

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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ROINN AN TAOISIGH

AS REVISED BY TAOISEACH

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SECRET

NORTHERN IRELAND

Subject to checking

Meeting between the Taoiseach and British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in Chequers on 19th November, 1984.

1. The meeting followed a tete-a-tete between the Taoiseach and Prime Minister on the previous night. It began at 9.45 a.m. and finished at 11.45 a.m. It was attended by the Taoiseach, Prime Minister, Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Robert Armstrong, one of the Prime Minister's Private Secretaries, Mr. Charles Powell, Mr. Michael Lillis, and the undersigned. Both the Taoiseach and Prime Minister spoke rapidly and vigorously. The tone of the meeting was at times particularly robust. The Prime Minister's attention was very obviously engaged.
2. Mrs. Thatcher opened by saying that there was often a wide difference between general propositions and practical realities. Before she committed herself to any generalities she wanted to know what exactly they meant. She had a bad experience, through not following this rule, on previous occasions.
3. The second point she wished to make was that whatever emerged from the present talks, it should not be more, or be seen to be more, as a result of the Brighton bombing. Neither should that incident be allowed to deflect us from whatever course was agreed. She said that there was now an opportunity in the new sense of reality which she thought was emerging.
4. Was there really a chance to amend the Irish Constitution so as to recognise the border - or in a referendum would distortions and false accusations make the whole business so marginal that the Government might not come through? She questioned whether we should not now be starting without running that particular risk. There were certain points which were obvious. For example, we needed to heighten the cooperation between the two Governments. What horrified her most of all was that many people in the North never had a chance of a normal life because of the security situation there. They objected to been frisked and searched. She wondered, however, was this not simply a feature of the situation which people should accept. Personally, she would, in that situation, be glad to be frisked and searched. It was evidence that the security forces were doing their work. Were the people in the North not glad that the fight against terrorism was going on in that way? Did they not take assurance from these particular activities?

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5. The Prime Minister said we should talk about things where we feel there is a future - with the land border. The assumption was that there could be a heightened degree of violence, even if it were temporary, following from any initiative, at the present time. But could there be any assurance that this violence would be temporary? Would it really be reduced later? She did not wish to undertake something that would lead to more violence. There was a real danger that a marxist society could develop. She did not ever want that to happen. When she looked at the strategic aspects of the problem she understood what the US feels about Nicaragua.

6. The Taoiseach said that if we do not take action to halt the drift soon then we might eventually finish with precisely the sort of situation that the Prime Minister feared. If constitutional nationalism was seen to be getting nowhere then we would be leaving the ground to Provisional Sinn Fein to emerge as the legitimate voice of nationalist Ireland.

7. We should not be misled by their decision not to contest elections. The Taoiseach referred to a recent ~~article~~ on this subject ^{from} the Financial Times ^{concerned} and to the strategy outlined by Danny Morrison - to avoid advantage being given to constitutional nationalism from Sinn Fein participation in elections. The argument was used that that participation enabled the SDLP and the Dublin Government to say that action must be taken in order to take the ground away from Provisional Sinn Fein. Their decision not to participate in elections was made for purely tactical reasons and could be reversed quickly and easily in the future.

8. The Prime Minister referred to the Electoral Bill which was being put through Parliament to deal with the problem of personation. She said that this Bill would be through before the next Local Elections. The Taoiseach said that if we are not able to make progress, Sinn Fein will take over, as people deduce, as a counsel of despair, that constitutional action will never be able to achieve what they want. This would lead to the use of terror as people abandoned the constitutional path. The Prime Minister asked what the SDLP wanted, which could be given, without outraging the majority in Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach said that we had worked to reduce expectations in Ireland so that people could accept what was practicable. Most people now accepted that unity was not on, in the short run. At the same time the suffering in the minority population was very considerable. There was harassment from Protestant Paramilitaries. There was IRA violence and mob rule in

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There was harassment, especially of young people, by the security forces, many of them local people, driven exclusively from the unionist community

areas where the security forces could not operate normally. What most people in those areas wanted was simply to live in peace. The Irish people simply wanted to live in the island of Ireland in peace. The Prime Minister expressed some incomprehension at what exactly they wanted. The Taoiseach said that she was naturally very proud of being English. Similarly, there was an Irish pride of identity. The minority in Northern Ireland felt themselves to be part of the Irish people - part of a majority in the island of Ireland from which they had been cut off by an arbitrary act. They cannot express this identity. They cannot fly the flag of their own Nation in their own country. They see the security forces as the forces of another community. UDR guns are used to bully them. They see bias - and hard evidence of it - in the way the system of justice is administered, in the operations of the security force, and in the policing system. A way must be found to enable them to identify with these systems. They must not see themselves as being excluded.

