



An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

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ORANGE MARCHES IN PORTADOWN 6, 12, 14 JULY 1986

1. On 4 July the RUC issued a statement on arrangements for the loyalist parades in the town on July, 6, 12 and 14 (attached . . .). Under these arrangements the Church Parade on 6 July was permitted to proceed through Woodhouse Street, Obins Street and Garvaghy Road. It was announced that the parades on 12th and 14th would not be permitted through Woodhouse Street or Obins Street. Consequently there was a widespread expectation among nationalists that the march on 12 July would not be permitted through Catholic areas. Expectations were particularly strong in view of the violence on 6 July which left 27 police officers and three civilians injured.

2. On 11 July it was announced that the March on the 12th would be permitted through Garvaghy Road. The Irish side had earlier conveyed the view to the British Joint Chairman that any decision which appeared to make concessions to those whose purpose was to attack or intimidate the minority community would be dangerous and unjust. Following the announcement a further message was conveyed requesting the Secretary of State to ban the parade. On the morning of the 12 July a further message was conveyed from the Irish Joint Chairman to the effect that the decision had been to undermine the credibility of the Agreement and to damage the position of the Irish Joint Chairman seriously in the view of nationalists North and South.

3. On 15 July a public statement was issued . . . and Irish views on the Portadown decision conveyed to the British side

Anglo-Irish Section.
1720M 23 July 1986.

JULY PARADE

1. The RUC has decided that the following arrangements will apply to the loyalist parades in Portadown on July 6, 12 and 14:

Sunday 6 July: Provided that strict conditions are fully adhered to, the church parade to Drumcree Church will be permitted to proceed via Woodhouse Street and Obins Street, returning via Garvaghy Road.

2

Saturday 12 July and Monday 14 July: The Orange parade on the 12th and the RBP parade on the 14th will not be permitted through Woodhouse Street and Obins Street.

In permitting the Sunday parade to take place along the traditional route (subject to conditions), the RUC is basing its decision on the requirement that it will be a dignified, peaceful church parade and on the tradition of respect accorded to church parades by the Roman Catholic community.

3.

The conditions attached to the RUC's decision, copies of which have been served on the organisers, relate to conduct, bands and persons permitted to participate and proper stewarding.

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It must be emphasised that in the event of these conditions not being fully complied with on the day, the parade will be re-routed.

2. The police have received notification from two nationalist bands of their intention to parade in Portadown on Sunday morning, 6 July, along part of the same route as that of the church parade. This proposed bands parade is an entirely new event without tradition, clearly intended to cause further difficulties. The police have decided that it cannot take place as notified. It is hoped that the organisers will reconsider their notification so as to avoid confrontation; otherwise the RUC will impose such conditions as are necessary to maintain the peace.
 3. The RUC is aware that the arrangements set out in this announcement could not satisfy the conflicting points of view in Portadown. It simply is not possible to reach a generally agreed solution within the community. The police believe that, given all the circumstances, and after the most careful consultation and deliberation, the action they intend to take over this period is fair to all and in the best interests of the
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people of Portadown and Northern Ireland as a whole.

4. In the past six months the RUC has policed 997 loyalist and 163 nationalist parades and demonstrations. Contrary to misleading predictions from some quarters, none of the traditional parades have had to be re-routed or banned and the RUC is appreciative of the co-operation and responsibility generally shown by the organisers and participants. This is how it should be. The RUC welcomes the growing signs of responsibility throughout the community generally on this sensitive issue of parades and notes that where violence has occurred it has been confined to a small hooligan element and has been condemned by all responsible people.

The RUC sincerely appeals to community leaders and all law-abiding people on all sides in Portadown and elsewhere, to use their influence to ensure that the period ahead will be peaceful. That and that alone, is the objective of the RUC, as it must be of all the people of Northern Ireland.

**Issued by the Royal
Ulster Constabulary.**

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON MARCHES,
15 JULY 1986

I have deliberately kept public silence about the events in Northern Ireland in order not to aggravate an already inflamed situation. It is necessary not to clear up misunderstandings which may have arisen about my position.

Nationalists have been dismayed by the events in the past ten days. They have suffered at the hands of thugs and bully boys. Their lives have been at risk, there has been one tragic death and many serious injuries. Nationalists' property has been vandalised, and their right to equal treatment under the law denied.

