



An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

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Northern Ireland Security Brief

1. Strength of the security forces

The total establishment strength of the RUC at present is 8250, with 2755 in full-time reserve. The present strength of the British Army is 10190, while the strength of the UDR (June 1986) is 6708 (2719 full-time and 3889 part-time).

2. Estimated strength of paramilitary organisations

The Provisional IRA has been estimated to consist of fewer than 500 committed activists of whom roughly 250 may be "on the run terrorists" from Northern Ireland currently resident in the South. The INLA currently in a state of disintegration, is a considerably smaller group, numbering possibly as few as 50. The Official IRA continues to exist but focusses on criminal activities

and is not involved in direct paramilitary activity. The UDA has an estimated 1,000 active members of whom, however, only about 200 are available for paramilitary activity. The UVF is believed to have less than 50 regular members available for paramilitary activity.

3. Violent deaths, injuries, incidents

Detailed information on the number of deaths, injuries, incidents and other statistics relating to the security situation are contained in a series of annexes attached to this note. In the period 1969 to date (28 February), 2532 people have been killed, 1750 of them civilians. The Provisional IRA is the organisation/ group responsible for the greatest number of deaths in that period (944).

4. Sectarian violence and intimidation

It is difficult to quantify precisely the level of sectarian violence and intimidation. In January 1987 the Northern Ireland Housing Executive announced that 1102 tenants from Northern Ireland had complained of intimidation and applied for alternative accommodation during 1986. The Executive said that the worst affected areas had been Belfast and Lisburn. While there were periods of particularly severe sectarian violence and intimidation last year and Catholic families in North Belfast and Lisburn undoubtedly bore the brunt of it (with a small percentage of RUC families and some Protestants also claiming victimisation), the figures quoted by the Housing Executive are, we are reliably informed, exaggerated. It must also be said that the peak periods in this regard were Easter and the summer of last year and there have been considerably lower complaints of sectarian violence since then.

5. Security Situation in Northern Ireland

A number of elements characterise the security situation in Northern Ireland at present:

- continued Provisional IRA attacks on members of the security forces and on RUC/Army installations; Provisional IRA 'punishment shootings';
- the INLA internal feud;
- sporadic Loyalist paramilitary activity (in particular UDA fire-bomb attacks in Dublin and Donegal);
- sectarian violence and intimidation;
- a generally satisfactory performance by the RUC in responding to the various threats posed to law and order.

6. Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein

The Provisional IRA, which is a proscribed organisation, has continued its campaign against the security forces on various fronts. It has carried out in recent months a number of mortar-bomb and/or machinegun attacks on RUC/Army bases, particularly in border areas. In addition, individual RUC/Army patrols and checkpoints in border areas have been the object of mortar or landmine attacks.

The Provisional IRA was also responsible for the murder of UVF leader John Bingham on 14 September.

The Provisionals' campaign against contractors and other people working for the security forces continues. However, it is essentially confined to the Derry/Tyrone area

and there have been less reports of intimidation recently. There have been only two killings since the campaign was announced on 5 August last.

The Provisional IRA has also murdered or injured people alleged to have acted as informers for the RUC. In recent weeks, particularly, there have been numerous knee-cappings and other punishment shootings.

The Provisional IRA is also interested in "economic targets". During the Christmas/New Year period they attacked pubs and hotels and more recently (30 January) they carried out bomb attacks in Belfast city centre and in Lisburn which were obviously aimed at business enterprises.

The general level of IRA violence over the last few months would suggest that the leadership is anxious to demonstrate that the 'armed struggle' has not been weakened either by the Anglo-Irish Agreement or by Sinn Fein's ending of the abstentionist policy.

Sinn Fein, unlike the Provisional IRA, is not proscribed in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State recently indicated through the Conference framework, however, that the British Government has been considering the introduction of a requirement on prospective candidates for local elections in Northern Ireland to make a declaration at the time of their candidature in which they would undertake not to participate in, or support, proscribed organisations. The declaration idea would be included in a "consultation document" as one of a number of options for dealing with the problem of Sinn Fein membership of local councils. The Secretary of State indicated that his primary consideration in proposing such an initiative at this time was to find a way out of the dilemma constituted by the Unionist reluctance to sit in the same chambers as Sinn Fein councillors. The idea in fact had originally been placed on the Conference agenda in December 1985 when the Irish side said that it was open to discussion. It was not taken further at the time. The Irish response to the Secretary of State recently has been that, while we could understand the British Government's desire to find a way around this problem, we believed that the matter should be discussed in the Conference before any public action was taken. (The Secretary of State had been considering publishing the consultation document very shortly after the general election here). It was also suggested to the Secretary of State that the publication of the consultative document before the Westminster general election could give Provisional Sinn Fein a considerable propaganda bonus. It is understood that, in the light of these observations, the British side is now reconsidering the initiative.

