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**Title:** Note of a meeting between Taoiseach Jack Lynch and Tom Conaty and Seumas O'Hare of the Northern Ireland Advisory Committee, and Canon Pádraig Murphy of Ballymurphy, mainly regarding the behaviour of the British Army, policing and discrimination in Northern Ireland.

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Note of discussion between the Taoiseach and Messrs. Conaty and O'Hare of N.I. Advisory Commission and Canon Padraig Murphy of Ballymurphy.

The undersigned was in attendance.

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(Mr. Seumas O'Hare is a Solicitor and member of the N.I. Housing Executive as well as a member of the N.I. Advisory Commission. According to Mr. Conaty, Mr. O'Hare is a "green Tory").

1. The Irish Government, the SDLP and Mr. Whitelaw were very concerned about the long-term solution of the present N.I. situation: what the delegation were worried about was the danger to the minority community in the short-term. After the Heath initiative Mr. Whitelaw got support for peace from the minority - in Belfast alone there were 65,000 signatures obtained for a peace declaration (it was this that gave him the strong position from which he decided to meet the IRA for talks).

Now the same people would certainly show no reaction against violence towards the B. Army and would not sign a similar declaration.

The main reason for the change in attitude was the conduct of the British Army. Canon Murphy had congratulated Mr. Whitelaw on the low key of operation Motorman. The sequel, however, has been complete disillusionment with the Army on the part of the minority. Rapport with Tuzo has gone (For instance, Canon Murphy and others had worked out a study of recent assassinations and brought it to General Tuzo with a map suggesting a pattern. Tuzo reluctantly consented to hear them but did not want to accept the study. Later on he made a public announcement that he would welcome

2.

information and suggestions from the public about the assassinations giving the impression that he had had no co-operation before from the public). General Ford is insensitive and a "N.W. Frontier" commander employing a policy of domination. Andersonstown is now an open prison. Large silver forts have been erected in the Catholic Ghettoes and the Army gives the impression of digging in for a siege and of confrontation with a wholly hostile community. Colonel Wilford did not belie his previous reputation. He said on TV that he had no regrets for Bloody Sunday. His Paras were sent in to Shankill Road and shot Protestants - then they were transferred, of all places, to Ballymurphy, which was accepted as a calculated move to antagonise the minority.

The Army authorities were biased. They highlight the preponderance of Catholic guns discovered but fail to mention the much greater incidence of Catholic searches for guns. They made few, if any, arrests in Carrickfergus and Larne when the Protestants rioted and burned Catholic property and drove the Catholics out of their houses. In general the minority treat the Army as they did the B. Specials - as they have found they cannot trust the Army to be fair. As under Faulkner, the situation appears to be treated purely as a military one, with the Army allowed its head without apparent political control.

The British Army will not listen to representations from the minority side.

Motorman and the British Army presence have not rescued the minority from the IRA - rather have they put the Provos more firmly in the saddle. In the present climate of B. Army

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insensitivity and harassment there are 10 recruits waiting to fill the shoes of every IRA man captured or shot. Mr. Heath should be told that if the British Army cannot beat the IRA without flattening the whole community then the Army cannot win and should pull out.

If there was some show of action on any of the other fronts, e.g. jobs for the unemployed, action on discrimination, equal treatment for violent Protestants etc. this might be a counter-acting influence, but, in fact, there is nothing going for the minority and, in that situation, they cannot be expected to co-operate with the British Army - even when, as is the case, they are suffering greatly from the intimidation of the IRA.

In the present circumstances the minority ghettos in Belfast will not respond to any call to reject the IRA.

2. Mr. Whitelaw is no longer in control of the situation. He is in N.I., from Monday to Wednesday. Forty British Civil Servants and 3 Ministers cannot run N.I. successfully. The establishment in the Army and in the Civil Service have taken over because of lack of local knowledge on the part of the Ministers concerned. The Unionist mentality <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ still in the ascendant.

Mr. Whitelaw, at first, was in fact, the G.O.C. Army - directly intervening and controlling. That stage is over and the professionals have resumed control. Mr. Whitelaw agreed that the Army should leave Catholic schools and Casement Park - Tuzo had merely to say this would endanger the lives of his soldiers.

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In every Department of State the N.I. Civil Servants have now more power than they had in Faulkner's time - and they are all unionist. They are really running N.I. and if an Assembly with a large percentage of new members is elected they will have even more power.

In D/Home Affairs there is no senior Catholic. W. Stott, Faulkner's man, moved out but his friends just moved up. The Police Authority have not the bite the clip the wings of the Civil Servants who are advising them and have been altogether unsuccessful.

Arthur Young tried to reform the RUC and Peacocke and Wolsey were retired. But those who succeeded were no different and the RUC remains the same and is totally unacceptable in the ghettos. Mr. O'Hare reported on serious intimidation of Catholics on the mixed housing area of Rathcool. Whitelaw accepted this and complained to the Chief Constable of the RUC. The result was that after three weeks the local RUC people rang up Mr. O'Hare and asked rather sneeringly what the complaint was all about.