My concern has been to see that nationalists are protected, particularly those in enclaves which are vulnerable to attack by sectarian mobs. Throughout the last ten days I have remained in constant contact with the situation on the ground. I have received detailed information from responsible leaders of the nationalist community, for which I wish to thank them. I have taken full account of this information in the messages which I have sent directly to the Secretary of State through the channels established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

I share the deep resentment of nationalists in Northern Ireland about certain operational decisions made by the RUC on the routing of marches and I have made my views known in strong terms to Mr. King. It is intolerable that provocative demands by unionist marchers should be listened to. I want nationalists to know that I am determined to see to it that their interests are safeguarded and that their physical security is protected.

I want to say also that I am shocked by the Sinn Fein/IRA attacks on members of the majority community. I condemn all this violence.

I call for restraint from all sides at this dangerous time. I call especially on the leaders of unionist opinion to show their abhorrence of unionist violence and to do everything in their power to prevent it.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON MARCHES,

16 JULY 1986

There have been criticisms from both sides of the community about the ways in which the RUC have policed the recent parades.

May I therefore make clear that operational matters regarding marches are entirely the responsibility of the Chief Constable. I have full confidence in him in the difficult judgements that the RUC have had to make in these contentious matters. I would like to express my sympathy with those members of the RUC who have suffered injury in discharging their duty of protecting both sides of the community from the violence of extremists on either side. I would also record my appreciation of the very long hours of duty carried out by so many in the RUC and the security forces during the whole weekend of the 12th, and my respect for the way in which they sought to discharge their responsibilities in an even-handed way.

I confirm again that operational responsibility for the routes of marches is the sole responsibility of the Chief Constable and the RUC, and that I have no intention of seeking to interfere in any way with that position. That has been, and will continue to be the position throughout the marching season, and anybody who is concerned about any particular event should follow the normal procedure and approach their local RUC officers.

There has been too much violence and injury in recent days, which is quite unacceptable in a responsible and civilized community. In the coming weeks I look to both communities to show respect and understanding for each others' traditions and stand together against these occasions being exploited by men of violence on either side.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S REPLY TO A PQ IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 16 JULY, 1986 CONCERNING PARADES

I have received messages from Mr. Barry expressing his concern about the events of recent days in Northern Ireland and his assessment of the impact on the nationalist community and in particular his criticism of certain operational decisions of the RUC. I have today issued a statement making clear that operational decisions on routing of parades are entirely a matter for the Chief Constable. I have also expressed my support for the way in which the RUC sought to deal even-handedly with both communities and to protect law abiding people from violence from whatever quarter it comes.

IRISH VIEWS ON THE RUC'S PORTADOWN DECISION

1. The effect of the decision taken by the RUC in relation to the Twelfth march in Portadown has been to raise questions in nationalists' minds about the effectiveness of the Agreement, to undermine the position of the Irish Joint Chairman and to present the IRA with a considerable opportunity for propaganda which they have not failed to grasp.

2. In exchanges in the Secretariat on 11 July, the Irish side, in a message from the Irish Joint Chairman to the British Joint Chairman, conveyed the view that any decision in relation to forthcoming events which had the appearance or the reality of making concessions to those whose purpose was to attack or to intimidate the minority would pose dangers for the Irish minority community and would be unjust. It was made clear that the Irish Joint Chairman attached the highest importance to this matter. Later on 11 July, following the announcement of the Chief Constable's decision, a further message was conveyed from the Irish Joint Chairman to the British Joint Chairman requesting that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should ban the parade along Garvaghy Road so as to withhold from the IRA opportunities to carry out violence against the police and to undermine the credibility of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the eyes of nationalists as well as to alienate nationalists from the police. On the morning of 12 July, in a further message to the British Joint Chairman, the Irish Joint

Chairman said the effect of the decision had been to undermine the credibility of the Agreement and to damage the position of the Irish Joint Chairman seriously in the view of nationalists north and south. On 14 July, a message was conveyed from the Irish Joint Chairman to the British Joint Chairman drawing the latter's attention to the coverage of the event in the Irish media which underlined these concerns expressed by the Minister on the morning of 12 July.

3. In a phone conversation on 10 July, Nicholas Scott had assured the Irish Joint Chairman that there would be no concession to those intent on intimidation.

4. Nevertheless, a decision was taken by the RUC in relation to the Twelfth march in Portadown which was in the eyes of the minority community a clear capitulation to those intent on intimidation, notably following the military-style demonstration involving some 3,000 - 4,000 men which the DUP organised in Hillsborough on the night of 10-11 July. Triumphant comments attributed to a number of unionist representatives since then have had the effect of strengthening this belief in the minority community. The substance of these comments has been to claim a defeat for the Anglo-Irish Agreement and there are many in the minority community who view matters in the same light.

