



An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

Reference Code:	2016/52/18
Creation Dates:	12 February 1986
Extent and medium:	24 pages
Creator(s):	Department of the Taoiseach
Accession Conditions:	Open
Copyright:	National Archives, Ireland. May only be reproduced with the written permission of the Director of the National Archives.

Oifig an Taoisigh

S.18805D
S.24404

12 February, 1986.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNMENT

Signature of European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
and legislation to give effect to the Convention

1. The Taoiseach seeks the authority of the Government:
 - (1) for the signature, as soon as possible, on behalf of the State, subject to ratification, of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism;
 - (2) for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to arrange for signature; and
 - (3) for the preparation by the Minister for Justice of the legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention, according to a timetable which would enable a Bill to be presented to the Dail within six months and on the basis that the ambit of the declaration under Article 13, on ratification, would be decided when the Government consider the draft Heads of legislation.

Proximate background to proposals

2. Paragraph 7 of the Joint Communique issued at Hillsborough on 15 November stated:

"...at its first meeting, the Conference will consider its future programme of work in all the fields - political, security, legal, economic, social and cultural - assigned to it under the Agreement. It will concentrate at its initial meetings on:

- relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland;

- ways of enhancing security co-operation between the two Governments; and
- seeking measures which would give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice.

In the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland the two sides are committed to work for early progress in these matters. Against this background, the Taoiseach said that it was the intention of his Government to accede as soon as possible to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism" (emphasis added).

3. The possibility of signing the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism [hereinafter "the Convention"] before becoming a State Party and before enactment of the necessary legislation arose in discussion between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister in Luxembourg on 3 December, 1985. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. King, has raised the questions of signature and accession at the two regular meetings of the Conference held to date, indicating, at the most recent meeting, that the British Government "attach enormous importance to this Convention". He stressed the adverse unionist reaction to the Agreement, his wish to demonstrate to the unionists that it can yield results of benefit to them and the feeling among many of them that the Irish Government do not wish to accede to the Convention.

4. The Irish law and position on extradition up to 1982 and British concerns in that regard are described in Appendix 1.

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

5. The Convention (attached as Appendix 2) was opened for signature in January, 1977 and was thereupon signed by Austria,

Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In the cases of France, Italy, Norway and Portugal, signature was subject to certain declarations and reservations made at the time. Spain signed in 1978 and Liechtenstein in 1979. Most of these countries have ratified. Ratification by the U.K. followed enactment of the Suppression of Terrorism Act, 1978. Belgium, France, Greece and Italy have not yet ratified. Ireland and Malta are the only two Member States of the Council of Europe which have neither signed nor ratified. Ireland had argued throughout the negotiations concerning the Convention that, for constitutional reasons, we would be unable to sign a text in the form in which it was adopted and had sought to get acceptance of an alternative formulation that would apply the principle "try or extradite" but had been unsuccessful despite letters sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in October, 1976 to the Foreign Ministers of all the other Council of Europe countries to enlist their aid.

6. The main feature of the Convention is that certain "terrorist" type offences are not to be regarded as political, for the purposes of avoiding extradition. Article 1 excludes the following from this category: aircraft hijacking, attacks against diplomats, kidnapping and the taking of hostages, offences involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic gun or letter or parcel bomb if the use endangers persons, any attempt to commit these offences and any role as an accomplice. It is this provision, in particular, which, up to recently, was

considered to prevent Irish accession to the Convention: this was because it sought to redefine the concept of "political offence" to exclude a wide variety of actions, on the implicit grounds that they were "terrorist" type actions. (See Appendix 1).

7. The Convention provides in Article 13 that a State Party may reserve the right to continue to refuse extradition for offences which it regards as political offences even if these offences are excluded by Article 1 from the category of political offence or offence connected with a political offence provided that in evaluating the character of the offence, the State undertakes "to take into due consideration" any particularly serious aspects of the offence including a collective danger to life or liberty, an effect on innocent persons, and cruel or vicious means used in the commission of the offence. Where States do not extradite, they are required under Article 6 to establish jurisdiction for the offence and to submit the case to their prosecution authorities to decide whether to prosecute "in the same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious nature under the Law of that State".