9. The Prime Minister said that she did not understand why a minority sought particular prerogatives, as of right. She cited the Macedonians, the Croats, the Serbs, the Sudeten Germans as examples of minorities who were not, as of right, given particular prerogatives. The people of which the Taoiseach was speaking said they owed allegiance to the Irish Republic but they were living in a country which was not part of that Republic and they were drawing on resources which the Republic did not provide. Did the Protestants in the South seek representation in Government, as of right - if there were enough of them left? What would be the effect on the Taoiseach of that sort of claim? She wondered if a possible answer to the problem might not simply be a redrawing of boundaries. The Taoiseach said that that would not be a solution. That was not what he was seeking. Such a course would, indeed, be a fatal mistake. What we have achieved at present is a lowering of expectations. We could do things now which would meet the needs of the situation and get away from the problems of alienation, of which he had spoken. The Prime Minister said that if these things were done, the next question would be what comes next? Were the Sikhs in Southall to be allowed to fly their own flag? British society allowed for rights of dissent. It was in fact, part of the business of the majority to organise society and government so as to protect minorities. There were minorities everywhere in Europe but they did not make the sort of claim which the minority in Northern Ireland were making.

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10. The Taoiseach said that the situation in Northern Ireland was not comparable to what was happening anywhere in Europe. Where could the Prime Minister point to a situation where one sixth of the population were directly and immediately affected by what happened in prisons - because they had relatives ^{or close friends} there? In British terms, the death toll as a result of the violence and alienation in Northern Ireland would be equivalent to about 100,000 dead.

11. The Prime Minister said that the Taoiseach spoke of harassment. But when the British Army went into Northern Ireland they were greeted with relief. Who was really being harassed? Some 2,500 people had lost their lives - in the security forces. (The Prime Minister was obviously under a misapprehension here). The Taoiseach said that the 2,500 were not deaths in the security forces. The vast majority of them ^{80%} were civilian deaths. Perhaps losses in the security forces might amount to one ^{quarter} of the total. Of the civilian deaths the greatest number were among the minority population. The Prime Minister then went on to refer to bombs in restaurants, and in Churches - which she said were particular horrifying crimes. The Taoiseach said that much of the violence ^{was} caused by Protestant paramilitaries - as well as by the Provisional IRA. The Prime Minister then repeated her argument as to why people objected to being searched etc. Surely the fact that the security forces were carrying out this type of operation was a form of guarantee that they were doing their job. The Taoiseach said that he was not particularly critical of that. The real problem was that the minority did not accept the RUC as their police force. They had the feeling that they were being searched by alien forces, which they did not accept. It was because of this feeling that the proposal for a Joint Security Commission had emerged in which a Minister from the South could participate. The Prime Minister said that any such Commission would have to be advisory "of course". She said that at one time, both of us had wondered whether there could be a joint police force. The Taoiseach said there ^{were} various parameters: the problem was very difficult. The Prime Minister said that obviously they must seek the best solution. The Taoiseach said that in Northern Ireland there were areas which were overwhelmingly of one disposition or another. He instanced Derry, West Belfast and ^{South} Armagh as places with large nationalist majorities. It was desirable that the police force should be drawn from the dominant community in the area being policed. There are parts of West Derry where the RUC was never seen - without a strong army presence. He instanced an occasion when he had been

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*suggested that he would not want
him (the Inspector) to accompany him.*

for him had arisen

naturally accepted this
offered RUC protection in West Belfast. An Inspector had offered to come along with him. He had refused the offer because he did not want to put the Inspector at risk. But he could walk up and down the streets of West Belfast without any risk to his person. We could not accept a situation where whole areas are without normal policing. That was a situation which would lead to anarchy. Part of the RUC have to have an element in it which can deal with these areas. What he was seeking was a reorganisation of the RUC which would enable this to happen. The Prime Minister said that the RUC had got a reasonable proportion of Catholics. They would be happy to recruit more Catholics.