5. It is recognised that, as promised in the RUC's public statement of 4 July, the parade in question did not pass through Woodhouse Street and Obins Street. The alternative routing of the parade along Garvaghy Road, however, was entirely unacceptable to the minority. This is an area with an overwhelmingly Catholic population. The views of the SDLP on the routing of any provocative Orange march through any Catholic area of Portadown are well-known to the RUC. They have been conveyed at many meetings in the past between the SDLP and the RUC and there can have been no room for misunderstanding on this score.

6. Over the past year, expectations on the part of the minority that the marches on 12 and 14 July in Portadown would not be permitted to pass through Catholic areas of the town (which are by no means confined to Obins Street and Woodhouse Street) have been fuelled by a number of signals:

i) It was agreed between the RUC and local minority representatives in 1985 that, in exchange for acceptance by the latter that the 'church parade' on the Sunday before the Twelfth could pass through Obins Street, the marches on 12 and 13 July would be re-routed out of Obins Street. In the event, however, the 'church parade' was marked by serious disturbances which, in the view of the minority representatives, should have demonstrated clearly to the RUC the undesirability of allowing any Orange parade (even one which is allegedly unprovocative) through a Catholic area. This view was reinforced by the disturbances during the parades of 12-13 July 1985, when Orangemen of clearly hostile intent had to be forcibly restrained by the police from entering Obins Street.

ii) This view was by no means confined to the minority.

- The RUC Divisional Commander for Portadown, Assistant Chief Constable William McCreesh, was quoted in the media at the time as having commented that Orangemen would never march through Catholic districts of Portadown again.
- The then Secretary of the State for Northern Ireland commented (in Oxford on 14 July, 1985) that people who were marching to celebrate one tradition were not justified in doing so in such a way as to give offence to the other traditions. Mr. Hurd went on to say that "to parade in a place or along a route where one is not welcome is not part of the British way of life".

- Since then, in his annual report for 1985, the Chief Constable has observed that "the key aspect is the attitude of the population of the area through which a parade is intended to march".

- Speaking in the EPA renewal debate in the House of Commons on 19 June, the Secretary of State said:

"How does it benefit anyone to march through an area where the inhabitants do not support the views being expressed by the marchers and where the only result is to exacerbate intercommunal tension".

- It will be recalled that the Chief Constable commented in a T.V. interview after the illegal march on Easter Monday this year to the effect that he did not know why the Loyalists wished to go up Garvaghy Road as they had three-quarters of Portadown to go through.

iii) With regard to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the position has been that a strong expectation was created in the minority community to the effect that decisions on parade routing in Portadown in the Summer of 1986, i.e., the principle adumbrated in the Agreement that people from both communities in Northern Ireland should be able to "live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance" would be given no less effect after the Agreement than before it. Indeed, there was a widespread expectation that in 1986 there would be an improvement vis-a-vis 1985, i.e., that the 'church parade' on Sunday 6 July would not be permitted through Catholic areas. In the event, there was considerable resentment on the part of nationalists that the latter parade was indeed allowed through a Catholic area. The strong statement issued by the police following the events which surrounded that parade reinforced the belief that there could be no possibility whatsoever of the Orange parade on 12 July being permitted through Catholic areas.

- iv) Garvagh Road is the central artery running through an area with an overwhelming Catholic majority. The electoral register indicates that 2,124 Roman Catholics live in the area as against 440 Protestants. It is misleading, therefore, for the Chief Constable to describe it as a "mixed area" (Downtown Radio, 12 July). It is as much a Catholic area as Obins Street (and, indeed, by virtue of its greater size contains a much larger number of Catholics than the latter). The term "mixed area", furthermore, usually implies a degree of integration between both communities which, in fact, is not the case along Garvagh Road - the Catholic and Protestant sections of the area are clearly distinguishable.

The potential for trouble along the Garvagh Road in relation to Orange marches has been clearly visible since Easter Monday, Ian Paisley led an impromptu and illegal march along Garvagh Road which was clearly designed to provoke and intimidate the minority and which caused serious disturbances. It was the belief of the minority that this episode would have impressed on the police that any march along Garvagh Road is provocative in intent and is, accordingly, unacceptable to the minority.

