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STATE OF A MEETING AT CHEQUERS  
ON TUESDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1971

The morning was spent in considering a draft Communique, with Mr Faulkner and Sir Harold Black in one room and Mr Lynch with the Irish Ambassador in a separate room; Mr Heath and Sir <sup>Heath</sup>~~Bert~~ Trend plied occasionally between the two rooms with various suggestions for change from one side or the other.

The first draft of the Communique is shown at Appendix A. This was drawn up by the United Kingdom side and communicated to us late on Monday night. The second draft at Appendix B gives the Northern Ireland re-write of the first draft, underlined parts indicating the places where changes were made. The changes were telephoned to Sir <sup>Heath</sup>~~Bert~~ Trend at 8 40 on Tuesday morning and when we arrived at Chequers he had produced the third draft shown at Appendix C; this incorporated only a limited number of the Northern Ireland suggestions but was nevertheless broadly acceptable to Mr Faulkner subject to a small number of draft changes.

The fourth draft shown at Appendix D emerged in the course of the morning after a discussion between Mr Heath and Mr Lynch. It was, however, unacceptable to the latter, who objected in particular to the reference to measures to prevent illegal traffic in arms.

The fifth draft at Appendix E then emerged, but the final phrase of the first paragraph in this was totally unacceptable to Mr Faulkner. He also expressed regret at the deletion of the reference to the control of gelignite. Mr Lynch asked why the objectionable part of the first paragraph was unacceptable when it was a direct quote from the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969. Mr Faulkner said that was two years ago and many changes had taken place since; the statement was therefore derogatory in inferring that much remained to be done and he just would not agree to the use of this wording. Mr Heath said he would be prepared to accept a similar statement referring to the United Kingdom because he well knew that discrimination in matters of race, etc, was to be found in various British cities. Mr Faulkner said, however, that the document was remarkably silent on security matters and yet took pains to highlight discrimination and repeated his complete unwillingness to accept it in its present form. Mr Heath suggested that the way out of this impasse would be to revert to the phrase in an earlier draft about the people of Northern Ireland living in "conditions of peace and stability which any

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Democracy should ensure to its citizens without regard to their religious or political convictions".

Mr Lynch indicated his readiness to accept that, but made the point that in his view no true democracy exists in Northern Ireland.

The final text is as set out in Appendix F.

Mr Lynch raised again the extent to which he was entitled to spell out Mr Faulkner's proposals for Parliamentary reform. Mr Faulkner suggested he might say simply "that Mr Faulkner would be asking Parliament to consider proposals for an increase in the size of the House of Commons and for enlarging and amending the structure of the Senate".

Mr Lynch said he would respect this and would also go on to mention that economic co-operation would continue to be discussed at official level; he might mention also his hope that ministerial contacts would be made at a later stage. He would reserve the idea of an All-Ireland Economic Council until some breakthrough had occurred in relation to the SDLP situation. So far as the SDLP were concerned, he would mention his wish to have an early meeting with them but he would try to avoid giving the impression that he was leading them. He would do his best in his talks with the SDLP to keep them away from the influence of the IRA. He had already told them frankly that he could not condone their civil disobedience campaign - and certainly would not condone a similar campaign in the Republic. He did, however, draw distinction between civil disobedience and "passive resistance".

Mr Faulkner said the more Mr Lynch could say this in public the better. Mr Lynch said he had already made a statement condemning civil disobedience.

Mr Faulkner enquired what Mr Lynch proposed to say on security. He said he would make it clear that his Government were doing all they could and would mention the steps that had been taken to increase surveillance of explosives and to increase Border security.

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Mr Lynch and the Irish Ambassador then left for London.

The meeting continued after Mr Lynch's departure, Mr Heath being joined by the Home Secretary. Mr Heath said that he would like to arrange another meeting with Mr Faulkner fairly soon to consider the next steps to be taken in advance of the Conservative Party Conference. It would be very unfortunate if at the Conference the Northern Ireland members were to do or say anything which might create a furore.

He thought the two Governments would need to keep much more closely in touch in the future and there must be an attempt to remove any idea that every time they met there was some crisis. He hoped the meeting could be arranged next week and would propose to review both the military and the political situation. The Home Secretary would want to go over details of his meetings and perhaps make suggestions. Mr Heath added that security would be a major item and he would probably wish to have the CGS and the GOC available.

Mr Faulkner said it was hard for Northern Ireland people not to treat a meeting between him and Mr Heath as of the top importance and this tendency often led to the feeling that something critical was at issue.

The Home Secretary asked what would Mr Lynch's terms be for adopting a helpful attitude. Mr Faulkner suggested that he would want internment ended and Opposition Members into the Northern Ireland Government. Mr Heath said that this was tantamount to giving the SDLP what they wanted, in which case one would not need Mr Lynch's help. Possibly we would find that Mr Lynch, after telling the SDLP that they would not be given what they wanted on internment, might prevail on them to change their attitude. Mr Heath thought that Mr Lynch was a sufficiently practical politician to understand the difficulties of the Opposition participating in Government, and he thought too that he had been visibly taken aback when Mr Faulkner had pointed out Mr Paisley's claim to a place in the Cabinet.

Mr Faulkner said he still came back to the security situation, which was the key to the whole problem; if only the IRA could be broken up the SDLP

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ould come to the conference table more readily. Mr Heath said the whole security meeting could be fully discussed at next week's meeting.

Mr Heath asked Mr Faulkner his intentions about filling the vacancy at the Ministry of Community Relations. Mr Faulkner said he was considering bringing in Senator Norman Kennedy, a prominent trade unionist. He was a member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party and supported the constitution. Mr Heath did not think this would greatly help with the Roman Catholic community and Mr Faulkner said that Mr Kennedy had thousands of Roman Catholics behind him in the trade union movement; he was considering whether he could appoint an acceptable Roman Catholic as a Minister of State. If this proved feasible he would try to do it at the same time as the appointment of Mr Kennedy, but of course his ability to carry an appointment of this nature depended in the last resort on how co-operative his party was likely to be and this in turn was affected by their view of the security situation.

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