Recent evolution of Irish Courts' jurisprudence on extradition, with particular reference to "political offences"

8. In its judgement of 7 December, 1982, in the McGlinchey case, the Supreme Court began to restrict the concept of "political offence". The Court decided that:

"no offences, regardless of who the perpetrators or the victim may be, can be accounted a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence unless there is evidence to show that it arose, directly or indirectly out of political activity in the sense" that it was "what reasonable, civilised people would regard as political activity";

and that the excusing of murder and violent offences

"at the behest of self ordained arbiters was the very antithesis of the ordinances of Christianity and civilisation and of the basic requirements of political activity".

9. In the McGlinchey case, the Courts were dealing with a charge of murder of an elderly lady in private life. In the Shannon case, where the charge was concerned with the murder of persons arguably officially representative of the institutions of State in Northern Ireland, the Courts followed and developed on the McGlinchey judgement.

Constitutionality of accession by the State to the Convention

10. The Attorney General has advised that he is as satisfied as it is possible to be in an area of law which the Courts have not considered in any detail that it would be constitutionally permissible for the State to become a party to the Convention, provided that it makes a declaration under Article 13 (i.e. that the State reserves the right to refuse extradition in respect of any offence mentioned in Article 1 which it considers to be a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives). In this latter connection, the Attorney General has adverted to a point

made by the Chief Justice and by Judges Hederman and McCarthy in the Quinn case to the effect that a complete definition of "political offence" should not be sought and that the Court must form an opinion on the facts of each particular case whether the offence in question can properly be described as political; and has noted that the adaptation of Article 13 in domestic law would leave the Court this freedom of evaluation, provided, first they evaluate it according to the criteria set out in the Article.

11. It would appear to be possible to make this declaration under Article 13 in regard to all or only some of the offences listed in Article 1. The declaration may be made either at the time of signing or on ratification. Reservations under Article 13 have been made by Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. It is usual to make the declaration at the time of ratification but Italy did so on signing. The Attorney General has stated that there appear to be no particular advantages to making the declaration prior to ratification. There might be some advantage in making the declaration on signature, having regard to the possibility of a reference of the necessary legislation to the Supreme Court under Article 26 of the Constitution. There is also the factor of unionist opinion which has consistently sought extradition and has refused to accept that trial here is an adequate substitute. A hostile unionist critic might say that adherence to the Convention, when qualified by a "maximum" reservation under Article 13, does not provide any assurance that it will

result in a single extra extradition even as compared with the "pre-McGlinchey" situation, not to mention the situation since, because the Courts could, under the legislation thus envisaged, reject all applications. In these circumstances, there may be some danger that a signature, unaccompanied by any signal of its intended limitations could initially be the subject of much publicity as being a substantial gesture to unionist opinion, only to become a source of recrimination at a later stage, when unionists might argue that not alone did the accession to the Convention fall short of what appeared to have been "conceded" in the Supreme Court judgements of recent years but that the belated tabling of a reservation showed bad faith on the part of the Government. The Taoiseach, nevertheless, considers that there would be significant disadvantages in making the reservation on signature in that the primary focus of public attention will arise at the signature stage and because there is a compelling need to promote, in these early stages, an increased acceptance among unionists of the potential benefits of the Agreement. In this context, a reservation on signature could be particularly expected to be the subject of misrepresentation in Northern Ireland as being a loophole or escape clause that would prevent any extraditions. Difficulties in publicly countering such charges might arise in that there may be inhibitions, by reference to a wish not to encourage constitutional challenge and out of delicacy in regard to the prerogatives of the Courts, on explaining the reasoning behind it. In circumstances as they are at present, the Taoiseach accepts that with a view to enhancing the prospects of a successful outcome to any test of the constitutionality of

the legislation, there is a case for making a reservation under Article 13 upon ratification.

Need for legislation to give effect to the Convention

12. Legislation would be required. Article 29.6 of the Constitution provides that no international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.

Ratification in advance of the legislation

13. It is the invariable practice of the State not to ratify international agreements which impose binding obligations requiring to be given effect by domestic legislation until the legislation is actually in place.