- v) Believing that this lesson would have been learned from the Easter Monday experience, minority representatives assumed at all times that Garvagh Road would not have been countenanced as an alternative route for this year's Twelfth marches, for the further reasons that:
- (a) in contrast to Obins Street, it does not form part of the tradition route,
 - (b) it involves a considerable detour away from Corcrair Orange Hall (to which the Orangemen usually march) and therefore makes little sense in logistical terms; and
 - (c) the Orange Order's Twelfth march last year was not routed along Garvagh Road.

- vi) There is considerable anger in the minority community that intensive and protracted consultations on the parade route took place with a variety of shades of Unionism. On the other hand the RUC did spell out carefully to minority representatives what its proposals were, or might be, in this regard. It was not enough simply to proclaim publicly that Obins Street and Woodhouse Street would be avoided. The RUC should have invited local minority representatives to a full exchange of views on the specific proposal to route the marches through Garvaghy Road. It is understood, however, that no such invitation has issued and that consultations were confined to the march organisers and to local majority representatives. Nationalist opinion has understandably been inflamed by this neglect of their sensitivities.
- vii) Having regard to the views cited in para. 5(2) above, it is extremely difficult to understand the RUC decision in relation to Garvaghy Road.
- viii) The obvious and logical route for the parade, in terms of the town's geography, would have been the Charles Street-Corcrain Road route to Corcrain Orange Hall and back. This would have involved remaining within a Protestant area of the town and avoiding both the Obins Street and Garvaghy Road areas. It is not clear why this route was not used.
- xi) Over the past few months, the Irish Government has sought to be as helpful as possible in relation to the exchanges which have taken place in the Conference under the terms of Article 7(a) - ("Policy issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events"). Replying to a PQ in Dail Eireann on 11 March, the Taoiseach exercised particular restraint in referring to exchanges which had taken place in regard to the handling of the Loyalist "Day of Action". In a similar spirit of cooperation, the Irish Joint Chairman allowed

his counterpart to state, as part of a reply to a PQ in the House of Commons on 15 April, that "no representations on the details of specific parades and marches have been received from the Irish Government". It will be appreciated that, in exercising such restraint, the Irish Government incurred certain political risks.

- x) The goodwill which the Irish side has thus displayed has not been reciprocated on the British side. The RUC decision in relation to Garvaghy Road flies in the face of the views expressed by the Irish side on this subject and stands in direct conflict with the personal assurance given to the Irish Joint Chairman on the previous day that there would be no concession to those intent on intimidation.

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ELEMENTS OF A POLICY ON PARADES

1. Nobody disputes the right of people in Northern Ireland to hold traditional parades. What is at issue, however, is the route to be followed by the parade.
2. Over the past twelve months it seems to have been accepted in principle by the RUC that a Loyalist parade should not be permitted through an area with a nationalist majority and vice versa. In his Annual Report for 1985, the Chief Constable observed that:

"The key aspect is the attitude of the population of the area through which a parade is intended to march".

Speaking in the EPA renewal debate in the House of Commons on 19 June, the Secretary of State said:

"How does it benefit anyone to march through an area where the inhabitants do not support the views being expressed by the marches and where the only result is to exacerbate intercommunal tension?".

In other words, taking into account population shifts in recent years, a traditional parade route must be held up to the test of whether, in the area through which the parade is due to pass, there is still a majority in sympathy with its objectives. This is an important advance on the previous position.

3. Another improvement has been the recognition on the part of the RUC (reflected in the Public Order (N.I.) Order 1981), that certain bands of questionable intentions must be excluded from parades.

4. In Portadown on 12 July, however, the principle referred to in para. 2 above was not respected. It was evidently not respected last year either as we have been given to understand that the RUC offered the Garvaghy route to the Orange Order during the negotiations prior to the 1985 Twelfth march. If, in the case of Obins Street, the primacy of the local population's wishes could be deemed both this year and last year to overrule the claims of a 'traditional' route, the same principle should have been applied a fortiori to an area (Garvaghy Road) which did not even have the status of a traditional route.

5. It is appreciated that, in a strict sense, operational matters concerning marches are the responsibility of the Chief Constable. It is, however, difficult to accept the thesis that the Secretary of State is without influence in regard to to operational decisions of obvious political import. Article 9 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, after all, makes it clear that the Chief Constable does not act in such matters with complete autonomy: it states that "responsibility for police operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces, the commissioner of the Garda Siochana maintaining his links with the Minister for Justice and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary his links with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland".