12. The Taoiseach said that the problems in Derry and Belfast were not solvable simply by recruiting more Catholics *even* if that were possible. In Britain there were local police forces. In Ireland we had developed from the RIC tradition of centralised policing. This should not rule out the possibility of local police forces. The Prime Minister said "but not in a Capital City". The Taoiseach said that in Brussels there were forty-six different police forces. The Prime Minister said that surely the Taoiseach was not *producing* the sort of activities the Belgian police force engaged in as an example of what should happen. Think of how they deal with riot situations. The Taoiseach said that this was the very point. A Walloon police force could deal with a Walloon population - and be accepted by them. Similarly, a Fleming police force could deal with a Fleming situation - and be accepted. We must get away from what *Peel* thought or did in 1846.

13. Armstrong intervened at this point and said that in the UK the population for a police force was approximately one million. There were about forty three separate police forces in Britain. The Prime Minister said that unless we talked about the problem *she* just would not understand it. Did the Taoiseach want Republican enclaves in Northern Ireland with their own separate police forces? The Taoiseach said that the situation there just was not normal and could not be dealt with in normal ways. The Prime Minister must understand that within the City of Belfast at the beginning of the present troubles 100,000 had been forcibly removed from their homes. *Some 15,000 Protestants had also* been expelled by violence and rioters. Each Community had sought safety in living in the same area. One-fifth of the population of Belfast had been forcibly expelled from their homes in the greatest mass movement of population since the last War. You simply could not leave these enclaves without normal policing. The Prime Minister

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asked if they would back a police force. The Taoiseach said that they would back a police force if it were properly constituted. On the details of a reorganisation they would need security advice. If this reorganisation did not take place then security in the areas of which he was talking would be left and was being left to the IRA - with their protection rackets, drugs, knee-cappings, and violence. These areas were at present being patrolled by the Army - not by the RUC. There was a tradition of violence and anarchy in which the young people of these areas were growing up. They had never known a normal society. The Prime Minister repeated that they would like to recruit more Catholics to the RUC. The Taoiseach said that this just was not the answer. Their own people would make sure that substantial numbers of Catholics would not join the RUC as it was presently constituted. It was an organisational problem. This was why we had suggested the JSC with some role in it for us in establishing and reorganising policing so that the minority ~~can~~ see our role. They can see something in the responsibility for policing that they find acceptable. The legitimacy of the police force would derive from this form of acceptance. The Prime Minister said that she agreed, in principle, to a form of Joint Security Commission "to advise Douglas". She would also like to see a Commission to get the Criminal Law in the two parts of Ireland as similar as possible. The Taoiseach said that the law on terrorism could be harmonised reasonably quickly. In fact, there was a schedule of offences in the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act which would be very useful in this respect. It would be a great deal more difficult to get the Law on Evidence harmonised. We had some very stringent rules on this - which were different from the British rules and which we would probably find it difficult, if not impossible, to change - if that course were regarded as desirable. The Taoiseach mentioned the need to consider a Bill of Rights. The Prime Minister then reverted to the question of how one gets Catholics into the police force. The Taoiseach said that this could be done as part of an overall package. A Joint Security Commission could play a role, if it had sufficient responsibilities. In reply to a query as to how the Security Commission might be constituted, Armstrong said that what had been in mind was a Commission consisting of the Secretary of State and the Minister for Justice, with the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner, with the Secretary to the Northern Ireland Office and whatever other appropriate official we thought should be nominated, plus others, as required. The Taoiseach said that what had been in mind was a Commission which would have responsibility for appointments, guidelines, and a complaints mechanism. We could not sell the idea, easily,

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if there were only to be consultation. We just could not accept a situation where we were told that it was proposed to do something and then whoever was responsible simply went ahead and did it, irrespective of the views of the person consulted.

14. Next, a Joint Security Commission would have to be part of a general framework. If we involved ourselves in security alone, the whole idea would be shot down simply because we would be seen "as helping you along".

