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IRELAND



Reference Code: 2005/151/678

Title: Inter-departmental Unit on Northern Ireland,
Discussion Paper No. 5 titled "Negotiated
Repatriation of Northern Ireland"

Creation Date(s): June 1975

Level of description: 1 item

Extent and medium: 46 pages

Creator(s): Department of the Taoiseach

Access Conditions: Open

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POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELANDDiscussion Paper No. 5NEGOTIATED REPARTITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND.Table of Contents

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INTER-DEPARTMENTAL UNIT ON NORTHERN IRELAND

POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 5.

Negotiated Repartition of Northern Ireland

A. ORIGIN OF PAPER

1. At their meeting on 18th July, 1974, the Government decided that the Inter-Departmental Unit on Northern Ireland should undertake detailed studies of the implications of negotiated independence for Northern Ireland and of negotiated repartition. This paper deals with negotiated repartition. Negotiated independence is considered in Discussion Paper No. 4.

B. DEFINITION

2. Negotiated repartition is interpreted as meaning the division of the present area of Northern Ireland as a result of negotiations, with one part of the divided area being integrated with the Republic and the remaining area being constituted as an independent state of Northern Ireland or continuing as part of the United Kingdom.

Genesis of negotiated repartition

3. There seems little possibility, on present indications, because of the lack of trust between the two communities, that repartition could emerge as an agreed settlement without the prelude of large scale violence. Repartition seems more likely to be adopted as a solution following large-scale inter-communal violence in the wake of British disengagement. It seems likely that such a disengagement would be total and, therefore, that the residual area would constitute an independent state - although there are other possible forms of status such as those of the Isle of Man and of the Channel Islands. It is conceivable, however, that repartition could come about, following negotiations, with the agreement of all the major parties concerned, against a background without escalation of violence beyond its current level. In this case, the residual area could either be constituted as an independent state or continue as part of the United Kingdom. We have had regard, in our examination of negotiated repartition to both these ways in which it could come about.

C. ATTITUDES TO NEGOTIATED REPARTITION

Support for negotiated repartition

4. Attitudes to negotiated repartition as a possible outcome to the Northern Ireland problem have not, in general, been made explicit. No reference has been made to it by representatives of the British Government in any of discussions held over the last year.

5. It is conceivable that where they were unable to obtain their first preferences and where it appeared unlikely that Catholic agreement could be expected to an independent state covering all the present territory of Northern Ireland, some loyalists might favour repartition as a form of settlement which would give them an opportunity of exercising full control.
6. The SDLP has declared, as party policy, its opposition to any repartition but there are differences within the party in the degree of hostility to the idea. Some elements, representing areas in the west of Northern Ireland, are prepared to accept repartition as an outcome in some circumstances. Members and leaders of the party in the east of the area could be expected to oppose it. Where this form of settlement was proposed in negotiations following violence or where, in discussions conducted in a peaceful atmosphere it seemed the least dangerous option available for Catholics in areas likely to be integrated with the Republic, differences within the party could become acute.
7. It seems very likely that the IRA - or at least some elements within it - would not accept repartition as a legitimate constitutional settlement. If it came about as a result of negotiations in the wake of civil war in Northern Ireland, however, they might not actively resist it for some time, for lack of capability to do so. The extent to which they could mount a campaign of violence, designed to wreck any repartition settlement, either at the outset or after some time, would depend to a large extent on the attitude of the minority in the residual Northern Ireland area.
8. We consider it unlikely that the British Government would favour a form of negotiated repartition in which the area not ceded to the Republic would remain part of the United Kingdom. They would probably see an area like this, including the Belfast area, as containing the seeds of further violence unless there was a very large population movement which would be unlikely to take place voluntarily if the area were to remain under Westminster jurisdiction.

Legal and oconstitutional aspects

9. If the residual area were/as an independent state, the outline of legal and constitutional aspects given in Discussion Paper No. 4, in relation to
constituted

negotiated independence for the full six counties, would apply generally. If the residual area remained part of the United Kingdom with de facto acceptance by us, the legal and constitutional position would be the same as that at present applying in relation to Northern Ireland as a whole. However, agreement in negotiations on a repartition of this sort might be conditional on the Government here agreeing to promote amendments to the Constitution in relation to the status of Northern Ireland, although the Sunningdale declaration might suffice.

10. The likely degree of domestic support within the Republic for negotiated repartition is a matter for political assessment. However, the following considerations would probably be elements in any public discussion of the matter:-

- a view that repartition would bring the country nearer to eventual unity than independence for the full six counties area. (One ground for this might be a belief that the residual area would be too small to be economically viable - the validity of this view is questionable as the residual area could well be economically stronger than the six counties area as a whole. The principal determinants of viability are likely to be the genesis of the residual state and the degree of consensus and stability within it).

a view that, if the residual area remained a part of the United Kingdom, the partition of Ireland as a whole would be cemented, on the ground that the residual area would have a more homogeneous population, with a larger population of Protestant unionists, especially if there were significant population movement;

concern at the effects on those involved and the substantial costs to the Republic if there were widespread movement of population and financial aid were to be given to those affected;

what had happened during a period of widespread inter-communal violence, where this preceded any repartition.

D. GUARANTEES FOR MINORITY

11. What is said on this subject in Discussion Paper No. 4 in relation to negotiated independence for the full six counties area would apply where the residual area was constituted as an independent state. However, where negotiations took place in the wake of large-scale violence they would be heavily influenced by the relative military strengths and successes of the contending parties. However, it can probably be assumed that if the loyalists were able to maintain their position in the residual area they would not be disposed to give much in the way of guarantees to the minority community. The other parties to the negotiations might be able, nevertheless, to secure certain minimum guarantees in the area of human and civil rights. There would be little prospect, however, of reserving minimum percentages of places in institutions of state for the minority or of securing power-sharing in Government.

12. This would also probably be the position in the unlikely event that independence for the residual area was negotiated without violence. One of the main attractions of such a solution for the loyalists would be the prospect of being masters in their own house. They would take the view that the reduced proportion of the minority in the residual area would not entitle them to any special institutional or entrenched guarantees and that the normal "British standards" should apply.
13. However, the Republic and Britain would have strong levers in their hands, in the financial support or lack of it to be given to the new area by Britain, in the veto on its membership of the EEC and in the general attitude, whether friendly or hostile, to be accorded to the new state. The latter element could be seen by the loyalists as particularly important in relation to border security. Acceptable guarantees might also commend themselves to the loyalists as a method of reducing the potential for internally promoted violence in the new state.
14. If the residual area in a repartition were to remain part of the United Kingdom it would be a matter for the Government and Parliament at Westminster to ensure that abuses would be avoided in relation to such matters as human and civil rights, discrimination in employment and so on. If the area was fully integrated, the same laws would apply as in the remainder of the United Kingdom and even if it were to have a form of devolved government with a legislature and executive of its own, the Westminster Government would presumably retain overriding authority and powers which could be used, if required, to safeguard minority rights.

E. EEC ASPECT

15. If the residual Northern Ireland remained a part of the United Kingdom, it would be within the EEC. If it became independent, the points about its relations with the Community set out in Discussion Paper No. 4 in relation to an independent state covering the full six counties area would remain valid. The smaller area and population of a residual Northern Ireland, as compared with the full six counties area, would scarcely affect the Community's attitude to the new state one way or the other. The residual area would have a population of over 1,000,000 as compared with Luxembourg's population of less than 350,000. This country, the UK and the other member states would have a veto on the area's membership of the Community.

F. DELINEATION OF NEW BORDER

Possible principles of delineation

16. The delineation of the border in any repartition of Northern Ireland would

be closely related, as in the case of guarantees for the minority, to the possible genesis of this form of settlement. Where it came about as a result of negotiations following widespread fighting, it might be strongly influenced by the location of areas held by the different parties at the time of a ceasefire which would depend, in turn, on the relative military success of the contending parties rather than on the political aspirations of the inhabitants of the various areas.

17. Nevertheless, it is likely that in any subsequent negotiations the parties involved would take into account the desirability of drawing a border in such a way that the newly defined areas would be as secure as possible from attack from both outside and within. This would depend to some degree on the extent to which a border respected the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of different areas. These wishes could be ascertained by a plebiscite. This would raise various, possibly contentious issues such as the appropriate units of area, whether a simple majority of those voting in each area should be taken as indicative of the wishes of the people of the area, opposing wishes on the part of majorities in contiguous areas and other issues faced by the Boundary Commission which reported in 1925. Other matters taken into account by that Commission such as drainage basins, economic links and hinterlands, the lines of railways, etc. would be of reduced importance in an era of free trade and cross-border arrangements.