6. In regard to the Twelfth in Portadown, there were clearly practical operational considerations which only the Chief Constable would have been competent to assess. There were also, however, obvious political implications which the Secretary of State would have had to consider, in particular the effects which certain decisions might have on relations between the security forces and the minority community. Having regard to the Secretary of State's responsibilities in the latter respect under Article 7 of

the Anglo-Irish Agreement, it is hard to accept that a decision on the routing of this particularly sensitive march would have been reduced to an exclusively operational matter and left entirely in the hands of the Chief Constable.

7. Under the Public Order (N.I.) Order 1981, certain important and specific powers in relation to marches are vested in the Secretary of State. These flow no doubt from the Government's overall responsibility for the preservation of public order. In particular, the Secretary of State has the power to ban a particular parade if he reaches the view, on the basis of information furnished to him by the RUC "or for any other reason", that

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- (i) rerouting of the imposition of conditions will not be sufficient to "prevent serious public disorder being occasioned" by the holding of the parade; or
 - (ii) the holding of the parade "is likely to cause serious public disorder or to cause undue demands to be made upon the police or military forces; or
 - (iii) the holding of the parade is "likely to cause undue hardship to persons working or carrying on business in that area or place".

8. It is suggested that, in the light of the evidence clearly available in the days prior to 12 July that serious public disorder might be occasioned by permitting the Twelfth march to pass through a nationalist area, there was a case to be made for the Secretary of State to issue an order banning the proposed march along Garvaghy Road. The Secretary of State might have reached this view either on the basis of information supplied by the RUC or of his own accord ("for any other reason"). In view of the massive

security presence along Garvaghy Road and the related obstruction of the nationalist population, the criteria indicated at (i) and (ii) would appear to have been fully met in this instance.

9. It is recalled, furthermore, that the Secretary of State last year exercised his power to ban a parade (on 27 June in Castlewellan) when the organisers refused to accept a route suggested by the police. It seems reasonable to assume in the case of Portadown that the RUC initially proposed an uncontentious route (i.e., the Corcrain Road route) and that the Orange Order held out instead for a route passing through a nationalist area. If this was so, then a situation arguably existed in which the parade organisers were refusing to accept a route suggested by the police.

10. Irrespective of the particular decisions taken by the Chief Constable or the Secretary of State, close consultations should take place well in advance of a proposed march with the public representatives of both sections of the community in the area through which the march is to pass. In the case of Portadown, no consultations were held with the SDLP on the proposal to route the Twelfth march along the Garvaghy Road, an area with an overwhelmingly nationalist population. Only the representatives of the majority were consulted. In situations of such sensitivity, the RUC should invite representatives of both sections of the community to a full exchange of views on whatever routing proposals it wishes to make. Its failure to do so in the case of Portadown contrasts strongly with the emphasis which it has previously laid on the need for consultation between the police and the public in relation to marches. In its statement of 8.7.85 the RUC said:

"The controversy this year suggests to the RUC that better more constructive arrangements could be devised

for consultation in respect of parades and parade routes. From soundings already taken, the police believe that responsible individuals and organisations will welcome improved consultative arrangements as a means of achieving the highest possible degree of understanding, cooperation and agreement".

11. In his Annual Report for 1985, the Chief Constable proposed that responsibility (or decisions on the holding and routing of parades should be entrusted to an independent public tribunal. For both political and practical reasons, this is not a very attractive proposal. First, the heart of the problem, from the point of view of nationalists, is the attitude which the police takes towards them. Nationalists are looking for evidence that the RUC will behave in an even-handed fashion. While this, of course, goes well beyond the question of parades, the latter offer nevertheless a context in which equal treatment of both traditions can be demonstrated with particular clarity. If sensitive parade decisions were entrusted to an independent tribunal, nationalists would perceive this as a clear abdication of his responsibilities on the part of the Chief Constable and their doubts about the RUC's good intentions would be intensified. There is also the practical consideration that efficiency would probably suffer if the RUC were not directly involved in both the planning and implementation of a particular parade route.

12. Taking into account the foregoing arguments, the following elements of a policy on parades are proposed:
 - (i) People have the right to parade - but not in such a way as to give offence to the opposite tradition. No parade should be permitted along a proposed route, whether 'traditional' or otherwise, if a majority of the population in the area concerned is clearly not in sympathy with the objectives of the parade.