Considerations in regard to early signature of Convention, before enactment of necessary legislation

14. The Attorney General has advised (Advice of 6 November, 1985, Appendix 3 to Memorandum) that signing the Convention in advance of a ruling on the constitutionality of necessary implementing legislation or f signing now or at some other date prior to enactment of the legislation would not be unlawful. He has advised, however, that it would be imprudent to sign an instrument while the possibility of a successful challenge to the constitutionality of the implementing legislation existed, unless such a possibility was far-fetched or remote; that he

cannot advise that the latter is the case; that in the event of a challenge or Article 26 reference on constitutionality, prior signature could appear to the Courts as presumptuous and might be counterproductive; and that he could not recommend this course.

15. The Taoiseach notes that most other Member States of the Council of Europe signed immediately the Convention was open for signature and that it is common practice for the State to sign international instruments, subject to ratification. While appreciating the particular sensitivity of the Convention now in question, it appears, prima facie, that constitutional challenges to some of these other instruments could not have been totally excluded. He considers that there are overriding political arguments, at present, for early signature. The unionist reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement has been of widespread opposition. It is difficult to predict how this will develop and it cannot be excluded that it may pursue irrational lines but there have been signs that some among them may be facing up to realities, even if they continue to call for the "dumping" of the Agreement. In order to encourage a process of coming to terms with realities, it is essential that no hint be given by either Government of delay or diffidence in implementing the Agreement. This is also necessary, in regard to aspects of the Agreement on which Northern nationalists are awaiting substantive action, if the progress made in remedying their alienation is not to be reversed.

16. Early signature, while going beyond our literal commitment in the Communiqué, would demonstrate our good faith in a particularly visible and striking way and would respond to the British concern articulated by the Secretary of State. The British signed and ratified the Convention without any reservations and find it difficult to understand the constraints imposed by a written constitution. Early signature would also have some direct beneficial impact on some unionists.

17. Having regard to the full context of paragraph 7 of the Communiqué, the Taoiseach envisages an indication being given to the British of an early future date for signature against a background of satisfactory progress in regard to relations between the security forces and the minority in Northern Ireland and measures to give substantial expression to the aim of underlining the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. He envisages that the progress likely to be made in relation to ^e these matters could be sufficient to justify signature.

Content of legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention

18. If Article 13 is availed of, a provision to establish domestic jurisdiction for the offence(s) in question and for submission of cases to the prosecution authorities becomes necessary in the legislation.

19. The Attorney General has indicated that the legislation will therefore need to contain:

- A. an appropriate provision determining its scope;
- B. a provision modifying the existing rules as to "political offences" in cases falling within that scope;
- C. an extra-territorial provision; and
- D. a number of other issues, including the need to prevent extradition for the purpose of questioning etc. (Article 5 of the Convention), the rule of speciality and prima facie evidence (depending on international and other developments).

These will be dealt with in the Heads of the Bill to be submitted by the Department of Justice in consultation with the Attorney General.

Costs and staff

20. The proposals would not give rise to any additional costs, except to the extent that any increase in the number of extradition cases and, if an obligation to prove a prima facie case were imposed in the legislation, in the workload of the Departments and Offices concerned, made it necessary to deploy additional staff. It is not possible to foresee the position in this respect which would, in any case, depend partly on later decisions on the legislation but any extra costs would be very small.

Consultation

21. The Memorandum, in draft form, was furnished to the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, the Public Service and to the Office of the Attorney General. The

Memorandum incorporates opinions received from the Attorney General and takes account of points made by the Department of Justice. The Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees with the terms of the Memorandum. Ministers and the Attorney General will be in a position to give their views at Government, if necessary.

Irish law and position on extradition up to 1982 and British
concerns in that regard

1. The Terrorism Convention is concerned with facilitating extradition by and between contracting States with a view to collaboration, among Member States of the Council of Europe, in combatting terrorism. Previous to conclusion of this Convention, extradition between Council of Europe countries was governed by the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and/or bilateral agreements. Ireland is a contracting party to the latter Convention but the U.K. is not. Reflecting a position generally accepted in international law since British court decisions in the 19th century, the 1957 Convention provided that "extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it is requested is regarded by the requested Party as a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence". There is no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes an offence of a political character.