18. Whatever might be the wishes of the inhabitants of various areas, as they might be determined by a plebiscite, the Unit was compelled to work on existing data and on the general assumption that Catholics would wish their area to be joined with the Republic and Protestants would prefer whatever alternative was available. Even this assumption is questionable. In a sample survey, carried out for ITN some time ago, some 52% of Catholics were shown as being in favour of remaining in the United Kingdom. However, in the absence of a firm basis for any alternative assumption we have used religious affiliation as a basis for determining the lines a repartition might follow. On this basis, we arrived at a maximum and a minimum possible area for transfer to this state and corresponding residual areas which would form the territory of the new state. A fuller discussion of principles of delineating frontiers and of the approach used by the Unit for this study is contained in Appendix 1.

Delineation of possible borders by Unit

19. The following is a summary of the assignment of units of area, with estimates of the population involved in 1971 -

<u>Minimum area for transfer to Republic:-</u>	Fermanagh	-	All
	Tyrone	-	Strabane R.D. and U.D., Omagh R.D. and U.D. and Castledearg R.D.
	Derry	-	Derry Co. Borough and Derry U.D.
	Armagh	-	Newry No. 2 R.D. and half of the total population in the combined districts of Keady U.D. and Armagh U.D. and R.D.
	Down	-	Newry U.D. and No. 1 R.D. Warrenpoint, Kilkeel and Newcastle U.D.s and South Down R.D.

This area consists of about 40% of the land area of Northern Ireland.

Total estimated population: 323,000 made up of 205,000 Catholics and 118,000 non-Catholics.

<u>Maximum area for transfer to Republic:</u>	This consists of the Minimum Area and the following districts in Derry, Tyrone and Armagh:		
	Derry	-	Limavady U.D. and R.D., Coleraine R.D. and Magherafelt R.D.
	Tyrone	-	Dungannon R.D. and U.D., Cookstown R.D. and U.D. and Clogher R.D.
	Armagh	-	The remaining half of the population of the combined districts of Keady U.D. and Armagh U.D. and R.D.

These additional districts had a total estimated population of 163,000, made up of 80,000 Catholics, and 83,000 non-Catholics. The total estimated population of the maximum area in 1971 was therefore 485,000, made up of 284,000 Catholics and 201,000 non-Catholics. The maximum area consists of about two-thirds of the land area of Northern Ireland. It is approximately the "line of the Bann".

Residual Area

The area of Northern Ireland remaining if one assumes the maximum area above were added to the Republic consists of all Co. Antrim, including Belfast Co. Borough, most of Co. Down, north-east Co. Armagh and Coleraine M.B. and Portstewart U.D. in Co. Derry. The area had a total estimated population in 1971 of 1,069,000 made up of 340,000 Catholics and 729,000 non-Catholics.

In the case where only the minimum area was transferred to the Republic, the population of the remaining Northern Ireland area would be the aggregate of the figures given above for the residual area and "additional districts".

20. It will be noted that the Catholic minority population in the residual area would exceed the Protestant minority population in the maximum area by about 140,000. If, in any plebiscite to determine the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of various areas as to which side of any

repartition line, they would like their areas to be located, Catholics voted for integration with the Republic and Protestants for whatever other alternative was available, the difference of 140,000 just mentioned would emerge in the result of the plebiscite. If this happened, it would be a further argument, in addition to the fact that almost all of the individual units of area within the "maximum area" seem to have Catholic majorities (see Appendix 1), in favour of a division which would give the "maximum area" to the Republic and the smaller residual area to the remaining Northern Ireland area. The 201,000 non-Catholics in the maximum area would more than double the non-Catholic population of the Republic.

G. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Introduction

21. Firstly, we present estimates of the financial costs likely to arise in a repartition settlement, on the basis that the public authorities - whether in Britain, the Republic or a residual Northern Ireland state - would pay most or all of the costs rather than simply let them fall on the individuals, families and private interests affected. How the costs might be apportioned in practice between public authorities and those directly affected has not been considered. Secondly, we assess the economic viability of the residual Northern Ireland area on the basis that (i) it would become independent, (ii) it would remain part of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, we assess the economic impact of repartition on the Republic, taking into account both the possible direct financial costs involved and the wider economic implications of taking over a substantial new area and population with its resources and needs.

22. It cannot be put too strongly that the cost estimates following (which may give a spurious impression of precision), are based on a series of arbitrary assumptions. The justification for the exercise is to provide some range of orders of magnitude, however tentative, on the basis that some guess is better than none. It must also be emphasised that, except for estimates of the cost of building new houses for persons entering or leaving the enlarged Republic, the estimates are essentially of the short-term/^{costs}that could be quantified. Other costs e.g. of creating jobs for those displaced, would arise in the longer term. A more detailed note on the estimates of costs is contained in Appendix 3. The following is a summary of the main results.

Repartition Cases

23. Four repartition cases were considered:

Case I: Minimum Area transferred to the Republic with 25% population movement either way and with 25% of their houses damaged. This would involve a total movement of 134,000 persons, made up of 29,000 Protestants and 105,000 Catholics.

This would cost £231 million, made up as follows:-

- (a) Resettlement allowances - £35 million.
- (b) Compensation for owners of private houses, land and industrial and commercial property -£50 million
- (c) Provision of accommodation and subsistence for families awaiting housing - £135 million.

Total £231 million.

Case II: As in Case I but with 60% population movement and with 50% of their houses damaged. This would involve a total movement of 322,000 persons, made up of 70,000 Protestants and 252,000 Catholics.

This would cost £652 million, made up as follows:-

- (a) Resettlement allowances - £83 million.
- (b) Compensation for owners of private houses, land and industrial and commercial assets -£128 million.
- (c) Provision of accommodation and subsistence for families awaiting housing - £341 million.

Total £652 million.

Case III: Maximum Area transferred to the Republic with 25% population movement either way and with 25% of their houses damaged. This would involve a total movement of 135,000 persons, made up of 50,000 Protestants and 85,000 Catholics.

This would cost £226 million, made up as follows:-

- (a) Resettlement allowances - £36 million.
- (b) Compensation for owners of private houses, land and industrial and commercial assets -£78 million.
- (c) Provision of accommodation and subsistence for families awaiting housing - £113 million.

Total £226 million.

Case IV: As in Case III but with 60% population movement and with 50% of their houses damaged. This would involve a total movement of 324,000 persons, with 120,000 Protestants and 204,000 Catholics.

This would cost £581 million, made up as follows:-

- (a) Resettlement allowances - £85 million.
- (b) Compensation for owners of private houses, land and industrial and commercial assets - £182 million
- (c) Provision of accommodation and subsistence for families awaiting housing - £314 million.

Total £581 million.

The number of Catholics moving is greater in all four cases. The estimated cost in each case is the total cost of inter-area transfers and resettlement, irrespective of where the burden ultimately may fall.

Cost of Providing New Housing

24. Though this - because of the time lag involved - belongs to a later integration phase, rather than to the initial phase of negotiated movement and resettlement (see Appendix 2) it can be added to the figures in cases I to IV to give the minimum (i.e. on the basis of the assumptions used in this exercise) cost of negotiated repartition for each case. As mentioned above, it was assumed that half of the existing house property would be destroyed or damaged beyond repair in cases II and IV and a quarter in cases I and III. The estimated costs for new housing set out below are net of the compensation paid by the authorities to private house owners under item (b) in each of the four cases (i.e. there is no double-counting). The cost of constructing the new housing and the overall totals are as follows:

<u>Case I:</u>	£231 m.	+	£121 m.	=	£352 m.
<u>Case II:</u>	£652 m.	+	£341 m.	=	£993 m.
<u>Case III:</u>	£226 m.	+	£69 m.	=	£295 m.
<u>Case IV:</u>	£581 m.	+	£292 m.	=	£873 m.

Range of Estimates

25. The immediate cost of negotiated repartition, which can be taken as being roughly equivalent to the cost of the ^{initial} phase of negotiated movement, together with the cost of the new housing requirements therefore ranges from £295 million in Case III to £893 million in Case II.

Financing of costs of repartition

26. The question arises as to how the costs discussed above and other costs of repartition would be financed. Where the residual area was to be fully integrated into the U.K., the Government here would presumably adopt the position that the U.K. should bear the total cost, on the grounds that U.K. or ex-U.K. citizens and residents were involved. Where population movement occurred initially as a result of violence, those who were compelled to move might have a case for compensation from the British Government under existing legislation in force in Northern Ireland. This would probably not be true where population movement took place following agreement to redraw the frontier. The British authorities might well resist the argument that they should bear the full costs involved in this case, having regard to the potential sums involved, the transfer of substantial territory, infrastructure, productive resources, property generally, population and taxable capacity, to the Republic. They might argue that these transfers should enable us to finance much of the costs. It should be noted that, in the absence of relevant provisions in a treaty or agreement, relating to repartition, we would have no basis in law for any claim that the British Government should bear all or any of the costs falling on our Exchequer as a result of repartition. It is, of course, possible that if it were necessary to secure a settlement, the British Government might be ready, reluctantly, to bear the full cost in the hope of solving the problem and reducing future expenditure. The fact that its agreement

would be necessary for a negotiated repartition settlement would give the Government considerable leverage in this matter of division of costs.