(ii) The RUC must put this principle into effect with greater consistency. To quote a recent "Belfast Telegraph" editorial: "Long before the crucial dates, the police must decide on wholly acceptance, non-controversial routes and stick to them". If parade organisers prove uncooperative, the option of a ban by the Secretary of State should be looked at more closely in future. (The Chief Constable would hopefully take the initiative in proposing bans to the Secretary of State).

(iii) Consideration might be given to strengthening the Public Order (N.I.) Order 1981 in a number of respects, e.g.,

- the principle outlined in (i) above could be embodied in suitable language;
- the present reference in para. 4(2)(b) to "the desirability of not interfering with a public procession customarily held along a particular route" might be deleted;
- a new section might be added, linked perhaps to the present 'Incitement to hatred' Section, which would outlaw the holding of clearly provocative marches (a category not explicitly covered in the present Order);
- the Chief Constable might also be given the power to ban marches, e.g., by a strengthening of the present para. 4(1)(ii).

(iv) The arrangements for consultation between the RUC and local public representatives on proposed parade routes should be considerably improved.

David Donoghue.
Anglo-Irish Divison.
24 July 1986.

Note on Forthcoming Events - August

1. Following the Portadown Black Preceptory March on 13 July, the marching season has entered a brief lull. Marching will resume in August when three major marches are expected in less than a week. In broad outline the marching schedule for August is as follows:

9 August: Anniversary of Internment

The most likely flashpoint is Downpatrick where Sinn Fein has organised an illegal commemorative march in recent years. Last year the parade passed off peacefully but clashes broke out between police and loyalists when the latter were prevented from walking through the town centre. There is the possibility of a loyalist counter-demonstration this year.

12 August: Apprentice Boys' March

The parade in Derry to celebrate the relief of the city attracts over 10,000 members to the city, drawn from all parts of the province. The march is confined to the Waterside area, crossing the Foyle only to the Diamond, the Memorial Hall and the Cathedral. A Black Preceptory Parade is traditionally held in Newtownbutler on 12 August. (This may be brought forward to the weekend of 9/10 August with a view to attracting larger crowds). Newtownbutler is a strongly nationalist area. Last year we received reports that nationalist traders were warned by the Protestant Action Force not to open for business during the march.

15 August: Ancient Order of Hibernians

The traditional 'Lady Day March' is held on the Feast of the Assumption. The location of the main rally varies and has generally been chosen with a view to avoiding clashes. The venue in 1985 was Ballerin, Co. Derry - a relatively

isolated and predominantly nationalist area. Some marches have attracted paramilitary elements and there have been scuffles. An unofficial nationalist rally at Warrenpoint has previously led to heightened tension and outbreaks of violence in nearby Kilkeel.

30 August: Royal Black Institution

The Royal Black Institution is effectively the senior branch of the Orange Order. Its main demonstrations are traditionally held on the last Saturday of August. These can attract up to 30,000 marchers at six venues: Newry, Larne, Clogher, Kilkea, Lisburn and Newtownstewart.

2. In addition to those outlined above, several smaller marches - traditional, near traditional and spontaneous - will take place in August. Eighteen police officers were injured in disturbances in Downpatrick last year during an Orange March on 2 August. A large loyalist band parade may be held in Portadown on the weekend of 16/17 August. Last year the route was not contentious but trouble erupted when some of the spectators attacked police on duty. Trouble also erupted during a loyalist parade through Keady, Co. Armagh on 30 August.

Anglo-Irish Section,
23 July, 1986.

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VISIT OF MARTIN GALVIN AND NORAID

1. NORAID organised a trip to Ireland in August 1984 for a group of about 130 supporters. The British Home Office banned Martin Galvin from entering the North but he defied the order. He appeared on the platform during a large rally at Sinn Fein HQ in Andersonstown, West Belfast. The rally had been reasonably peaceful but, when Mr. Galvin appeared, a large force of RUC launched an attack on the platform. They fired numerous plastic bullets into the crowd killing one man. The killing became a major news story around the world and the RUC's behaviour was widely condemned. Although most commentators also condemned NORAID's involvement, there is little doubt that NORAID regard the shooting as a major propaganda coup which will boost their fundraising efforts.