A move by Enoch Powell in the House of Commons on 26 February 1987 to have Sinn Fein added to the list of proscribed organisations given in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act was turned down by Nicholas Scott "on the grounds of principle and also because it

would not be practical". Labour MPs and Seamus Mallon supported Scott's stance.

7. INLA

The INLA, also a proscribed organisation, is currently in the throes of an internal feud which has resulted so far in five deaths. Three of the INLA's reputed four factions have been trying to suppress the fourth in an effort to wind up the INLA to its present form. It is likely that there will be further killings.

The recalcitrant fourth group (formerly led by the late John O'Reilly) is believed to have been responsible for a number of INLA activities in recent months in the Newry/Armagh area, including the display of weapons to journalists last December, attempted bomb attacks on the Newry/Dundalk road and the attempted killing of David Calvert in Lurgan on 8 January.

8. UDA

The UDA which is not proscribed, has played a role, if not a leading one, in the Loyalist campaign against the Agreement. For most of 1986 it held back, clearly determined not to allow itself to be used in order to strengthen the image of Unionist politicians (as in 1974). UDA members were involved in the 'day of action' on 5 March 1986 and in other protest activities such as the Hillsborough anniversary rallies but on the whole kept a fairly low profile and concentrated on lucrative racketeering operations. Earlier this month, however, John McMichael of the UDA unveiled some proposals (in a document entitled "Common Sense") for a power-sharing devolved government which attracted considerable interest.

In one area, however, the UDA has been quite active recently. Using its codename UFF, the UDA claimed responsibility for the planting of a series of incendiary devices in the centre of Dublin on 7-8 November 1986 and again in Dublin and Donegal on 7-8 February 1987. The devices were relatively unsophisticated, however, and those which exploded did not cause much damage (except to a store in Donegal). It is our understanding that, despite intense efforts to obtain them, the UDA does not at present have access to explosives.

The UDA is also believed to have been involved in some sectarian killings, in particular the murder of an elderly Catholic woman and her son near Ballynahinch on 16 October 1986.

9. UVF

A spate of sectarian assassinations of Catholics in North Belfast during the first half of 1986 effectively came to an end with the killing of UVF leader John Bingham by the Provisional IRA on 14 September. Since then the UVF (which is a proscribed organisation) has been relatively quiet, though it was initially suspected of involvement in the recent raid on a UDR base in Coleraine (with which, however, the UDA is now being linked).

10. Ulster Clubs

This organisation came into existence in Portadown in the summer of 1985. It tried to occupy the middle ground between Loyalist politicians and paramilitaries. However, under its Chairman Alan Wright, it was poorly managed and failed to carve out an independent role for itself. Somewhat belatedly, it unveiled some days ago a strategy for the Loyalist campaign against the Agreement which envisages a Grand Committee comprising a mixture of political and paramilitary representatives and a series of subordinate committees paralleling the N.I. Government Departments.

11. "Ulster Resistance"

On 10 November 1986 a new Loyalist organisation with this name was founded in the Ulster Hall in Belfast. It was the latest of Ian Paisley's attempts to mobilise a 'third force' (though many regarded Peter Robinson as the driving force behind this one). While he and Robinson were careful not to describe the new body as an 'army', others were less careful. The paramilitary purpose of "Ulster Resistance" was clear from its military structure and trappings: nine divisions, the unfurling of divisional flags, uniformed participants ahead of the rallies (which took place over a period of several weeks in Kilkeel, Enniskillen, Derry, Larne and elsewhere). The membership of "Ulster Resistance" is the subject of much speculation. People associated with the UDA and the UVF have reportedly not been approached (in order to protect the new body from infiltration by the security forces). There were suggestions that, with UDA and UVF members liable to be watched by the security forces, the bulk of the membership consisted of people who had been involved in the mid-seventies with lessor-known Loyalist groups such as Down Orange Welfare or the Ulster Volunteer Services Corps.

At present, "Ulster Resistance" is quiescent, perhaps due in part to Robinson's reported fall in Loyalist esteem following his appearance in the Special Criminal Court, and rallies are held only at long intervals. It is, however, probably a force to be reckoned with in the event of an intensification of the Loyalist campaign against the Agreement.