27. However, if the British refused to bear the full costs, the matter would obviously be the subject of negotiations which could have a whole range of outcomes. One basis for a settlement could be that the costs would be borne by the U.K. and by the Republic in the same proportions as the Gross National Product (GNP) of the U.K. and the Republic. On the basis of 1973 figures, the proportion would be 95.9 : 4.1. On this basis, the Republic's share of the costs (total expenditure in range £295 million to £893 million) could range from £ 12 million to £36 million. It would also have to bear its share of other costs which it has not been practicable to quantify.
28. Another basis for a division of costs that might be put forward would be that the Republic should finance any costs falling on its Exchequer as a result of the movements of Catholics into and Protestants out of its territory, as enlarged by the settlement, and that the U.K. should finance costs to its Exchequer as a result of Catholics moving out of and Protestants into the area to remain in the U.K. For example, in the case of a Protestant moving from Co. Fermanagh to Co. Antrim, the Republic would pay for his compensation for his house and land and commercial property, if any, and perhaps for his resettlement allowance whereas the U.K. would defray the costs of his accommodation and subsistence while awaiting rehousing, and the costs of resettling him in the medium to long-term, including construction of a house (and any State expenditure on provision of jobs, retraining and so on/ which we have not quantified) On this basis, the/costs would be £683 million and £210 million to the Republic and U.K., respectively, in the case involving maximum expenditure (Case II) and £217 million and £78 million respectively, in the case involving minimum expenditure (Case III).

28. Another basis conceivable, is that the Republic would bear all costs involved in the movement of Catholics and the U.K. all costs involved in the movement of Protestants. On this basis the costs to the Republic and U.K., for the case of maximum expenditure would be £802 million and £91 million, respectively. The respective costs in the case involving minimum expenditure would be £196 million and £99 million.

30. Where the residual area of the North was to become independent, three parties would be involved. The administration of the new state might make common cause with the Republic in holding that the British Government should bear all the costs involved. One factor likely to make Britain receptive to this view would be that a settlement on these lines would involve a complete cessation of its expenditure on Northern Ireland at a future date. At the other extreme, it might take the view that as the problem was now solely one of disagreement among Irish people, the two Irish states should bear all the costs involved. Another possibility would be a sharing of costs between all three parties and yet another is a division between the U.K. and the Republic. This could be on any one of the bases discussed above. In the case where the division was solely between the two Irish states, the respective burdens would be affected by whether the minimum or maximum area were transferred to the Republic. It is likely that the residual Northern Ireland state would favour a basis where it bore all costs involved in Protestant movement and the Republic was responsible for all costs involved in movement of Catholics. If a settlement on the basis of negotiated repartition were ever to appear likely, these issues would require further study.

Economic viability of residual Northern Ireland area

31. This would depend on whether the residual area remained part of the U.K. or became an independent state. In the latter case, the considerations set out in Discussion Paper No. 4 in

relation to an independent state with the full Six Counties territory, would be relevant, subject to necessary modifications arising from the smaller area involved. Available data do not permit an analysis for this area in the detail given in Discussion Paper No. 4. What can be done is to give certain indications of the relative wealth and income of the areas of Northern Ireland that might constitute the minimum area for transfer to the Republic, the maximum transferred area and the residual Northern Ireland area. These are given below.

32. Though there is seemingly a study being carried out in the Department of Economics in Queen's University, Belfast on estimates of county incomes in Northern Ireland, it appears that no published material is as yet available similar to that published by the ESRI for counties in the Republic. However, some guidance is provided by Table 71 of the "Survey of Personal Incomes, 1969-70", produced by the U.K. Inland Revenue. This lists the personal income totals for each county derived from the survey. The table following shows the total net personal income for Northern Ireland and for each of the individual six counties together with estimates of the average personal income per head of the population, on the basis of the 1971 Census of Population figures:-

	<u>£m.</u>	<u>Average income per head</u> £
Northern Ireland	547	360
Antrim	257.3	484
Down	158.6	325
Armagh	42.1	317
Fermanagh	10.4	208
Derry	46.5	258
Tyrone	32.1	232

(Half of the population of Belfast is included in Co. Down and half in Co. Antrim for the purposes of the calculation of average personal income per head.)

33. It is clear that the portion of Northern Ireland included in either the minimum or maximum transferred areas is considerably poorer than the residual area that would comprise the smaller Northern Ireland state. Further indications of this are given in Appendix 3. Part of this disparity in wealth and income is of course due to the adverse influence of the border and to the more intensive development of the region around Belfast, relative to the outlying parts of Northern Ireland. In a repartition situation the border would be shifted further east and north. This should benefit the former border areas but might on the other hand adversely affect the areas on both sides of the new border unless EEC developments succeeded in bringing about closer economic integration between the new Northern Ireland state and the remainder of the island.
34. The picture is further complicated by the extent of possible population transfers between the transferred area and the remainder of Northern Ireland. On the basis of our population estimates about four times as many Catholics might leave the new Northern Ireland, in cases I and II, as Protestants would leave the transferred areas (the minimum area in these two instances). On the same basis, the numbers of Catholics and Protestants moving each way, in cases III and IV which refer to the maximum transferred area might be in the ratio 3 : 2. It is impossible to predict how this would affect the relative disparities of income between the residual area and the minimum or maximum areas, especially if repartition were to occur in or following a situation of widespread intercommunal conflict involving substantial property damage.
35. Nevertheless, leaving aside this latter consideration, the indications are that, other things being equal, an independent Northern Ireland consisting of the residual area, as defined in paragraph 19 would be more viable economically than an independent state, comprising the entire six-county area. The state's viability would still, of course, depend greatly on the size of any British launching subsidy, on the nature of

its trading and other economic relationships with Britain and the Republic, including its relations with the EEC and on the climate - whether of peace or of violence - in which it started to operate.

36. Many matters would arise, which would require further detailed study. The following are some examples:-

- (1) the residual state might not produce all its requirements of normal food items in which Northern Ireland is now self-sufficient;
- (2) much of the water supply for Belfast comes from the Mourne Mountain area most of which might be transferred to the Republic or from Lough Neagh over which an enlarged Republic, where it took over the maximum area, would have partial control; more generally large parts of existing systems of infrastructure - water, sewerage, power etc. - would be divided and might require arrangements for joint operation;
- (3) the new state might have difficulty in launching its own currency.

37. Where the residual area was fully integrated into the United Kingdom, the question of its viability would not arise in the same way, although it might arise in the context of devolution arrangements within the U.K. generally. In general, however, its economic health would be closely tied up with that of the U.K. generally. It is worth mentioning that Professor Carter, of the University of Lancaster, has pointed out that Northern Ireland might do better under a county council type of integration than as an independent State since interregional transfers are invariably more generous than international transfers.

37. Economic effects of negotiated repartition on Republic

38. The economic effects of repartition on the Republic would depend firstly on the amount of population movement. Even if the Republic did not become directly involved in any intercommunal violence which could occur as a prelude to repartition, the potential cost to the

Exchequer of large-scale population movement, consequent on such violence, could be crushing, especially if the British Government and any Northern administration refused to bear any part of costs falling on this part of the country. It will be recalled that up to 250,000 Catholics might move into the enlarged Republic from the residual area and this could cost £900 million if the Republic had to bear the full cost of the items which have been quantified.

40. The adverse effects in the longer-term, in retarding foreign investment and economic development generally, could be drastic and long continued, even if repartition led to a cessation of violence in the North. If it did not have this result, the adverse effects could be even more severe. The effects of repartition would also depend on the future status of the residual area and the nature of any British economic support for its launching - since these factors would largely determine its economic circumstances. A repartition negotiated in circumstances of peace would be most significant in bringing large new territory, population, productive resources, taxable capacity, liabilities for public spending on social services, infrastructure, job promotion and administration, and so on, into the Republic. Many questions would arise - would any attempt be made to maintain payment of social welfare benefits at the Northern Ireland rates where these were higher or would the rates be assimilated with those in the Republic? What of the free health services - would the arrangements in force in the Republic be introduced? Similarly for higher education grants and the full range of social services, in the widest sense, and state transfers to families and individuals. Would former public servants in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, in and British nationalised bodies Westminster Departments/such as the Post Office, in local authority service and in other public bodies retain their scales of wages and salaries or would they have to accept the scales appropriate to their grades in the Republic?