2. The Irish law on extradition is contained in the Extradition Act 1965. This and the corresponding British act regulate extradition between the two States and, by agreement, both included the concept of the non-extradition of political offenders as between the two countries: the Irish act also applies this concept generally. Since the onset of fatal violence in Northern Ireland at the beginning of the 1970s, the British have, in a significant number of cases, sought the

extradition, especially to Northern Ireland, of persons against whom they were proceeding for, allegedly, having committed terrorist offences but up to December, 1982, no such application was successful, the Courts here applying the political offence exception in favour of those whose extradition was sought for such offences. As a consequence, successive British Governments have pressed, with a force varying from time to time, for changes in our legislation and/or practice in order, as they saw it, to overcome the problems posed by suspected terrorists enjoying the protection of the political exception.

3. The Law Enforcement Commission appointed jointly by the Irish and British Governments in December, 1973, pursuant to the Sunningdale Agreement was unable to make an agreed recommendation about extradition and was equally divided on the matter. The four Irish members adhered to the view previously taken by the Irish Government that it is a principle of international law that the extradition of a person accused of a political offence does not take place. They also maintained the Irish Government view that because Article 29.3 of the Constitution declares that Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States, amending Irish legislation to permit extradition for a political offence would be repugnant to the Constitution. Mr. Justice Henchy entered a caveat to

the opinions expressed by the other Irish members, confining himself to the opinion that it was not possible to advise that the possible amending legislation in question would not be held to be repugnant to Article 29.3 and therefore invalid. The British members took a different view, concluding that while international law recognises a general practice of refusing extradition for political offences, there is no principle of international law forbidding it: rather such law recognises the right without imposing the duty to refuse extradition in such cases.

4. The British members also made the point that sovereign States, where it is in their mutual interest to do so, make exceptions to the general rule of non-extradition and that it is the practice of States to make such an exception where that is justified by the enormity or barbarism of the crime. They held the view that the terrorists operating in Northern Ireland, whatever their motivation, fall within such an exception. The Irish members, in contrast, adhered to the view that to qualify the political offences exception might be invalid by reference to Article 29.3 of the Constitution.

EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM
CONVENTION EUROPÉENNE
POUR LA RÉPRESSION DU TERRORISME

The member States of the Council of Europe, signatory hereto.

Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members :

Aware of the growing concern caused by the increase in acts of terrorism :

Wishing to take effective measures to ensure that the perpetrators of such acts do not escape prosecution and punishment :

Convinced that extradition is a particularly effective measure for achieving this result.

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of the following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives :

a. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970 :

b. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971 :

c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents :

d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention :

e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons :

f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.

Article 2

1. For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, a Contracting State may decide not to regard as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives a serious offence involving an act of violence, other than one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a person.

2. The same shall apply to a serious offence involving an act against property, other than one covered by Article 1, if the act created a collective danger for persons.

3. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.

Article 3

The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between Contracting States, including the European Convention on Extradition, are modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

Article 4

For the purposes of this Convention and to the extent that any offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 is not listed as an extraditable offence in any extradition convention or treaty existing between Contracting States, it shall be deemed to be included as such therein.

Article 5

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.

Article 6

1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offence mentioned in Article 1 in the case where the suspected offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him after receiving a request for extradition from a Contracting State whose jurisdiction is based on a rule of jurisdiction existing equally in the law of the requested State.
2. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.

Article 7

A Contracting State in whose territory a person suspected to have committed an offence mentioned in Article 1 is found and which has received a request for extradition under the conditions mentioned in Article 6, paragraph 1, shall, if it does not extradite that person, submit the case, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.

Article 8

1. Contracting States shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with proceedings brought in respect of the offences mentioned in Article 1 or 2. The law of the requested State concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters shall apply in all cases. Nevertheless this assistance may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to afford mutual assistance if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for mutual assistance in respect of an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.
3. The provisions of all treaties and arrangements concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters applicable between Contracting States, including the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, are modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

Article 9

1. The European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe shall be kept informed regarding the application of this Convention.
2. It shall do whatever is needful to facilitate a friendly settlement of any difficulty which may arise out of its execution.

Article 10

1. Any dispute between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, which has not been settled in the framework of Article 9, paragraph 2, shall, at the request of any Party to the dispute, be referred to arbitration. Each Party shall nominate an arbitrator and the two arbitrators shall nominate a referee. If any Party has not nominated its arbitrator within the three months following the request for arbitration, he shall be nominated at the request of the other Party by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. If the latter should be a national of one of the Parties to the dispute, this duty shall be carried out by the Vice-President of the Court or, if the Vice-President is a national of one of the Parties to the dispute, by the most senior judge of the Court not being a national of one of the Parties to the dispute. The same procedure shall be observed if the arbitrators cannot agree on the choice of referee.
2. The arbitration tribunal shall lay down its own procedure. Its decisions shall be taken by majority vote. Its award shall be final.