12. Sectarian violence and intimidation

At different times during the past year, notably around Easter and during the Summer, Loyalist intimidation of Catholics occurred in mixed areas with Protestant majorities such as North Belfast, Lisburn, Ballynahinch and

Ballymena. This intimidation frequently involved petrol-bomb attacks on Catholic homes, schools or business premises. There have also been sectarian attacks on Catholics living in outlying rural areas. Reverse sectarian violence (directed at Protestants) has been considerably less.

13. RUC

In dealing with the various threats to law and order, the RUC has performed on the whole creditably. It has had some successes with arms and explosives finds in different parts of the North and the number of people charged last year with terrorist-type offences (655) was higher than it has been for some years past. The quality of their intelligence tends to be better in relation to Loyalist groups - the speed with which they were able to make arrests and bring charges following the recent raid on the UDR base at Coleraine, for example, was striking. In contrast, the number of nationalist arrests is down and there have been no notable successes in the pursuit of Provisional IRA activities.

Anglo-Irish Section,
March 1987.

2283m

Statistics on Security

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Annexes 1, 1A, 1B

Casualties in Northern Ireland

These tables show the total numbers of people killed and injured since the outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland in 1969 together with a breakdown showing the number of civilians, members of the RUC, British Army etc, killed and injured.

Annex 2

Annex 2 contains details of the numbers of deaths in Northern Ireland, broken down as between agents responsible, for the period 1969-1986. It also gives the breakdown for 1986 and for the period 15 November 1985 (the signing of the Agreement) to 31 December 1986.

Annex 3

Security Statistics for Northern Ireland:
Terrorist Incidents 1969-1986

This table illustrates the level of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland for the period 1969-1986.

Annex 4

Finds of Commercial Explosives in Northern Ireland

Annex 4 gives the origin of the commercial explosives found by security forces in Northern Ireland during the period 1976-1986.

Annexes 5

Finds of detonators in Northern Ireland

Annex 5 gives the origin of detonators found by security forces in Northern Ireland during the period 1976-1986.

Annex 6

Geographical pattern of fatal casualties 1980-86

This Annex contains details of the geographical pattern of fatal casualties between 1980-1986 (broken down as between three areas - Belfast, "Rural non-border" and border areas).

Annex 7

Violent incidents in border areas of Northern Ireland attributable to Provisional IRA activities

Annex 7 contains details of the number of violent incidents in border areas attributable to IRA activities since the beginning of 1986. It also indicates (with details for 1985 also) the number of deaths caused by these along with a breakdown of the victims by category.

Annex 8

Attacks on RUC/UDR barracks (1986-87)

This Annex gives a month-by-month breakdown of the numbers of attacks (carried out by the Provisional IRA and the INLA on RUC/Army barracks during 1986 and to date (28 February) in 1987.

Annex 9

Expenditure on security in Northern Ireland by UK exchequer (1974-86)

Annex 9 is designed to give an estimate of the costs incurred by the UK exchequer on security in Northern Ireland. The figures are approximate rather than definitive.

Anglo-Irish Section,
March 1987.

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ANNEX 1

FATAL CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987 (Feb 28)	Total since 1969
<u>Total No. of Civilians Killed</u>	51	50	57	57	44	35	25	39	3	1750
<u>Security Forces Casualties</u>										
Army	38	8	10	21	5	9	2	4	-	386
UDR	10	9	13	7	10	10	4	8	1	160
RUC and RUC (Reserve)	14	9	21	12	18	9	23	12	1	236
<u>Total No. of Security Forces casualties</u>	62	26	44	40	33	28	29	24	2	782
<u>TOTAL Casualties</u>	113	76	101	97	77	64	54	63	5	2532

Source: RUC Statistics

ANNEX 1A

FATAL CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
<u>Total No. of Civilians Killed</u>	12	23	115	321	171	166	216	245	69	50
<u>Security Forces Casualties</u>										
Army	-	-	43	103	58	28	14	14	15	14
UDR	-	-	5	26	8	7	6	15	14	7
RUC and RUC (Reserve)	1	2	11	17	13	15	11	23	14	10
<u>Total No. of Security Forces casualties</u>	1	2	59	146	79	50	31	52	43	31
<u>TOTAL Casualties</u>	13	25	174	467	250	216	247	297	112	81

Source: R.U.C. Statistics

ANNEX 1B

Injuries in Northern Ireland 1971 - 1986

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>Total</u>
Civilians	1,838	3,813	1,812	1,680	2,044	2,162	1,027	548	557	530	873	528	280	513	468	773	19,251
<u>Security Forces</u>																	
Army/UDR	390	578	548	483	157	264	188	135	153	77	140	98	88	86	33	55	3,483
RUC/Reserve	315	485	291	235	263	303	183	302	165	194	332	99	142	267	415	622	4,613
Total Security Forces	705	1,063	839	718	430	567	371	437	318	271	472	197	230	353	448	677	8,096
Total Injured	2,543	4,876	2,651	2,398	2,474	2,729	1,398	985	875	801	1,350	525	510	866	916	1,450	27,347