41. Published data do not permit a quantified assessment of the increment to national product and demand, consumer demand or industrial and agricultural output that would be involved in the integration of the maximum area into the Republic. However, it would seem that the principal economic resources of the area are the rich agricultural land in the Foyle/Mourne drainage basin, the textile industry in Derry and Tyrone (mainly shirt making but including the new Courtaulds plant and other yarn spinning plants the industries in the Maydown and Springtown Industrial estates at Derry, especially Du Pont (synthetic fibres) and British Oxygen, the Hoechst plant at Limavady (synthetic fibres), the ^{and the Mourne Mountains area} tourism potential of Co. Fermanagh, mainly the Erne waterway/and the electricity power station at Coolkeeragh on Lough Foyle (360 MV, oil-fired). The area has a good network of roads, hospitals, schools etc. In any negotiations on a repartition, it would clearly be vital to secure reliable data on the output and resources of the area and on its taxable capacity and the extent of public expenditure in it on each of the main areas of public activity. For a useful comparison of costs and benefits, it would in fact be essential to have information not only on the capital value of the assets in the transferred area but also a comparison of taxation yields and public expenditure in the area. This information is not at present available in any accessible form,
42. In the absence of even a reasonable basis for estimating this information, it is not possible to give any simple answer to the question as to whether a negotiated repartition would bring a net economic gain or a loss to the Republic. However, it is probably fair to say that if it came about without violence and substantial population movement and if the British bore a fair share of the cost of whatever voluntary movement occurred, it would not impose any excessive burden on the Republic, especially if the prevailing Republic rates of payment in the social welfare and other public fields were to apply in the new area absorbed.

Equally, it seems unlikely that it would bring any significant economic advantage as the income and output, resources and productive capacity of the area are probably comparable, in relative terms, with those of the Republic, as presently constituted.

43. If, however, repartition came about in the wake of violence and involved substantial population movement, it could impose a tremendous economic burden. It might be, however, that in the situation contemplated, much of this burden would fall on the Republic in any case (unless it closed the border on refugees from the North). Moreover if a negotiated repartition led to or ensured the continuance of a ceasefire in a large-scale inter-communal conflict it could well avoid substantial expenditure that might otherwise have to be incurred.

CONCLUSIONS

44. There seems little possibility that negotiated repartition could emerge as an agreed settlement from negotiations without the prelude of large-scale violence. It is more likely as an outcome of negotiations following violence if Britain withdraws from Northern Ireland. However, it is just conceivable that ^{could} it/come about peacefully and by agreement.
45. It seems likely, however repartition came about, that a British disengagement would be total and that the residual Northern Ireland area not integrated with the Republic would be constituted as an independent state.
46. In a negotiated repartition, the new border would probably be delineated by reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of various areas, perhaps as determined in the light of the results of a plebiscite. If Catholics opted to join the Republic and Protestants for whatever other alternative was available, the new border might leave all of Co. Antrim, Co. Down excluding South Down, north-east Co. Armagh and a

small area in Co. Derry around Coleraine in the residual Northern Ireland area, with the remainder of Northern Ireland added to the Republic. This division is based on the assumption that Catholics as distributed throughout Northern Ireland at the time of the 1971 Census would wish to join the Republic - which might well be true if repartition were an issue. It should be noted, however, that a public opinion poll conducted last year indicated that at that time 52% of the Catholic population then surveyed wished Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom.

47. If repartition came about in the wake of violence on a civil war scale in the North, over 300,000 people might change residence and the cost of relief, compensation and rehousing of Catholics moving into the (enlarged) Republic could range up to £600-£800 million. (The adverse effects in the longer term of violence on this scale, in retarding foreign investment and economic development, could be severe, if not overwhelming, and long continued, even if repartition led to a cessation of violence in the North).
48. There is insufficient information available for a reliable assessment of whether a peaceful, agreed repartition would bring a net economic gain or loss to the Republic. However, if it came about without substantial population movement and if the British bore a fair share of any costs, it might neither impose any excessive burden nor bring any significant economic benefit in the medium to long-term. In the short term there would be some saving in expenditure on security and in the climate for tourism and investment.
49. Other things being equal, an independent Northern Ireland consisting of a residual area in North-East Ulster, would be more viable economically than an independent state comprising the full six counties area. The state's viability would still, of course, depend greatly on the size of any British

subvention, on the nature of its trading and other economic relationships with Britain, the Republic and other EEC countries and, above all, on the circumstances - whether of peace or of violence - in which it started to operate. In all circumstances, it would probably experience a serious reduction in its standard of living, at least initially.

50. Where the residual area remained a part of the United Kingdom, the question of its economic viability would not arise. If repartition of this sort came about by agreement, the economic impact on the Republic could range from neutral to beneficial depending on further developments in the residual area.

51. As in the case of independence for the entire six counties area, the matter of immediate concern to the Republic where the residual area was to become independent would, subject to the security of the State here and its citizens, be the welfare of the people of Northern Ireland and particularly of the minority. Strong internal and external guarantees would be desirable to safeguard civil rights, and particularly the position of the minority. However, because of the reduced but still sizable proportion of the minority the Loyalists might be less willing to agree to - or, if they did agree to operate - such guarantees. The Republic and Britain would have strong levers in their hands to obtain agreement to the establishment and enforcement of guarantees. These would include their veto on the area's membership of the EEC, the potential influence of the Republic on border security and the British attitude to any financial subvention for the new state.

52. On balance, it appears to us that a negotiated repartition which came about with the agreement of all the major parties involved without any escalation of violence beyond its

current level, and whether the residual area remained part of the United Kingdom or was constituted as an independent state, would have beneficial consequences throughout the island as compared with the present situation. We take this view because, in the political sphere, it is assumed that the necessary agreement would resolve the current intercommunal tensions and, on economic grounds, since we would thereby be relieved of some expenditure on security and could expect an improved climate for development. (However, since an agreed repartition could consolidate a state of Northern Ireland and defer unity indefinitely it could be argued that it would not be preferable to a continuation of direct rule - if this secured general acceptance - or some similar arrangement, with continuing reference, by referendum or otherwise, to whether the people of Northern Ireland wished for a change of status). Our attitude to the new state resulting from agreed repartition would (by definition) be positive - as our agreement to its establishment is assumed. As already indicated it is, however, very difficult to envisage circumstances in which this type of agreed repartition could come about.

53. Where, as seems more likely, repartition was the outcome of negotiations following large-scale violence, in the wake of a British withdrawal, there might be no alternative to our accepting it short of an attempt by military means to prevent its emergence. Military intervention, in this situation, would entail an attempt to subdue loyalist resistance and to dominate the entire Protestant population of Northern Ireland. Discussion Paper No. 6 indicates that this is beyond our military and administrative capabilities.

JUNE, 1975.

Signed:

D. Kelly
CHAIRMAN

Department of the Taoiseach

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APPENDIX 1.

Delineation of new border in a negotiated re-partition

1. As stated in the text of the Paper, the Unit, in examining the delineation of the new border in a negotiated re-partition worked on existing data and on the general assumption that Catholics would wish areas in which they were a majority to be joined with the Republic and Protestants would prefer whatever alternative was available. Two sets of data were used. The first source was the information on the distribution of the two broad religious groups shown in the 1971 Census of Population. The second source was figures of the number of Catholics in each Catholic parish in Northern Ireland, derived from censuses conducted by the Catholic Church authorities in various years in the period 1971-1974. Except in the ^{Belfast area which falls into} Greater/the Diocese of Down and Connor, the information received also included estimates of the Protestant population of each parish.

2. The smallest units of area for which particulars of religious affiliations were available from the Census were Urban and Rural Districts and County and Municipal Boroughs. Table 1 and Map 1 in the Annex show the information available from the Census results.

It should be noted that a very large percentage of the overall population (approximately 10%) did not declare their religion. The figures are as follows:-

Co. Antrim (excl. Belfast Co. Borough)	30,596
Co. Armagh	12,001
Co. Down	25,615
Co. Fermanagh	4,336
Co. Londonderry	18,521
Co. Tyrone	14,925
Belfast County Borough	<u>36,490</u>
Total	<u>142,511</u>

The number not stating religion in 1961, when a question of religion was last asked in the Census, were very much smaller, only 28,000. Thus, while there may have been some growth in indifference in the interval, it is very likely that the reticence on religious affiliation in 1971 was attributable to such motives as fear and non-co-operation.

3. In addition to the number not declaring any religion, it is estimated that Census forms were not returned at all in respect of 30-40,000 Catholics, because of the protest staged at the time in relation to the Census.

