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To: SECRET

From:

Hume on the Anglo-Irish Summit

1. I had dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Hume in Dublin last night. He had returned from a week's visit to the U.S. yesterday and was leaving for Strasbourg this morning.

2. "Guarantee"

On the Taoiseach's instructions I showed Mr. Hume one of the drafts for the "guarantee" section of the communique. He approved it from his point of view but with one suggestion:

"The British and Irish Governments share a deep concern at the political, social and economic problems of Northern Ireland which have caused immense human suffering. They share a commitment to taking every measure within their power to eliminate the causes of this tragedy. They will both engage in efforts designed to diminish the (historic) divisions between the two sections of the community in Northern Ireland and reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland."

NOTE:- The underlined words are Hume's suggestion. They would substitute for "They will both encourage any efforts which would"

Ideally he would prefer an explicit British statement to the effect that Britain had no interest in remaining in Northern Ireland and would work for progress towards Irish unity. I explained that this was being sought. He recognised that it might not be possible to elicit it at present.

3. Anglo-Irish Council

Hume said that the A.I.C. in its original SDLP conception had been intended exclusively as a major concession to Unionist anxieties. He saw no intrinsic benefit in it from the viewpoint of the Dublin/SDLP aspiration to unity - nor, in its formal linking of Dublin and London, to Irish nationalism. His view, therefore, was that, in the Anglo-Irish equation, the A.I.C. was a concession to the British side which should make it possible for them to move on the more fundamental issue of the "guarantee". He was distressed that it was now being presented on the nationalist side as a nationalist desideratum - to be "extracted" from the British.

I pointed out to him that, whatever the original conception, the paradoxical reality now was that expectations had been built up here both by Paisley's exploitation of the secrecy of the A.I. Studies and the recent revelations in our domestic politics, of the

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A.I.C. as being somehow an advance in the process of unity. I further stressed that, in our domestic anticipation of the Summit, there had been as yet no expectations built up about the "guarantee" question which was in fact the Taoiseach's principal objective: the challenge to the Government had been exclusively confined to progress on the A.I.C.

Hume nevertheless felt that the Taoiseach might in talking with Mrs. Thatcher, return to the original concept and represent the A.I.C. as a gain to Unionists and indeed ^{an} erosion of the Irish nationalist interest for which a quid pro quo on the "guarantee" was essential.

He further suggested that there might be a reference in the section of the communique on the A.I.C. to the intention of both Governments to work together within the A.I.C. to bring the Irish people closer together.

4. All-Ireland Court

He would welcome the establishment of such a court, an SDLP idea going back to 1972. Nevertheless he saw the Court as a concession to British security concerns in the present situation.

5. SDLP

He felt the Taoiseach might tell Mrs. Thatcher that the SDLP was the only political bulwark against the Provisionals who have now embarked on a campaign specifically designed to destroy the SDLP.

He said that the British forget that the SDLP leadership comprises a group of people who abandoned promising careers in 1973 for politics, several of whom are now on the dole. The Unionist side, most of whose politicians traditionally regarded politics as a pastime, is better funded and they have 11 full-time M.P.s in London.

In short, the SDLP, weakened by the hunger strike and comprising dedicated people who have lost much and gained nothing through their involvement in politics, is endangered by this new direct threat and the continuing failure of Britain to make any substantial concession to their position. Both Governments have a vital interest in ensuring that it does not go to the wall.

M. Lillis
2nd November, 1981.

C.C. Taoiseach, Tánaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Department of the Taoiseach: Mr. Nally, Mr. Kirwan.
Department of Foreign Affairs: Secretary, Mr. M. Burke (for
Mr. Neligan)