Table 1 Violent Deaths in Northern Ireland 1969 - 1986: agents responsible

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Non-spec. Rep.	Provo. IRA	INLA	Off. IRA	Non-spec. Loy.	UDA UFF	UVF and PAF	Brit. Army	UDR	RUC RUCR	Unattributed
347	944	57	15	552	50	33	229	5	46	159

Table 2 Violent Deaths in Northern Ireland 1986 - agents responsible

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Non-spec. Rep.	Provo. IRA	INLA	Off. IRA	Non-spec. Loy.	UDA UFF	UVF and PAF	Brit. Army	UDR	RUC RUCR	Unattributed
-	37*	-	-	7	4	4	3	-	3	5

Table 3 Violent Deaths in Northern Ireland Nov. 15 1985-1986: agents responsible

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Non-spec. Rep.	Provo. IRA	INLA	Off. IRA	Non-spec. Loy.	UDA UFF	UVF and PAF	Brit. Army	UDR	RUC RUCR	Unattributed
-	44	-	-	7	4	4	3	-	3	5

23 of those were among members of the security forces.

ANNEX 3

SECURITY STATISTICS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
Terrorist Incidents 1969 - 1986

Categories	Shootings	Bombs*	Malicious fires	TOTALS
1969	-	8	-	8
1970	213	170	-	383
1971	1,756	1,515	-	3,271
1972	10,528	1,853	-	12,481
1973	5,018	1,520	587	7,125
1974	3,206	1,113	536	4,955
1975	1,805	635	248	2,688
1976	1,908	1,192	453	3,553
1977	1,081	535	432	2,048
1978	755	633	269	1,657
1979	728	564	315	1,607
1980	642	400	275	1,317
1981	1,142	529	536x	2,207
1982	547	332	199	1,378
1983	424	367	528	1,319
1984	334	248	340	1,422
1985	137	215	740	1,092
1986	392	254	905	1,452

* includes devices defused

x no figure for April-June 1981

ANNEX 4

Finds of Commercial Explosives in Northern Ireland

Year		I.I.E. Undyed	I.I.E. Dyed	Other	Total
1976	KG. %	505.23 83.1%	38.41 6.3%	54.6 10.6%	608.24 100%
1977	KG. %	166.11 70.4%	22.95 9.7%	47.02 19.9%	236.08 100%
1978	KG. %	50.93 58.5%	1.85 2.2%	34.23 39.2%	87.01 100%
1979	KG. %	51.45 81.8%	5.6 8.9%	5.8 9.2%	62.85 100%
1980	KG. %	28.79 97.2%	-	0.8 2.7%	29.59 100%
1981	KG. %	59.51 91.9%	2.5 3.8%	2.68 4.1%	64.69 100%
1982	KG. %	87.37 100%	-	-	87.37 100%
1983	KG. %	3.06 85.4%	0.35 9.7%	0.18 5.0%	3.59 100%
1984	KG %	15.80 97.28	- -	0.47 2.72%	17.27 100%
1985	KG %	13.00 38.33	- -	20.919 61.67	33.919 100%
1986 - Oct 31	KG %	10.5 37.2%	- -	17.733 62.8%	28.233 100%

Key: IIE Undyed: Manufactured by Irish Industrial Explosives for use in the South.

IIE Dyed: Manufactured by Irish Industrial Explosives for use in Northern Ireland.

Other: Manufactured elsewhere, of uncertain origin or not known if dyed.