4. The following are figures for the numbers of Catholics in the various dioceses supplied by the Catholic Church authorities:-

Dromore	57,077
Derry	156,195
Clogher	38,531
Down ^{and Connor} (Belfast)	154,257
Down and Connor (remainder)	123,305
Armagh	<u>95,079</u>
Total	<u>624,444</u>

It will be noticed that the diocesan total exceeds the official census total by 146,523. However, if one recalls that 142,511 persons did not declare their religion and the strong likelihood that most of these could be Catholics and that Census forms were not returned for, perhaps, a further 30-40,000 Catholics and if we allow for some rounding up of totals in odd parishes here and there and for any rises in population since 1971, it is quite plausible to accept the diocesan figures as being reasonably accurate and worthy of acceptance until more refined and up to date figures become available. As it was not possible to collate the statistics for parishes with those for the administrative units used in the Census results over a sufficiently wide area of Northern Ireland, further studies of the possible line of a border for a repartition were based on the Census units, except for the examination described in paragraphs 15-16 below. However, the diocesan figures have been used to estimate the religious distribution of those who did not declare their religious affiliation at the Census - see notes to Table 5 in the Annex.

5. The almost universal practice in defining frontiers between states is to have continuous lines enfolding solid areas without enclaves. There are some small exceptions. The difficulty of proceeding in this way in Northern Ireland, while respecting the wishes of majorities in the Census units of area emerges clearly from Table 1 and Map 1 in the Annex. The main problems concern the large Catholic minority in Belfast and Lisburn Rural District (which includes some Belfast suburbs) and the various areas contiguous ^{to} with the present border with the Republic which have apparent Protestant majorities on the basis of Census data on persons who declared their religion. Examples are Castlederg Rural District, Enniskillen Urban and Rural District and Strabane Rural District.* In general, most of the Catholic majority areas in Counties Tyrone and Derry are not contiguous to the present border.

6. Following the recent Cyprus conflict, proposals have been put forward for a solution involving separate Greek and Turkish areas consisting of aggregations

* But see paragraph 13 below.

of cantonments i. e. small separate areas, including enclaves, with local Greek or Turkish majorities. Such an approach could overcome the problems referred to in the previous paragraph. However, having regard to the fears of the communities in the North, it would seem unlikely to command support, in view of its drawbacks from the security point of view. As compared with Cyprus, where relatively powerful guarantors are involved, the Irish Army is very small while we are assuming the British to be withdrawing their army; moreover, there is no United Nations presence. Thus, the prospect of adequate guarantees is lacking. Moreover, the Cyprus proposals are in the context of a single, federal Government for the whole island, superimposed on the separate cantonal administrations, whereas what we are considering is a repartition in which the separate areas would come under separate sovereign Governments.

7. For the present report, the approach adopted was to trace possible lines of re-partition which would define solid areas without enclaves, broadly by reference to political allegiance, as indicated by religious affiliation. We identified what seemed likely to be the minimum area which might be integrated with the Republic and, also, a maximum area which would consist of the minimum area plus additional areas which would bring the frontier of an independent Northern Ireland more or less to the line of the Bann in the North and, very broadly, the MI motorway in the South. Despite the existence of areas with apparent Protestant majorities contiguous to the present border, we proceeded by sweeping eastward from that line on the basis that the inclusion of a substantial Protestant minority in any area to be incorporated into the Republic would be offset by the inclusion of a substantial Catholic majority in the remaining area of Northern Ireland - this was, of course, before allowing for any population movement that might take place.

8. In this approach, the whole of an administrative unit (including in the case of some Rural Districts, any Urban Districts within their area) was assigned to

one or other side of the postulated frontier. Two exceptions were made. In the case of Armagh Rural District, an area with a Protestant majority but which embraced within it the majority Catholic areas of Keady and Armagh city (both Urban Districts), half of the total population of the three units combined was assigned to each side of the frontier in the case where the minimum area is added to the Republic. In the other case, involving a maximum area, the whole Rural District is included in the area to be incorporated with the Republic. In the "minimum case", the border has here been traced in an arbitrary manner on Map 2 in the Annex. Secondly, Coleraine Rural District is included in the maximum area to be joined to the Republic but the strongly Protestant units of Portstewart U.D. and Coleraine Borough have been assigned to the residual Northern Ireland area.

9. Table 2 in the Annex shows the administrative units included in the minimum area assumed to be annexed to the Republic, together with their declared Catholic and Protestant* populations and the percentage each constitutes of the total population. Table 3 shows corresponding information for the additional units of area assumed to be added to the minimum area to constitute the maximum area that might be incorporated into the Republic. Table 4 gives similar data for the units, assumed to constitute the minimum residual Northern Ireland area. Map 2 shows the three areas concerned and traces the assumed frontier lines.

10. The following is a summary of the assignment of units of area, with particulars of the population involved, as shown in the 1971 Census results:

Minimum area:	Fermanagh	-	All
	Tyrone	-	Strabane R.D. and U.D., Omagh R.D. and U.D. and Castleterry R.D.
	Derry	-	Derry Co. Borough and Derry U.D.
	Armagh	-	Newry No. 2 R.D. and half of the total population in the combined districts of Keady U.D. and Armagh U.D. and R.D.
	Down	-	Newry U.D. and No. 1 R.D., Warrenpoint, Kilkeel and Newcastle U.D.s and South Down R.D.

*The figures for Protestants involve an element of estimation as, for Rural and Urban Districts and Municipal Boroughs numbers are given in the Census only for the three main Protestant religions - Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist. The minority Protestant religions are grouped with non-Christians, people of no religion and the significant numbers who did not state religion. A breakdown of this composite group is available only at county level. Estimates of the numbers of members of the smaller Protestant denominations in each administrative unit were made by assuming arbitrarily that they constituted the same proportion of the composite grouping as in the relevant county or county borough as a whole.

Total recorded population: 308,000 made up of 167,000 declared Catholics, 112,000 declared Protestants and 29,000 non-Christians or persons who did not state their religion

Maximum area: This consists of the Minimum Area and the following districts in Derry, Tyrone and Armagh:

Derry	-	Limavady U.D. and R.D., Coleraine R.D. and Magherafelt R.D.,
Tyrone	-	Dungannon R.D. and U.D., Cookstown R.D. and U.D. and Clogher R.D.
Armagh	-	the remaining half of the population of the combined districts of Keady U.D. and Armagh U.D. and R.D.

These additional districts had a total recorded population of 163,000, made up of 66,000 declared Catholics, 77,000 declared Protestants and 19,000 non-Christians or persons who did not declare their religion. The total recorded population of the maximum area in 1971 was therefore 470,000, made up of 233,000 declared Catholics, 190,000 declared Protestants and 47,000 non-Christians or persons who did not declare their religion.

Residual Area

The remaining area of Northern Ireland consists of all Co. Antrim, including Belfast Co. Borough, most of Co. Down, north-east Co. Armagh and Coleraine M.B. and Portstewart U.D. in Co. Derry. The area had a total recorded population of 1,049,000, made up of 245,000 declared Catholics, 708,000 declared Protestants and 100,000 non-Christians or persons who did not declare their religion.

11. It can be seen from Table 2 in the Annex that even the minimum area for transfer to the Republic contains the following units of area with apparent Protestant majorities - Strabane, Castlederg and Enniskillen R.D.s and Enniskillen, Newcastle and Kilkeel U.D.s. The minimum area as a whole, however, had a majority of Catholics over Protestants of about 55,000 in 1971. Some of the individual units of area in the additional districts added to make up the maximum area had apparent Protestant majorities and these additional districts combined had a Protestant majority over Catholics of about 11,000. As a result, the maximum area had a Catholic majority over Protestants of about 44,000.
12. All of these figures refer of course to the numbers of declared Protestants and Catholics. Reference has been made in paragraph 2 above, to the evidence that the number of Catholics (in allegiance if not in practice) is seriously underestimated in the area as a whole. Estimates of the true distribution

of the population by religious affiliation, following adjustments for the categories involved in this underestimation are shown in Table 5 in the Annex, to which are appended some notes on the derivation of the estimates. Estimates made with the assistance of the figures supplied by the Catholic authorities indicate that, if one takes account of persons who did not declare any religion and of Catholics for whom no form was returned, one should add figures of 51,000 and 10,000, respectively, to arrive at the number of "born" Catholics and Protestants in the maximum area. This would reinforce the position in this area to give a majority of "born" Catholics over "born" Protestants of 85,000. Similar estimates indicate that 96,000 and 21,000, respectively, should be added to the figures in the residual area to get the numbers of "born" Catholics and Protestants. This reduces the Protestant excess in this area by 75,000.

13. It is not possible to make estimates, with the same measure of confidence, of the effects on apparent local majorities of the factors making for understatement of Catholic numbers. This is because the figures shown in the Annex for numbers of Protestants in the various local administrative units involve an element of arbitrary estimation (see footnote to paragraph 9). However, it is clear, having regard to the percentages of the total population who did not declare religion, that if the "born" Catholics among these - and the Catholics for whom no forms were returned - were added to the numbers of declared Catholics, the apparent Protestant majorities in the following areas would almost certainly be changed to Catholic majorities:-

Ballycastle R.D., Lurgan M.B., Newcastle U.D., Enniskillen M.B.,
Dungannon U.D. and Dungannon R.D.

