently became Head of the Administration's Small Business Association, and has just recently stepped down from this post.

Phil and Linda are perhaps best known, however, for their organisation over many years of Renaissance Weekends, which bring together every New Year leading figures in politics (including the Clintons), business and the arts, with their families, for private seminars and discussion sessions, as well as sports and social get-togethers. Maeve and I, and the family, have attended in recent years as personal guests of the Laders (we are, I believe, the only diplomats to have been invited).

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The Laders have a reasonably informed interest in Irish issues and, for instance, always ask me to make presentations on Northern Ireland at Renaissance occasions (Maeve and the children have also addressed other aspects of the modern Ireland at them). If appointed to London, Phil will take a concerned interest in the North, and will wish to be helpful in every way possible. Needless to say, I will brief him fully once an announcement is made.

Yours sincerely



Dermot Gallagher
Ambassador

cc: Ambassador Barrington, London

Seán Ó hUiginn Uas
Secretary
Anglo-Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs

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SECURE FAX NO: SFG9

23 MAY 1997

TO HQ
FOR SECRETARY O HUIGINN

FROM WASHINGTON
FROM P HENNESSY

MOWLAM'S VISIT: CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS

1. I spoke with Congressmen Richie Neal and Peter King regarding their meeting last night with Mo Mowlam at the British Embassy. The meeting, at which Tom Manton was also present, took place prior to the dinner hosted by the British Ambassador. (Because of the Memorial Holiday weekend, Members were rushing to get out of town). Mowlam was accompanied by the British Ambassador, Sir John Kerr and Quentin Thomas.

- ▶ Neal was clearly impressed, finding Mowlam to be an engaging, effervescent character. He contrasted the lightness in the atmosphere with the clearly reluctant view of US engagement which characterized even the most benign encounters with Patrick Mayhew.
- ▶ Neal put it to Mowlam that in the past, the Labour party said the right things, but failed to deliver in government. She shot back that this Labour government intended to do the right things.
- ▶ She characterized decommissioning as a double-edged issue with implications for Loyalist as well as Republican paramilitaries. On the

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question of date of entry, Thomas said that it was not realistic to expect that a ceasefire would be called on a Tuesday and Sinn Féin would enter the talks on Wednesday. However, the British side were committed to expediting Sinn Féin's entry, and they would not allow the Unionists to stand in the way.

- ▶ Referring to the local elections, she expressed satisfaction that the Loyalist paramilitaries had done well.
 - ▶ She also spoke generally of the need to build up Trimble [I understand that the White House, to whom she also made this point, will be talking to him shortly.]
 - ▶ She put it to Neal and the others that she would be expecting them to lean on the "Shinners" (Neal was struck with her easy use of the term) to secure a new ceasefire.
 - ▶ She told Neal that she intended to deal with the Bloody Sunday issue. She acknowledged that innocent people had been killed. She was in touch with John Hume about this and was waiting for Hume to get "more data".
2. Peter King gave Mowlam a similarly positive assessment: he was impressed with her openness and her apparent readiness to deal flexibly with outstanding issues in the peace process ("she said all the right things"). However, he was very struck by her own evident concern regarding the marching season, and her uncertainty as to how the issue should be handled. [She struck a similar note at the White House,

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indicating pessimism that the Hume/Saulter channel could be revived.] At Gerry Adams' request, he had passed on to her appreciation for her visits to the Lower Ormeau and Garvaghey Road.

3. With regard to Sinn Féin's participation in the process, she sought to reassure King that Blair favoured an inclusive process. She agreed that decommissioning was a "phony issue", but given the profile it has been given by Major the new government had to deal with it.

Kennedy and Dodd

4. Mowlam also met separately with Senators Kennedy and Dodd. The meeting with Kennedy, which was one and a half hours in length, facilitated a detailed review of where matters now stand in contacts between Sinn Féin and the British Government. This tended to confirm that confidence-building measures and time frame did not pose major difficulties. On decommissioning, Mowlam emphasised her readiness to rely on the Mitchell Report. She noted that the concept of parallel decommissioning was nowhere defined, and also gave a sense that she was looking for a creative way around the problem.
6. In relation to timing, Mowlam and Kennedy reviewed strategies for getting Sinn Féin quickly into talks. Mowlam wondered if Sinn Fein had indicated to Kennedy that the present lull in activity could be interpreted as a ceasefire. Kennedy said that he could not confirm it in that sense, but told Mowlam that he had been asked by Sinn Féin to draw attention to the fact that there had been no attacks since Constable Collins in Derry.

ENDS