15. The Prime Minister enquired would we not be seen as helping most the minority areas. They have not got effective security in those areas. With the new arrangements they would have an alternative to the IRA, in practice. The Taoiseach said that policing to fill that void has to operate in a political framework. If we were to get over the problem of alienation, then there would have to be changes, in the political framework, in the security area and in relation to the Courts. The Prime Minister said that there could be no freedom unless there was law. She enquired why John Hume had not come into the Assembly. The Taoiseach said that he had not gone into the Assembly simply because on many previous occasions he had been told by the Unionists that they would not share power with him. He was being asked to come into an administration or a legislature where the people he represented could never have any real power. The offer was that they should simply act as the helots of people whose traditions they did not share. There was only a very limited number of times you can do that. Hume himself might have gone in, got a refusal once again, and then got out. But others in the Party were strongly against participation and Hume had accepted their advice. They just could not contemplate a situation where neither they nor their children nor their childrens' children after them could ever participate in the Government of the country in which they lived. They just could not accept that kind of permanent humiliation. The Prime Minister said that you have minorities everywhere that will never get power. The Taoiseach said that you had drawn a line around the six Counties creating an Protestant majority there, cutting off the minority from the nation both

which they identified.

** People were set against each other within a narrow space. This had been the cause of the dissension over the last sixty years. ~~Minority was against majority.~~ ~~There was a concept of identity.~~ But at least, now, people were thinking again. They all see the chaos into which they are going after sixty years. People were now willing to go a certain distance in order to avoid what they saw in the future. The Prime Minister said

** Within that area a situation had been set up, which, because of the different allegiances,

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that there was no one on the Unionist side who would accept power-sharing. The Taoiseach said that many are saying that they would, privately. The Prime Minister said that many of them were saying that we lived next to a country which wants our territory. They could see the present propositions as dropping the claim but not the operation of the claim. The people in the North had fought with Britain in the last War. The Prime Minister referred to Winston Churchill's praise of their contribution. Power-sharing just was not on for those people. Sunningdale still lives vividly in their memory.

16. The Taoiseach referred to the attempts that had been made at the end of 1981 and early 1982 to form an Executive in Northern Ireland. An American model had been under consideration then, under which the Secretary of State could appoint an Executive from the Assembly or elsewhere - just as President Reagan appointed his Cabinet. That had been seriously considered about that time but the Government had changed and the whole idea had not been proceeded with. His understanding was that parties were not totally against the concept. The Prime Minister said that the Executive in Britain emerges from elected representatives from one House or the other. In the British Cabinet there were four members of the Upper House on the Executive. The Taoiseach said that power-sharing had been operated for a short time in the 1970s. He enquired as to whether the Prime Minister was now abandoning the principle that the Executive must be acceptable to the two communities. The Prime Minister said that she was not abandoning that principle. We just have not found a basis acceptable to both communities. Twice in recent years we had tried very hard to get that type of an Executive but each time the effort had fallen apart. Atkins had made one attempt; Prior had made another. Neither attempt had worked. The Taoiseach said that was simply because you gave the Unionists a right of veto. The Prime Minister said that they knew quite well that they were not going to get a devolved Government unless they agreed. The Taoiseach said that perhaps both of us are going about this problem in too rational a way. We must understand the history, the traditions and the emotions in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister asked was there such fundamental animosity that we can never get an acceptable Executive ~~or~~ Was it just that we have not got the right formula. The Prime Minister continued that we certainly were not going to get anywhere unless security is improved. That meant changes in the law and on policing.

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In any role of that sort the part of the South could only be advisory. She was looking to a situation where everyone was living under a rule of law. If we were talking about political structures we must find one that was acceptable to the majority and the minority. We haven't got that yet - and do not look like getting it. Those who lead in the North won't come to talk of these matters. She would be making a statement in the House on the present meeting. She would be cross-examined there for an hour. The Paisleyites would - you know the language they use! Other Unionists would be more moderate. Enoch Powell and Molyneaux would press for a Unionist form of Government. One thing the Nationalists would not have would be provincial local government. If we looked at housing - the Executive now works satisfactorily. Schools also work satisfactorily - as part of the great 1944 settlement. Job distribution might not be perfect. She understood that some districts would not accept Catholics - and instanced Lisburn, but these defects could be dealt with under present systems.