It emerges that this is also a strong possibility in relation to Enniskillen R.D., Clogher R.D., Strabane R.D. and East Down R.D.

14. These possibilities in respect of Dungannon, Enniskillen and Clogher and the Catholic majorities in Limavady, Magherafelt and Cookstown R.D.s might seem to suggest that the assumed minimum and maximum areas should in fact coincide. However, if one combines Census figures for those who declared religion for (a) Limavady U.D. and R.D. and (b) Cookstown U.D. and R.D., small apparent Protestant majorities emerge. These would, almost certainly in the case of Limavady and probably in the case of Cookstown, be changed into Catholic majorities if one took account of undeclared Catholics or those not counted at all in the Census. However, having regard to the arbitrary and uncertain elements in the figures for these and other areas in the list of "additional districts" and in the interests of presenting a range of possible costs and effects, the Unit adhered to the assignment of units of area set out in paragraph 10 above.

15. Despite the analysis in paragraphs 11-12 above, it might be argued by loyalists that as, on the basis of Census figures for those who declared religion, the maximum area contains several districts with (apparent) Protestant majorities which would be contiguous to a residual Northern Ireland (as it would be if, in fact, the maximum area were to be joined to the Republic, as assumed) a new border should be further to the west. Having regard to the elements of arbitrariness and uncertainty involved in our estimates of Protestants and Catholics at local level, we also examined this matter on the basis of the figures provided by the Catholic Hierarchy for the Catholic and Protestant populations of each parish. We concentrated on parishes in the additional rural districts (some embracing urban districts), added to the assumed minimum area to make up the maximum area. In particular, we examined the figures for parishes immediately west of the Lower Bann (i. e. north of Lough Neagh), on the west bank of Lough Neagh itself and west of the western border of Tanderagee Rural District in Co. Armagh. In the North, there is a block of three parishes west of the Bann and contiguous to the residual area each of which have a Protestant majority - Coleraine, Limavady and Kilrea - although the division in the latter parish is 2,500/2,450. The total population of this block, as shown by the parish figures, is 32,000, composed of 21,000 Protestants and 11,000 Catholics. South of this block, the line of parishes along the Lower Bann and on the west bank of Lough Neagh have almost all Catholic majorities as have the next line of parishes to the west of those along the Lower Bann. However, west of the Catholic majority block on the west bank of Lough Neagh, there is a block of five parishes with Protestant majorities. Because this block is surrounded by Catholic majority areas, even on the east, its case for inclusion in the residual area would be weaker than the Coleraine-Limavady area. In the South, there are a further five parishes or parts of parishes, included in our maximum area for integration into the Republic, which have Protestant majorities and form a block contiguous to the residual area. These are Loughgall, Kilmore, Dungannon, Moy and the part of Tanderagee parish not in Tanderagee Urban District. This block has a total population on the basis of the parish figures, of 38,000 people composed of 26,000 Protestants and 12,000 Catholics.

16. If the two blocks identified above were added to the residual area, its population would, on the basis of parish figures, be increased by 70,000, made up of 47,000 Protestants and 23,000 Catholics. The result of such a re-alignment would be to increase the Catholic minority in the then residual area to over 363,000 while reducing the Protestant minority in the maximum area to about 153,000 - both these figures being derived from the "corrected" population figures. The argument of paragraph 20 of the text of the paper would apply with even greater force in relation to an imbalance of this magnitude. A re-alignment on the lines discussed would seem, therefore, to be unjustified.

17. The conclusion which emerged from the entire examination was that in a re-partition situation, Catholics in the North and the Government here, if it so wished, could make a strong case for the incorporation of the full maximum area into the Republic.

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ANNEX
TABLE 1.

Census of Population 1971
by Administrative Districts

<u>CO. ANTRIM</u>	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Ballycastle U.D.	1,563	54.6	1,092	38.2
Ballyclare U.D.	287	5.6	4,555	88.5
Ballymena M. B.	3,471	21.3	11,455	70.3
Ballymoney U.D.	900	23.6	2,600	68.3
Carrickfergus M. B.	2,029	13.3	11,652	76.6
Larne M. B.	4,644	25.6	11,998	66.2
Lisburn M. B.	4,856	18.1	19,748	73.6
Newtownabbey U.D.	10,665	18.6	40,848	71.1
Portrush U.D.	890	19.2	3,370	72.7
Whitehead U.D.	414	15.8	1,912	73.2
Antrim R. D.	7,837	20.1	28,302	72.5
Ballycastle R. D.	3,724	46.2	3,818	47.4
Ballymena R. D.	5,166	15.2	26,133	76.8
Ballymoney R. D.	4,624	21.1	15,728	71.9
Larne R. D.	4,357	19.2	16,400	72.2
Lisburn R. D.	27,918	37.8	38,235	51.8
Belfast County Borough	91,420	25.6	226,954	63.6
Total for county	174,765	24.6	464,784	65.5
 <u>CO. ARMAGH</u>				
Armagh U.D.	5,909	50.7	4,615	39.6
Craigavon U.D.	4,389	34.6	7,069	55.7
Keady U.D.	1,691	79.0	282	13.2
Lurgan M. B.	10,548	44.3	10,679	44.8
Portadown M. B.	5,395	24.6	14,798	67.5
Tandragee U.D.	283	16.4	1,283	74.5
Armagh R. D.	9,806	36.7	14,704	55.1
Newry No. 2 R. D.	19,445	67.0	6,877	23.7
Tandragee R. D.	244	8.3	2,386	80.9
Total for county	57,710	43.5	62,686	47.3

Note:- M. B. is Municipal Borough

Declared Roman Catholics Declared Protestants

<u>CO. DOWN</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Banbridge U.D.	1,998	29.4	4,312	63.5
Bangor M. E.	2,958	8.5	29,005	82.8
Donaghadee U.D.	188	5.1	3,314	90.2
Downpatrick U.D.	4,815	65.3	2,078	28.2
Dromore U.D.	366	15.8	1,738	75.2
Holywood U.D.	1,573	19.7	5,713	71.7
Kilkeel U.D.	579	20.2	2,058	71.7
Newcastle U.D.	2,063	44.8	2,186	47.5
Newry U.D.	8,590	74.5	1,967	17.1
Newtownards M. B.	1,746	11.3	12,553	81.3
Warrenpoint U.D.	2,892	68.7	1,021	24.3
Banbridge R.D.	4,655	24.8	12,302	65.5
Castlereagh R.D.	4,009	7.6	43,860	83.2
East Down R.D.	12,825	42.5	14,478	48.0
Hillsborough R.D.	3,097	8.8	28,657	81.7
Moir R.D.	1,619	17.6	6,940	75.4
Newry No. 1 R.D.	7,996	53.4	5,704	38.1
North Down R.D.	4,763	14.6	25,225	77.5
South Down R.D.	7,566	55.5	5,013	36.7
Total for county	74,298	24.1	208,133	67.4
 <u>CO. FERMANAGH</u>				
Enniskillen M. B.	2,823	43.5	3,093	47.8
Enniskillen R.D.	7,250	42.6	7,841	46.1
Irvinestown R.D.	4,968	47.4	4,699	44.8
Listaskea R.D.	8,697	54.5	6,034	37.8
Total for county	23,738	47.8	21,673	43.4
 <u>CO. DERRY</u>				
Coleraine M. B.	3,240	22.0	10,230	69.3
Limavady U.D.	1,796	32.4	3,203	57.7
Derry U.D.	14,582	46.7	13,547	43.3
Portstewart U.D.	1,098	22.0	3,286	65.8
Coleraine R.D.	4,505	23.0	13,267	67.6
Limavady R.D.	8,953	48.5	7,624	41.3
Magherafelt R.D.	15,219	43.9	14,670	42.3

<u>CO. DERRY (contd.)</u>	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Derry County Borough	32,647	63.8	13,533	26.5
Total for county	82,040	49.4	79,416	44.0
 <u>CO. TYRONE</u>				
Cookstown U. D.	2,288	34.5	3,622	54.5
Dungannon U. D.	3,168	41.7	3,320	43.7
Omagh U. D.	6,148	53.6	4,124	35.9
Strabane U. D.	6,696	71.5	1,706	18.2
Castlederg R. D.	3,747	45.0	4,129	49.6
Clogher R. D.	4,179	44.1	4,474	47.2
Cookstown R. D.	6,423	44.7	6,049	42.1
Dungannon R. D.	11,153	43.0	11,385	43.9
Omagh R. D.	14,260	51.3	10,398	37.4
Strabane R. D.	7,308	42.6	8,411	49.0
Total for county	65,370	47.3	57,616	41.7
Total for Northern Ireland	477,921	31.5	894,308	58.9

TABLE 2.