2. Martin Galvin also came to Ireland in the Summer of 1985 where he again defied the exclusion order by appearing at an IRA funeral in Derry in August. He also attended a 'H' block Commemoration Rally at Bundoran, Co. Donegal. This event was the subject of much advance publicity given the proposed presence of the New York City Police Emerald Society Band. In the event the band was instructed by the New York Police Commissioner not to participate in the Rally in such a manner as to lead them to be identified as members of the Emerald Society Band. Some off-duty members of the band did however march in civilian clothes. We know from reports in Irish American newspapers that both Martin Galvin and Michael Flannery, a director and founder-member of NORAID, have been invited as guest speakers at this year's Bundoran demonstration scheduled to take place on 30 August 1986. A recent notice (attached) in the Irish People indicated that the NORAID contingent will be limited to 30.

CROSS-BORDER ROADS

1. According to a fairly recent survey of border crossing points by the Army, about 100 out of a total of 260 crossing points are currently impassable as a result of obstacles put in place by the N.I. security forces. The effects of these closures have been felt particularly in Co. Leitrim where all 6 crossing points are closed and in Co. Donegal $\frac{2}{3}$ of the 66 crossing points are blocked.
2. The position consistently adopted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been to condemn all road closures on the grounds that they damage the economic and social life of the border areas and serve to heighten divisions between North and South. Despite repeated representations over the years the British have so far responded negatively, citing security considerations as the reason why crossings could not be reopened. The question was raised in the Secretariat in December, 1985 with five specific cases receiving special mention - Lackey Bridge, Co. Monaghan; Cashel Bridge, Co. Leitrim; Dolan's Lane, Co. Donegal; Aghalane Bridge, Co. Cavan and Leitrim Bridge, Co. Monaghan. The British response at the time suggested that this matter could best be progressed by a comprehensive joint review by the Garda/RUC on the implications of reopening each road. Before taking up the British suggestion we sought the views of the Gardai on the five specific cases mentioned and discovered that the Gardai shared the views of the British side about the desirability from a security viewpoint, of not reopening these crossing points. The reopening of these roads would also create a demand for an increased commitment of Garda manpower and resources which they are unable to entertain at present. We are presently trying to reconcile the conflicting security views with the political necessity of achieving the reopening of closed border roads.

3. In June we were informed following contacts at local level between Gardai and the RUC, that the Northern Ireland security forces proposed closing fifteen crossing points in Counties Donegal and Cavan. Advance notice was given in this instance to allow the Gardai to comment on the proposal. Only one of the fifteen crossings would be a new closure; the remaining fourteen have been closed previously but locals have obviously succeeded in reopening them. We have advised the British through the Secretariat against the closure of the Clady/Dunnalob road in particular - the Gardai have advised that its closure is likely to give rise to local agitation. It would also cause residents of Clady a five mile detour to get to mass in Dunnalob.

The British are proposing to start work shortly in the rebuilding of the permanent vehicle checkpoint (P.V.C.P) on their side of the border which was destroyed in a bomb attack some time ago. It will be necessary therefore, to temporarily close both the Clady/Dunnalob road and the Clady/Castlefin road. In the long term they have indicated desire to close off both these roads unless we agree to maintain permanent vehicle checkpoints on both roads. (We have a P.V.C.P. manned on a 24 hour basis by 2 Garda and 4 Army on the Castlefin /Clady road - there have been suggestions from the British side that this checkpoint is not manned on a 24 hour basis). The Gardai do not believe a second P.V.C.P. is necessary and consultations are to take place at local level between Garda and RUC Officers to discuss this issue.

In view of the likely local hostility to this road closure and the fact that we have yet to succeed^{ed} in achieving the reopening of even one cross-border road since the coming into effect of the Agreement, it is now important for us to resist British attempts to close either of these two

roads. It is politically unacceptable that in relation to cross-border roads the first visible results of the Agreement should be negative - the closure of yet another cross-border road.