discriminated against

17. The Prime Minister then went on to enquire as to whether Paisley had given evidence before the Forum. The Taoiseach said that he had not. The Unionist opinion had not been given formally but many individuals had come and given views or evidence. The whole process had been highly educational for both Unionists and Nationalists. The Prime Minister then returned to the phrase "acceptable to the majority and minority communities". The Taoiseach said that there could still be a possibility of going back to what Jim Prior was talking about. There would be an assurance to Unionists of the British link if the Secretary of State was Prime Minister in Northern Ireland and that he would continue to act as such unless and until everybody agreed to come into the system. That would be a powerful incentive for Unionists and Nationalists to come together in an Executive. The Prime Minister emphasised again that we can do nothing unless we get agreement between majority and minority. The Taoiseach went on to describe what had happened in 1974. Then there had been no question of one Minister abusing his powers or acting in a way other than collectively, within the Executive. That provided one model of the sort he was suggesting. Another model was that the Secretary of State should work in conjunction with an Irish Minister on all the functions of government other than those reserved to Westminster. The Prime Minister said that that was out. It smacked too much of joint authority. That was definitely out. The Taoiseach said that he had

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in principle in earlier discussions

understood that there had been agreement on some such proposition. As far as we were concerned if you called what the Irish Minister did "consultation" it could be criticised as enabling the Secretary of State simply to ask the Minister what he thought about a particular proposal and then to ignore his views. The Prime Minister said that joint authority or anything like it was totally out. The Unionists would say that you are giving up your Constitutional claim but you are coming across the border and don't really need the claim. That would put us well on the way to civil war. She said please understand that. The Taoiseach said that some relationship is required which cannot be criticised simply as being an arrangement just to bolster up your security forces.

18. The Prime Minister said doesn't security matter to them? If there is no security there is no liberty. They are coralled into ghettos. The most welcome thing of all was effective security and the police force with which they can identify. They all have one person, one vote but they say that they have not got security. The other functions of Government worked well. Housing works well. Education works well. There are laws against discrimination. When these functions were in the hands of local representatives they did not work. The Taoiseach mentioned the Report of the Fair Employment Agency on the Civil Service - which the Civil Service *had* said would have to be redone. Sir Robert Armstrong said that at present recruiting was in or about a forty/sixty ratio. The Prime Minister said that if you cannot get fairness on an elected basis you can get it on an appointed basis. She had no wish for direct rule but it was better for both communities than any likely alternative. The Taoiseach referred to the effects which higher unemployment and alienation are having on society in Northern Ireland. He said the basic question was how do you create a situation in which people there can live normal lives. The Prime Minister said to me, security is most important. The thing is to get rid of terrorism. The Taoiseach said we have homed in on that. If we attempt to act on security alone we will not succeed. There must be action at the political level. If arrangements were not made there for an Irish Minister working with the Secretary of State you would not get acceptance of changes we proposed on Articles 2 and 3. If they were changed in a referendum the new situation could not be changed by any subsequent Government simply by legislative act. There were risks in what he was suggesting but if he was to succeed he needed institutions and forms which *gained* the support of the minority in Northern Ireland and enable them to identify with the security system and ~~the~~ system of justice they can respect. That could derive from

institutions working with

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Irish and British authority. The Prime Minister said that the Taoiseach had mentioned the Belgian analogy. The Taoiseach said that the Belgians gave allegiance to the King. Without him there would be nothing. In 1830 the Monarchy had been instituted as a symbol of the State. The Prime Minister said but the French don't fly the Tricolour there. She then went on to give an example of Unionists and Nationalists working together in a Hughes factory in Belfast. When she came the Nationalists put up the Tricolour and the Unionists put up the Union Jack. When she was not there everybody worked in harmony.

19. The Prime Minister said that the Unionists would say that you are in fact doing a repartition, even if you are not doing it geographically. She said it is not something I have ruled out. History shows that the Irish, whether the Scottish-Irish or the Irish-Irish - don't like to move. However, they all seem to be terribly happy to move to Britain.

20. The Taoiseach said that that might be part of the tragedy of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that 70% of the jobs in Northern Ireland were in the public sector. It was very difficult to attract industry there. There had been the example of a Manager of a factory murdered. That sort of thing discouraged other investors. Too many people were working in the Civil Service, the Health Service, the Prison Services in Northern Ireland. there was very little wealth creation. The British subvention was now about £2 billion a year. The Taoiseach said that there was no future in a community divided in that way. They must seek to create a society in which the present divisions ceased to exist. The Prime Minister enquired what kind of future there is in the Republic. Was it really a harbour for the IRA? The Taoiseach said that question was irrelevant. There was nobody in ~~the Republic~~ who could be got at, who, if he lived in Belfast or Northern Ireland could be got at. The situation was exactly the same in both areas. *who could not also be arrested in the Republic on the same evidence*

21. The Prime Minister enquired as to whether the future in the South was as dark as in the North. The Taoiseach said that things could be bad if we did not get the IRA out of the way.