There must be a new constitution laid down for the RUC - new blood, a new outlook, new terms of reference, a new attitude. No "gutting" of the RUC has been attempted.

Messrs. O'Hare and Conaty had produced a paper on Police, a copy of which they promised to send to the Taoiseach..

The bigger Local Authorities are just as bad as they were. The appointment of one Catholic nurse in Fermanagh was spoken about by the new administration as if it was a big deal.

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In particular the local authorities were using planning permission in a discriminatory way. In Ballymurphy planning permission could not be obtained for a factory after a 12-acre site for industrial development had been acquired. Mr. Howell had been ~~worried~~<sup>worried</sup> by the delegation to bypass Belfast Corporation but would not ~~do so~~.

3. No less than in Civil Service and Police appointments, discrimination in industrial employment was still rife. For example, advance factories were provided in inverse proportion to unemployment percentages. The town of Antrim with unemployment at 3%, the lowest in N.I. and lower than most towns in Britain, had a number of idle advance factories built. Ballymurphy with 47% unemployment was without work and would be waiting planning permission for a long time. (c.f. N.I. The Facts for August and September, 1972). Mr. Howell had some time ago made an announcement that a major factory was being set up in West Belfast but nothing happened.

There was, of course, no private industrial investment in the Catholic ghettos because of violence.

The N.I. Employment Commission with representatives from the Chambers of Commerce and the Trade Unions was useless in this situation.

Canon Murphy said this problem must be faced head on. Job applications forms would have to be altered to provide for a statement of applicant's religion and percentage quotas laid down for Catholics. The U.S. was facing up to the colour problem and coloured Americans were winning their percentage of jobs. In Belgium the language groupings were being quoted for jobs. Assuming that Harland and Wolffs were Protestant, new industries

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in Falls and West Belfast should have targets of at least 70% Catholics, with Civil Service etc. on country-wide bases giving 35% of posts to Catholics.

The British Government were apparently fighting with the EEC Commission for 18% of EEC posts for British. It would be a good idea to disclose to the Dutch Government how little the British were doing to see that Catholics got a fair proportion of jobs in part of U.K.

The establishment answer is that Catholics are not trained for the better jobs and that existing job-holders cannot be ousted (The British are using the contrary argument in EEC).

(Canon Murphy inquired how many Protestants were in the Garda force).

4. The Advisory Commission still meets every Monday regularly and, specially, on request. It offered access to Mr. Whitelaw and, originally, promises of action were given and understanding was displayed, the climate was good and violence was on a reduced scale.

Now it is merely a talking shop and Mr. Whitelaw looked as if he was batting out time and as if he would get rid of the Commission if he could do so.

At the Monday meetings they hear a report from Mr. Whitelaw on the current situation and go on to consider the legislation which went into abeyance on the ~~pr~~ proroguing of Stormont.

In fact there was a political vacuum. The Commission understood that the Green Paper was to be published in about 10 days' time.

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If it did not make a firm commitment about jobs for the minority in the Civil Service, assisted by special training schemes, early retirements, golden handshakes etc., it would not have any impact on the Catholic population. It must clearly convey to them that something concrete is being done.

Mr. Whitelaw's current attitude of "You cannot rush things" will not do.

5. It seems clear from the decision on the NI Plebiscite and generally that the British Government is very concerned to bring Mr. Wilson and Mr. Marlyn Rees with them in a tri-partisan policy on N.I.

6. The IRA were still anathema to the middle-class Catholics and it would be fair to say that no more than 10% Catholics were doctrinaire IRA. But in the present climate of job and housing discrimination, of Army searches, census-taking and general leaning on the Catholic ghettos, the Catholic population will not reject the IRA.

Intimidation by the IRA was rife.

7. The backlash was a real threat. It was posed by the U.D.A. with the U.V.F. in the background. They were intimidating successfully the small Catholic enclaves. They looked good on parade and the British Army was not taking them on.

The British Army had warned that they would take serious action on para-military uniforms in Catholic areas. But when asked to act on the UDA in the Shankill, it was stated that there was no law on the matter but that the Army would act against people wearing uniforms in a provocative way!

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
The UDA were intimidating the Protestant moderates.

8. The delegation enquired if the Taoiseach could find some occasion publicly to confirm his stand as second guarantor of the Catholic community in the North who felt themselves in a desperate situation. The Strasbourg result was a tonic but they wanted continuing interest shown by the South in the current near-Civil-War situation.

They wondered if, by exchange control or other machinery, the Government here could stop the flow of money from abroad to the IRA - it was coming through the South.

They would like to see Mr. John Laird's approach to the U.N. blocked by the Government.

They inquired if the Government or public corporations here could set up job-producing enterprises in Catholic ghettos or get local industrialists to do so with Government support.



Rúnaí Cúnta

13.10.72.