23 July 1986.

1390P

Cross-border Security CooperationPresent state of play

1. The programme of work intended to enhance cross-border security cooperation as envisaged in Article 9(a) of the Agreement got under way when the Commissioner and the Chief Constable met in Dublin on 15 February 1986. At that meeting there was agreement on the broad approach to be adopted and on the areas that would be examined in the development of the programme.
2. Subsequently it was decided (on the suggestion of the Irish side) to set up a small steering group (now referred to as the quadripartite group) comprising the chief officers of both police forces, the NIO, Department of Justice and Secretariat to oversee in a general way the development of the work programme and to act as a channel through which reports on the programme of work would be submitted to the Conference.
3. The first meeting of the quadripartite group was held in Stormont on 25 February 1986. At that meeting the two chief officers agreed to set up working groups of senior police officers to tackle the work programme under the general headings set out in Article 9(a). Assistant Commissioner Fanning and Assistant Chief Constable Forbes would examine matters relating to intelligence (threat assessment, liaison structures, exchange of information) and Deputy Commissioner McMahon and his opposite numbers (Wallace, Mellors, Whiteside - as appropriate) would report on operational matters (including resources, technical cooperation and training of personnel). This group would also examine relevant legislation and legal procedures affecting security cooperation.
4. As matters developed, 4 working parties were established - one under Fanning and Forbes dealing with intelligence matters and three under McMahon and Wallace/Mellors dealing with operational planning, legislation, legal procedure and related matters and computerisation.

5. The Fanning/Forbes report on intelligence matters was completed in early May 1986. This was followed by a bilateral meeting between the two chief officers at which the report was agreed in principle. A quadripartite meeting was held on 4 June 1986 at which the report was discussed in detail. At that meeting, the Commissioner outlined his approach to implementing the report and it was agreed that the officers responsible for the report would oversee its implementation.
6. The report was discussed at the meeting of the Conference on 17 June 1986. During the discussion, the British side stressed the importance they attached to having an agreed programme (including a timetable) for implementing the recommendations. The Conference agreed that implementaion would be monitored and that the Conference itself should be kept informed of progress.
7. The present position in relation to the other areas of work is that three reports have now been completed by the working parties. The first of these deals with operational planning (including structures and resources); the second contains a review of legislation, primarily in the area of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction (including matters such as police powers of arrest and detention, questioning of suspects etc.) and the third deals with computerisation. These reports are now being considered by the two chief officers and it is intended that there will be a meeting between them in early course. This will be followed as soon as possible by a meeting of the quadripartite group before the reports are discussed at the next meeting of the Conference.

N. Ryan

10 July 1986

Sectarian killings in North Belfast

1. Since January 1986 there have been eight sectarian murders in Belfast, seven of them carried out by Loyalist paramilitaries. Six of the victims have been Catholics. On 14 January a Catholic security man, Mr. Leo Scullion, was shot dead at Ligoniel Working Men's Club. On 31 January Mr. Martin Quinn was shot dead as he slept in his home in the Bawnmore Estate on the Northern outskirts of the city. On 14 March Mr. John O'Neill was abducted in Belfast City Centre and his body discovered the following day in the Loyalist Tynedale Estate in North Belfast. On 7 May, Margaret Caulfield, a 29 year old Protestant recently married to a Catholic, was shot dead as she slept in her home in Ballysillan in North Belfast. The following day a 17 year old Protestant youth, Mark Frizzel, died in hospital from injuries received when he was attacked in the Short Strand area. He was apparently the victim of a Catholic sectarian attack.
2. In the past ten days there have been three sectarian killings in the city, all of them Catholics. On 10 July a 20 year old man, Brian George Leonard, was shot in the head as he worked on a building site off the Shankill Road. He died two days later. On 13 July Colm McCallan was shot in the head near his home in Ligoniel. He died later in hospital. On 19 July a Catholic fireman and part-time taxi driver, Martin Duffy, was shot dead in Chichester Park, Belfast. He had been driving his taxi when a man hailed him from the footpath, drew a gun and shot him at point-blank range.
3. None of those killed are known to have had any political connections. The three most recent murders have been attributed to the Protestant Action Force, a cover name used by the U.V.F. A caller to Downtown Radio, claiming responsibility for the murder of Leonard, said that if

Loyalists were "unable to parade on traditional routes the Protestant Action Force will stop Catholics and Republicans from working and living in Loyalist areas". Although no responsibility was claimed, a U.V.F. gang has also been suspected of the murders of Scullion, Quinn, O'Neill and Caulfield. The eight killings represent the worst spate of sectarian violence in the area since 1978 when the 'Shankill Butcher Gang' was rounded up.

4. Condemning the murder of Martin Duffy the Minister for Foreign Affairs said on 21 July:

"I have repeated to the British authorities my concern that the physical security of nationalists in North Belfast and elsewhere be fully protected. I call on both communities to support the efforts of the police to provide protection for all the people. It is time for responsible men and women in both communities to reject once and for all those who, by word or deed, seek to provoke confrontation and to spread sectarian hatred".

Anglo-Irish Section.

23 July 1986.

1388P