Source: From statistics supplied by the British Embassy

Finds of Detonators in Northern Ireland

Year		G.B. made for the Republic	G.B. made for N. Ireland	U.S. made - illegal in U.K	Unmarked	Other	Total
1976	Qty. %	588 46.4%	35 2.7%	197 15.5%	438 34.5%	10 0.9%	1,268 100%
1977	Qty. %	273 34.9%	21 2.7%	35 4.5%	445 56.9%	8 1%	782 100%
1978	Qty. %	149 60.5%	2 0.8%	10 4.1%	2 0.8%	83 33.7%	24 100%
1979	Qty. %	58 19.2%	10 3.3%	6 1.9%	212 70.4%	15 4.9%	301 100%
1980	Qty. %	26 18.5%	- 0%	20 14.2%	81 57.3%	13 9.2%	140 100%
1981	Qty. %	59 26.9%	2 0.9%	26 11.8%	119 54.3%	13 5.9%	219 100%
1982	Qty. %	61 26.1%	2 0.8%	47 20.1%	73 31.3%	50 21.4%	233 100%
1983	Qty. %	15 15.8%	2 2.1%	5 5.3%	36 37.9%	37 38.9%	95 100%
1984	Qty. %	16 23.2%	- 0%	7 10.1%	15 23.2%	30 43.5%	69 100%
1985	Qty. %	3 1.7%	1 .56%	128 72.3%	37 20.9%	8 4.54%	177 100%
1986	Qty. %	7 8.3%	- -	1 1.2%	52 61.9%	24 28.6%	84 100%

Source: From statistics supplied by British Embassy

Geographical Pattern of Fatal Casualties 1980 - February 1987

	Category 1 Belfast Area	Category 2 Rural Non Border	Category 3 Border Area	Total
1980	40 (56.3%)	6 (8.5%)	25 (35.2%)	71
1981	56 (52.8%)	12 (11.3%)	38 (35.9%)	106
1982	39 (41%)	17 (18%)	39 (41%)	95
1983 ¹	23 (33.8%)	11 (16.2%)	34 (50%)	68
1984 ²	20 (35%)	10 (17.5%)	27 (47.5%)	57
1985 ³	8 (15.7%)	7 (13.7%)	36 (70.6%)	51
1986	24 (38%)	10 (16%)	29 (46%)	63
TOTAL	229 (40.3%)	83 (14.6%)	256 (45.1%)	568

Category 1 : Belfast Area includes Belfast, Lurgan, Lisburn, Portadown, Hollywood, Carrickfergus and Craigavon, and the area bounded by a continuous line drawn through these towns.

Category 2 : All rural areas including towns not falling within Category 3. Specifically includes Dungannon, Cookstown, Omagh, Ballymena, Downpatrick, Banbridge, Newcastle, Limavady and Enniskillen.

Category 3 : All areas within 10 miles of the border including towns. Specifically including Kilkeel, Armagh, Strabane, Derry and Newry.

Footnote 1 : Information is only available on location for 68 of 77 deaths in 1983.

Footnote 2 : Information is only available on location for 57 out of 64 deaths in 1984.

Footnote 3 : Information is only available on location for 51 of a total of 54 deaths in 1985.

Violent Incidents in border areas* of Northern Ireland
attributable to Provisional IRA activities

	1985	1986	1987 (28 Feb)
1. Total no. of violent incidents:	- **	83	9
2. No. of deaths resulting from these incidents among			
UDR	2	6	-
Ex-UDR	1	1	-
RUC	21	10	-
Army	1	4	-
IRA	4	1	-
INLA	-	-	1***
Civilians	7	7	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	36	29	1

* Border area is taken as an area within a ten mile radius of the border.

** Figure not available

*** This death resulted from the internal INLA feud.

ANNEX 8

Attacks* on RUC/UDR barracks 1986 - 87

<u>1986</u>	<u>No of attacks</u>
Jan	5
Feb	-
Mar	1
Apr	-
May	4
June	2
July	-
Aug	4
Sept	1
Oct	3
Nov	2
Dec	<u>2</u>
	24
1987 - To date (28 Feb)	5

* The Provisional IRA have claimed responsibility for all but one of these attacks; responsibility for that other attack was claimed by the INLA.

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Expenditure on security in NI by UK Exchequer, 1974-1986

	Expenditure on law, order and protective services and NI	Extra costs of British Army in NI	Cost of NI security to UK Exchequer per head of UK population
	St.£m	St.£m	St.£/head
1974/5	109	33	3
1975/6	150	60	4
1976/7	168	65	4
1977/8	178	69	4
1978/9	206	81	5
1979/80	250	95	6
1980/1	312	111	8
1981/2	344	149(2)	8
1982/3	369	143	9
1983/4	393	141	10
1984/5	406	n.a.	n.a.
1985/6	433	n.a.	n.a.

Notes:

1. Estimates of NI expenditure on Law, Order and Protective services are in current prices and are derived from UK Supply Estimates, Class XV for 1974/5 to 1977/78, and from 'the Government's Expenditure Plans, 1983-84 to 1985-86' for years 1978/9 to 1983/4.

2. Estimates of the extra costs of the British Army in NI have been derived from a series of Parliamentary Answers. A new basis of calculation was introduced in 1981/2.

3. Population data from the UK are for 1 January each year as reported in Eurostat demographic statistics, 1980.