22. Both sides had been setting incompatible targets - the Unionists on one side and the Nationalists on the other side. *But* The parameters of the situation have now changed. We must find a solution before the swing which is now developing goes too far - and drags us all down.

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The elements of what is necessary in that solution are some form of power-sharing and a measure of involvement by us as well as changes in the policing system and in the judiciary. If these changes were successful they would dry up the water in which the terrorist swims. If you concentrate on security alone, you simply will not succeed.

23. The Prime Minister said that this was something she simply did not understand. Surely safety in the home was something to be valued. If the rule of law was upheld then we would have succeeded. The Taoiseach said that there was more to it than that. Both sides in the North felt their sense of identity being threatened. ~~→ The Prime Minister said that what you are saying in the nationalist enclaves is that the price of policing the border is power in Government for 40% of the people.~~

24. ~~She~~ ^{She} went on to say that people were arguing that they owed no allegiance to the Government but they took the Government's money. They were saying that the Irish minorities were different from other minorities. The Nationalists feel that all they have to do is to wait. The Taoiseach said that what was needed was some system in which both sides can express their identity. She referred to the Irish language, Irish dances and Irish ways. The Taoiseach said that there were two allegiances in Northern Ireland - a British allegiance and an Irish allegiance. He accepted the British position on sovereignty but under that level the problem must be ~~an Irish~~ ^{an} politically, in the security area and in relation to the judiciary. The Prime Minister said that security and the judicial area were the same. The Taoiseach said that mixed Courts could solve part of the judicial problem. What you are left with then is the political problem. There is obvious difficulty for us in "consultation". He had been thinking of a system under which the British Minister would seek to agree with the Irish Minister concerned and if agreement were not forthcoming that there would be appeal to the two Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister reacted strongly to this. She said "no no - that is joint authority - you are giving them 40% of our country". There followed some argument as to the origin of the suggestion about appeal to the Prime Minister.

25. The Prime Minister then went on to say it means that "Douglas' hand is ~~static~~ ^{in a state of flux}. It has got to come to you and to me. He ~~can~~ ^{can't} no longer manage. I can't fetter his judgement in that way. It is a very strange way of giving up a claim.

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26. The Taoiseach said that it would be impossible for us to go to our people to change Articles 2 and 3 on the basis of "consultation".

27. The Prime Minister said that whether you can change it or not, we are still left with the problem that 70% of the jobs in Northern Ireland are in the Public Service. British soldiers are being killed. The cost to the British Exchequer is now about £2 billion a year. She just could not be seen to give into violence. At the same time they had to protect those in the Nationalist enclaves from the IRA. The most important thing to do is to go for the security group. On the political side we can't get agreement between the majority and the minority. We just have not got it. She went on to say that if consultation were involved it would be genuine. She repeated that you just cannot ~~settle~~ the judgement of the Secretary of State and his duty in the end to decide in the best interests of the territory over which he presides. She said I am answerable to Parliament at Westminster who are answerable for Northern Ireland. The Taoiseach said that for fifty years they had not regarded themselves as being answerable. They had never permitted a question on Northern Ireland to be discussed in the House. That was partly the reason for the present trouble. The Prime Minister went on to speculate that if there was no devolved Government in Northern Ireland, would not the best course be to have a proper system of local government or, alternatively treat Northern Ireland as simply another part of the United Kingdom.

28. At this point, the meeting adjourned. Both sides consulted the remainder of the delegation and the meeting resumed again at 12.20 p.m. with the Tanaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Secretaries of State Howe and Hurd and Messrs. Armstrong, Powell, Donlon and the undersigned. A separate note is available on that discussion.

John

21st November, 1984.

cc. Tanaiste
Mr. Sean Donlon, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. Ward, Secretary, Department of Justice
Mr. M. Lillis, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs.

(M. Donlon will convey copy to the ambassador)