Population, by religion, in administrative units included in
minimum area assumed to be integrated with the Republic.

	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Derry County Borough	32,647	63.8	13,583	26.5
Derry U.D.	14,582	46.7	13,547	43.3
Strabane R.D.	7,303	42.6	8,411	49.0
Strabane U.D.	6,696	71.5	1,706	18.2
Castlederg R.D.	3,747	45.0	4,129	49.6
Irvinestown R.D.	4,963	47.4	4,699	44.8
Enniskillen R.D.	7,250	42.6	7,841	46.1
Enniskillen M. B.	2,823	43.5	3,098	47.8
Lisnakea R.D.	8,697	54.5	6,034	37.8
Omagh R.D.	14,260	51.3	10,398	37.4
Omagh U.D.	6,148	53.6	4,124	35.9
Newry U.D.	8,590	74.5	1,967	17.1
Newry No.1 R.D.	7,996	53.4	5,704	38.1
Newry No.2 R.D.	19,445	67.0	6,877	23.7
South Down R.D.	7,556	55.5	5,013	36.7
Warrenpoint U.D.	2,892	68.7	1,021	24.3
Newcastle U.D.	2,063	44.8	2,186	47.5
Kilkeel U.D.	579	20.2	2,058	71.7
Half of Armagh R.D., Armagh U.D. and Keady U.D. com- bined <i>§ Appendix 1</i> 8,703	8,703	43.0	9,800	48.4
(See Para <i>§</i> of report)				
Total minimum area	166,960	52.5	112,196	35.3

Note:- M. B. is Municipal Borough

TABLE 3

Population, by religion, in administrative areas, additional to those in minimum area, assumed to be added to make up a maximum area, assumed to be integrated with the Republic.

	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Limavady U. D.	1,796	32.4	3,293	57.7
Limavady R. D.	8,953	48.5	7,624	41.3
Coleraine R. D.	4,505	23.0	13,267	67.6
Magherafelt R. D.	15,219	43.9	14,670	42.3
Clogher R. D.	4,179	44.1	4,474	47.2
Dungannon U. D.	3,168	41.7	3,320	43.7
Dungannon R. D.	11,153	43.0	11,385	43.9
Cookstown R. D.	6,423	44.7	6,049	42.1
Cookstown U. D.	2,288	34.5	3,622	54.5
Half of Armagh R. D., Armagh U. D. and Keady U. D. combined <i>Appendix 1</i> (See paragraph of report)	8,703	43.0	9,800	48.4
Total for additional areas	66,387	40.8	77,414	47.6
Total for maximum area	233,347	47.6	189,610	38.7

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TABLE 4.

Population by religion in administrative units included in residual Northern Ireland area as it would be constituted if maximum area assumed were integrated with Republic.

	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Portstewart U.D.	1,098	22.0	3,286	65.8
Portrush U.D.	890	19.2	3,370	72.7
Coleraine M. B.	3,240	22.0	10,230	69.3
Ballymoney U.D.	900	23.6	2,600	68.3
Ballymoney R.D.	4,624	21.1	15,728	71.9
Ballycastle U.D.	1,563	54.6	1,092	38.2
Ballycastle R.D.	3,724	46.2	3,818	47.4
Ballymena R.D.	5,166	15.2	26,133	76.8
Ballymena M. B.	3,471	21.3	11,455	70.3
Ballyclare U.D.	287	5.6	4,555	88.5
Antrim R.D.	7,837	20.1	28,302	72.5
Larne M. B.	4,644	25.6	11,998	66.2
Larne R.D.	4,357	19.2	16,400	72.2
Whitehead U.D.	414	15.8	1,912	73.2
Carrickfergus M. B.	2,029	13.3	11,652	76.6
Newtownabbey U.D.	10,665	18.6	40,848	71.1
Lisburn R.D.	27,918	37.8	38,235	51.8
Lisburn M. B.	4,856	18.1	19,748	73.6
Craigavon U.D.	4,389	34.6	7,069	55.7
Portadown M. B.	5,395	24.6	14,798	67.5
Lurgan M. B.	10,548	44.3	10,679	44.8
Moirá R.D.	1,619	17.6	6,940	75.4
Tandragee U.D.	283	16.4	1,283	74.5
Tandragee R.D.	244	8.3	2,386	80.9
Dromore U.D.	366	15.8	1,738	75.2
Banbridge U.D.	1,998	29.4	4,312	63.5
Banbridge R.D.	4,655	24.8	12,302	65.5
Downpatrick U.D.	4,815	65.3	2,078	28.2
East Down R.D.	12,825	42.5	14,478	48.0
Hillsborough R.D.	3,097	8.8	28,657	81.7
North Down R.D.	4,763	14.6	25,225	77.5
Newtownards M. B.	1,746	11.3	12,558	81.3
Castlereagh R.D.	4,009	7.6	43,860	83.2
Holywood U.D.	1,573	19.7	5,713	71.7

	<u>Declared Roman Catholics</u>		<u>Declared Protestants</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of total population</u>
Bangor M. B.	2,958	8.5	29,005	82.8
Donaghadee U. D.	188	5.1	3,314	90.2
Belfast County Borough	91,420	25.6	226,954	63.6
Total for residual area where maximum assumed area integrated with Republic.	244,574	23.3	704,711	67.2

Note:- M. B. is Municipal Borough

TABLE 5

Estimated true distribution of Northern Ireland population in 1971 by religious affiliation.

Area	Total	Catholics	Protestants	Others
I. Minimum transferred area	322,680	205,200	117,480	
II. Additional districts	162,579	79,583	82,987	
III. (I + II) Maximum transferred area	485,259	284,783	199,523	944
IV. Residual area	1,069,390	340,112	725,330	3,948
V. (= III + IV) Total N. Ireland	1,554,640	624,895	924,853	4,892

Notes

1. The total population shown is greater than the official population figure by 35,000, the estimated number of Catholics for whom forms were not returned to the Census at all. This figure is an arbitrary one but is believed to be a fair estimate of the number involved. Within the total, 20,000 were assigned to the residual area and 15,000 to the minimum transferred area.

2. Others (last column above), includes members of non-Christian religions and stated agnostics and atheists and persons who described themselves as "undenominational", "unattached" etc.

3. The 142,511 persons for whom no religion was stated were divided in the proportions 11:3 between Catholics and Protestants. This was derived on the following basis. The diocesan figures for Catholics referred to in paragraph 3 of Appendix 1 exceeded the official figures for Catholics by 146,523. (The evidence indicates that there may have been no increase in the Catholic population since the Census was taken). If one accepts these diocesan figures as correct and if one assumes they contain 35,000 Catholics in respect of whom no form was returned to the Census, this would leave 111,000 persons regarded as Catholics by the church authorities who did not state their religious affiliation on their Census return. This would leave about 31,000 of Protestant affiliation who did

at the Census.
not state their religion / These estimates are roughly in the
proportion 11:3. It was assumed that this proportion would hold
true for each county (or part of county where a county was divided
between the maximum area and the residual area).

APPENDIX 2.

Estimation of costs of negotiated re-partition

1. The Unit considered that it is most likely that any negotiated re-partition settlement would be preceded by a de facto re-partition situation with considerable violence and population movement both within Northern Ireland and into the Republic. This might greatly influence the actual negotiated settlement and would have significant effects on the costs involved (e. g. because of property damage and the cost of caring for refugees for any lengthy period). On the other hand, it is of course possible to have a negotiated re-partition settlement which would be preceded by little or no violence. This could include a more orderly exchange of population over, perhaps, a year, with compensation being paid to the owners of private property prior to their departure and with a concerted attempt to limit or even eliminate the amount of time people might have to spend in 'transit camps'. We have had regard to both these possible ways in which re-partition could come about in the estimation of possible costs.

2. The cost estimates were made on the basis that the public authorities whether in Britain, the Republic or a residual Northern Ireland state - would pay most or all of the costs involved rather than simply let them fall on the individuals, families and private interests affected. This would be on the basis of legal or moral obligation or in the hope that an initial outlay on these costs would save money in the long run, by contributing to a cessation of violence in Northern Ireland and thus permitting the Government to reduce their continuing outlays on security. For Britain, there would be the additional financial attraction - in the case where the residual area became dependent - that disengagement would allow them to eliminate, either at once or over a period of years, the entire financial burden of their involvement in Northern Ireland. For a residual Northern Ireland state, the incentive to contribute to the costs involved might be the prospect of making its population more homogeneous through population exchanges, and thus contributing to the future stability of the new state.

