

FROM : A J N Tansley
British Embassy
DUBLIN

ASST/ SEC 230/2
21 FEB 1997
C.G.R.U.

466062

19 FEB 1997

ASST SEC

DATE : 18 February 1997

CC : Mr MacCabe
Ms Bharucha
Ms Fenning, RID
Mr Thomas, B&L
Mr Bell
Mr Watkins
Mr Leach
Mr Wood (L&B)
Mr Beeton
Mr Brooker, B&L
Mr Hill
Mr Perry
Mr Steele
Mr Stephens, B&L

~~to be in copy~~
2. in copy

PA-610/94
Dud 21/2
1. to Mrs McLennan - bloody body reference
2. by fax to [unclear] parents, doctors and
[unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]

DHM

CARDINAL DALY

1. Cardinal Daly was the speaker at the meeting of the Irish Association on 13 February.
2. He began by comparing the mood in Northern Ireland today to that in France at the beginning of the Second World War. The IRA had abandoned their ceasefire, but had yet to embark upon large scale military operations. He described the IRA decision to return to violence as not only reckless and dangerous, also politically inept. They had severed links between the Irish and US Governments and the Republic movement and had increased suspicions amongst unionists that the 1994 ceasefire was not genuine but merely a variation of the "armalite and ballot box" strategy. It had also intensified sectarian tension in Northern Ireland
4. Cardinal Daly went on to say that he hoped that no British government would be so foolish as to backtrack on the process which had been in train since the signature of the Anglo-Irish agreement. The 1994 ceasefire had been a momentous occasion. It would be wrong to exaggerate its significance in the evolution on republican thinking. Despite recent events, he still held out hope for a peaceful settlement. He had taken some comfort from the recent statement by the IRA that it was still committed to the search for peace and to the Sinn Fein leadership's efforts in that direction. He had also been encouraged by Adams' statements that Sinn Finn were prepared to

accept the Mitchell principles, and perceived in all this an internal debate in the republican movement about the armed struggle. He called on the two Governments to maintain contacts with Sinn Fein in the hope that this would lead to a re. oration of the ceasefire.

5. Cardinal Daly then dwelt on the position of Unionists, stressing that their fears were genuine and could not be ignored. But at the same time, Unionists had to take account of nationalists concerns. Drumcree had had severe repercussions, and had served to highlight how little progress had been made in cross-community reconciliation and the depth of sectarianism that still existed in Northern Ireland.

6. Cardinal Daly then turned his attention to the British Government, calling for action on prisoner issues, and in particular the cases of Roisin McAliskey and Danny McNamee. He also called for a more resolute and pro active response to the North Report and a full impartial investigations into the events of Bloody Sunday in the light of the new evidence which had emerged, together with a full unqualified apology for what had happened.

U 7. In the subsequent questions, Cardinal Daly was pressed harder than I would have expected from a Dublin audience on catholic sectarianism, and in particular the question of the boycott of protestant businesses. While trying to be even handed, his replies failed to satisfy the whole audience, some of whom saw an inconsistency when he claimed that it was understandable for catholics not to want to do business with Orangemen who had manned illegal checkpoints last July but did not extend the same understanding to Orangemen who objected to dealing with convicted IRA terrorists in the Garvaghy Road Residence Association. *bun an fionn As. Association audience!*

(Signed)
A J N Tansley