Article 11

1. This Convention shall be open to signature by the member States of the Council of Europe. It shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2. The Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.
3. In respect of a signatory State ratifying, accepting or approving subsequently, the Convention shall come into force three months after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Article 12

1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, specify the territory or territories to which this Convention shall apply.
2. Any State may, when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval or at any later date, by declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, extend this Convention to any other territory or territories specified in the declaration and for whose international relations it is responsible or on whose behalf it is authorised to give undertakings.
3. Any declaration made in pursuance of the preceding paragraph may, in respect of any territory mentioned in such declaration, be withdrawn by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Such withdrawal shall take effect immediately or at such later date as may be specified in the notification.

Article 13

1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, declare that it reserves the right to refuse extradition in respect of any offence mentioned in Article 1 which it considers to be a political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives, provided that it undertakes to take into due consideration, when evaluating the character of the offence, any particularly serious aspects of the offence, including :

- a. that it created a collective danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons ; or
- b. that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it ; or
- c. that cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the offence.

2. Any State may wholly or partly withdraw a reservation it has made in accordance with the foregoing paragraph by means of a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe which shall become effective as from the date of its receipt.

3. A State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may not claim the application of Article 1 by any other State ; it may, however, if its reservation is partial or conditional, claim the application of that article in so far as it has itself accepted it.

Article 14

Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by means of a written notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Any such denunciation shall take effect immediately or at such later date as may be specified in the notification.

Article 15

This Convention ceases to have effect in respect of any Contracting State which withdraws from or ceases to be a Member of the Council of Europe.

Article 16

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council of :

- a. any signature ;
- b. any deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval ;
- c. any date of entry into force of this Convention in accordance with Article 11 thereof ;
- d. any declaration or notification received in pursuance of the provisions of Article 12 ;
- e. any reservation made in pursuance of the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 1 ;
- f. the withdrawal of any reservation effected in pursuance of the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 2 ;
- g. any notification received in pursuance of Article 14 and the date on which denunciation takes effect ;
- h. any cessation of the effects of the Convention pursuant to Article 15.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this Convention.

Done at Strasbourg, this 27th day of January 1977, in English and in French, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory States.

En foi de quoi, les soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé la présente Convention.

Fait à Strasbourg, le 27 janvier 1977, en français et en anglais, les deux textes faisant également foi, en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Conseil de l'Europe. Le Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe en communiquera copie certifiée conforme à chacun des Etats signataires.

For the Government
of the Republic of Austria :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République d'Autriche :

Willibald PAHR

For the Government
of the Kingdom of Belgium :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume de Belgique :

Renaat VAN ELSLANDE

For the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République de Chypre :

Ioannis CHRISTOPHIDES

For the Government
of the Kingdom of Denmark :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume de Danemark :

K.B. ANDERSEN

For the Government
of the French Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République française :

P.C. TAITTINGER

For the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne :

Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER

For the Government
of the Hellenic Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République hellénique :

Dimitri S. BITSIOS

For the Government
of the Icelandic Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République islandaise :

Einar AGUSTSSON

For the Government :
of Ireland :

Pour le Gouvernement
d'Irlande :

For the Government
of the Italian Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République italienne :

Gherardo CORNAGGIA MEDICI CASTIGLIONI

For the Government
of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg :

Gaston THORN

For the Government
of Malta :

Pour le Gouvernement
de Malte :

For the Government
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume des Pays-Bas :

Max van der STOEL

For the Government
of the Kingdom of Norway :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume de Norvège :

Knut FRYDENLUND

For the Government
of the Portuguese Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République portugaise :

José MEDEIROS FERREIRA

For the Government
of the Kingdom of Sweden :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume de Suède :

Karin SÖDER

For the Government
of the Swiss Confederation :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la Confédération suisse :

Pierre GRABER

For the Government
of the Turkish Republic :

Pour le Gouvernement
de la République turque :

I.S. ÇAGLAYANGIL

For the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland :

Pour le Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne
et d'Irlande du Nord :

Anthony CROSLAND