3. The estimates relate largely to a phase of negotiated movement and, where possible, resettlement of people, probably over a period of a year, although they also consider the housing requirements involved in the later phase in which those who moved would have to be integrated into the communities in their new State of residence. The phase of movement and resettlement and its requirements allow themselves to be more readily costed, however tentatively. It is impossible to estimate the cost of any earlier phase of

de facto repatriation and violence as one cannot foretell how long it would last, how extensive the property damage would be, how many refugees there would be and how long they would remain displaced. In 1972, the maximum number of refugees dealt with by the Department of Defence in any one day was 5,308 and the cost to the Department of looking after one refugee per night was £2.65. On the basis of price increases since then this figure would have to be increased to £3.50. If there were, say, 50,000 refugees to be catered for and if they were looked after for, say, 3 months, this would cost £16m. Obviously, if numbers of this magnitude or greater were to be cared for any lengthy period, it might be necessary for the Government to billet most of them on private families. We decided, however, to assume that the average stay in transit accommodation for half of the families who would move would be one year in the situation where families are to be rehoused in vacated housing, and two years in the situation where new housing would have to be constructed. (It was assumed that the other half of families moving would be catered for by relatives or by shared housing arrangements.)

4. As regards property damage, it is realistic to assume that if widespread violence were to occur the property damage could be considerable. In cases II and IV, it is assumed that this would be the case and consequently that perhaps half of the housing could be damaged beyond repair. In cases I and III it is assumed that less violence would occur or that there would be none at all but that perhaps a quarter of the house property included would suffer damage due to the effects of their occupants moving, vandalism, etc. No damage would of course be caused to land and we decided to ignore the damage to industrial and commercial assets as in most cases these would probably escape the effects of violence more easily than houses.
5. The cost of providing the necessary extra housing would normally arise in a subsequent phase of integration - because a major housing development could take from about 18 months to 5 years to complete given that the necessary resources in manpower and materials could be made available without serious setbacks to normal economic and social requirements. If, in the meantime, all the expected population movement had taken place, the cost of providing transit accommodation would be extremely high. This cost can be considered as belonging to the phase of negotiated movement.
6. As indicated in paragraphs 18 - 19 the text of the Paper and in Appendix 1, the Unit chose to consider two situations involving the transfer of parts of Northern Ireland to the Republic - the transfer of a minimum area and the transfer of a maximum area.

7. The range of costs estimated is heavily influenced by assumptions about the extent of population movements in a re-partition situation. Population movement is not a necessary accompaniment of a negotiated re-partition and it is very difficult to assess its possible magnitude. This would depend on the genesis of re-partition, on any guarantees for minorities that might form part of a settlement of this kind, on the reliability reposed in the good faith of the respective majorities by the minorities concerned or in the will and ability of any external guarantors to enforce observance of guarantees. Within a prospective minority, its members' readiness to consider moving to the other side of the new border would depend on such factors as their occupation and job prospects, the value of property they owned, their age and family circumstances.
8. In general, we considered that there would be a strong natural reluctance to move to a new environment, especially with the prospect for many of long delays before they were rehoused or secured a new livelihood. However, a negotiated re-partition seems most likely to come about on the basis that the loyalists would have their way in a residual independent State, the Government of which would be drawn exclusively from their ranks. In this eventuality, we felt that the inherent attachment of many Northern Ireland Catholics to the area in which they were born and raised might be outweighed by the prospect of living under a regime which would not only be hostile to their political aspirations but which, they might expect, would discriminate against them on the economic plane and might cut heavily the forms of social expenditure which benefit them. The likelihood that large numbers of them would react in this way would be greatly increased, to the point of being a near certainty, if the re-partition came about in the wake of widespread violence with its aftermath of bitterness and hate.
9. In this latter situation, fear would probably lead many Protestants to move from the area to be incorporated into the Republic. If, however, the re-partition settlement were negotiated without any escalation of violence, it is difficult to judge to what extent the desire to maintain business interests which are largely in their hands, would outweigh Protestants' uneasiness about their position in an enlarged Republic.
10. If despite the view expressed above, Catholics were to secure what they regarded as worthwhile guarantees in the areas of civil rights, discrimination in employment, participation in political, administrative and judicial institutions, and so on, they might not move in any great numbers. In this

whole matter, there is no firm basis for assessment and many permutations are possible. We had no choice, therefore, but to make arbitrary assumptions designed to give some range for the orders of magnitude that might be involved.

11. As indicated in the text of the Paper, the Unit chose to consider two situations: (a) where 25% of the Protestants leave the area transferred to the Republic and 25% of the Catholics leave the area retained in the North and (b) where there is a similar population movement but of the order of 60% in each instance. In addition, it has been decided in relation to the houses of the families who would move, that half of the houses would be destroyed or damaged beyond repair in situation (b) (which would almost certainly be associated with widespread violence) and a quarter in situation (a) (because of the possibility of some violence, damage arising out of the occupants moving, and vandalism occurring while the property lay vacant). These assumptions about population movement and the assumptions that either a minimum or a maximum area within Northern Ireland might be transferred to the Republic gave four cases for the estimation of costs.

12. In estimating costs the Unit decided to consider the following cost items in relation to the persons who move:

- (a) a resettlement allowance - admittedly arbitrary (see paragraph 14) - of £1,000 per family;
- (b) the cost of compensation for owners of private houses, land and industrial and commercial property, who could not be provided with replacement property in the 'host' area on account of the shortage of houses, land, etc. there; and
- (c) the provision of accommodation and subsistence for families awaiting the re-allocation or the completion of houses.

As regards (c), the basis of assessment used is an average waiting period of one year, where families are to be resettled in vacated accommodation and of two years where new housing has to be constructed; as already indicated, it is further assumed that half the families involved would be catered for by relatives or by means of shared housing arrangements and therefore would not give rise to any costs under this heading.

13. It was assumed that no payment would be made by the Republic for the schools, hospitals, administration buildings, publicly-owned housing and other Government property in the areas transferred to the Republic. As these were paid for out of Northern Ireland taxation or borrowing or from UK subsidies, they can be considered as belonging equally well to those former citizens of Northern Ireland who now find themselves in or migrate to areas transferred to the Republic.

Some other property items were also excluded from the estimates of total cost such as agricultural buildings, livestock and crops. All loss of income considerations were ignored except to the extent that they are partially covered in the resettlement allowance. The only administrative costs included were those which are comprehended in the estimate of £3.50 for the cost of caring for one person for a 24-hour period, which arises under item (c) in the preceding paragraph. It would be practically impossible to estimate the general administrative costs involved in planning and carrying out the repatriation settlement, which as mentioned above would extend over a period of up to five years.

14. The detailed procedures used to estimate the various cost items are available in a separate paper. It might be said that the £1,000 figure for the family resettlement allowance is some £150 higher than the amount payable under the Department of Labour resettlement assistance scheme in the case of a family of four returning here from England.

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APPENDIX 3.

Indicators of regional economic differences within Northern Ireland.

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Paragraph/ in the text of the Paper presents some evidence of regional economic differences within Northern Ireland. The following are some further indicators:-

- (1) About £420m. of the £547m. total net personal income for Northern Ireland referred to in paragraph / of the text of the Paper belongs to the residual area i.e. Antrim, most of Down, north-east Armagh and a small area of north-east Derry.
- (2) The table in that paragraph indicates that average personal income per head is much higher in the residual area than in either the minimum or maximum transferred area. The discrepancy is particularly marked in the fact that the figure for Antrim (£484m.) is over twice that for Tyrone (£232) and Fermanagh (£208).
- (3) The average price per acre of agricultural land, as reflected in land sales between 1970 and 1972, is much higher in Antrim, Down and Armagh than in the three remaining counties. The figures based on the 437 sales occurring during the period April to September 1972 are as follows:

County	Average price paid per acre
Down	412
Armagh	375
Antrim	285
Tyrone	168
Derry	152
Fermanagh	107
Northern Ireland	245

- (4) the UK Green Paper on "Finance and the Economy" lists all the firms in Northern Ireland employing more than 500 people and most of the firms employing between 250 and 500 people. 32 of the 40 firms in the first category and 35 of the 50 firms in the second category are situated in the residual area.
- (5) Rateable valuation statistics for (a) industrial, (b) domestic and (c) agricultural property also show that the residual area is much wealthier. The following table shows the aggregate net valuation of each county and county borough before reduction on account of derating for the year ending 31 March, 1973:

County or County Borough	Industrial and Freight Transport	Domestic	Agricultural
Antrim	£ 955	£ 2,124	£ 427
Armagh	288	585	305
Down	420	2,038	522
Fermanagh	40	148	212
Derry	294	598	247
Tyrone	136	459	370
Belfast Co. Borough	1,284	2,367	-
Derry " "	49	259	-

(6) Finally, the average unemployment rate by local office area for 1973 was about 4.4% in the residual area as against about 11.2% in the maximum transferred area.